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This thesis proposes an extension to restorative discipline practices in order to provide 
better education for adult democratic citizenship. It argues that school discipline is subject 
to widespread misunderstanding, and that many classroom management systems fail to 
attend to a complete conception of its goals. Restorative discipline is a notable exception, 
and is currently being implemented under the policy of Positive Behaviour for Learning in 
New Zealand. Attention to the rational consideration of fairness, as well as the restoration 
of relationships that have been harmed, is argued to be educative about the justification of 
authority. Such education is a commonly neglected goal of good school discipline, as many 
classroom management systems seek to maintain order without helping pupils to 
understand why it is justified by any means other than the declaration of the person 
perceived to have power. 
Learning about why certain restrictions on one’s behaviour are fair is educative about the 
justification of social institutions in a democracy. Students who better understand how the 
authority of state institutions is grounded in more than the will of those in power are better 
prepared for engagement with adult democratic life. The consideration of fair resolutions to 
conflicts when two parties have fundamental disagreements over facts or values can 
contribute to this, and this can be discussed in restorative conversations in addition to 
considering what harm has been done. This thesis proposes greater attention in restorative 
conversations to asking what might be fair in addition to how a relationship might be 
repaired. 
This thesis draws not just on restorative theory, but also on Gutmann and Thompson’s 
deliberative model of democracy and conceptions of justice as fairness in the tradition of 
Rawls. It proposes social contract theory as a means of exploring fairness in the classroom, 
with particular attention to Gauthier’s contractarianism and Scanlon’s contractualism, and 
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This thesis makes the claim that the concept of school discipline is subject to substantial and 
widespread misunderstanding. It claims that the vast majority of the literature on classroom 
management fails to attend to educational goals intrinsic to good discipline, and that doing 
so would better prepare students for adult democratic citizenship. After identifying which 
aspects of school discipline are often neglected, this thesis addresses how they could be 
attended to, and identifies a pilot education policy in New Zealand that provides a 
significant opportunity for meeting this goal. 
This thesis proposes an extension to the education policy of Positive Behaviour for Learning 
in New Zealand. It mounts a philosophical defence of the desirability of the changes 
proposed, and then suggests a practical means by which they could be achieved. It argues 
that making such changes not only leads to better school discipline, but that good school 
discipline so construed is an important component of democratic citizenship education. 
The thesis begins with a conceptual analysis of school discipline. It evaluates different 
understandings of the term and how it is often confused with classroom management, to 
the detriment of a good understanding of what good school discipline should entail. Chapter 
one concludes by summarizing good school discipline as consisting of three goals: the 
maintenance of good order to enable learning, education about just authority, and 
developing the disposition to act in accordance with such authority. The better meeting of 
these goals drives the analysis and argument of this thesis. 
Chapter two considers how the literature on school discipline and classroom management 
almost universally fails to draw attention to goals of school discipline other than good 
classroom management, and that when it does so it presents as optional extras aspects 
which should be components of equal importance. The chapter gives close attention to 
Lewis’ The discipline dilemma (1997) as a work that recognises and highlights the problems 
the school discipline literature has in attending to a full conception of its goals, but one that 
still does not take the step of demanding equal attention to aspects of discipline that are 
commonly devolved to the judgement of individual teachers, when they should rather be  
considered necessary components. 
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The chapter goes on to examine which classroom management systems are well-placed to 
meet the broader goals of good school discipline, and concludes that restorative practices 
are pre-eminently well-placed. It concludes by outlining the shape of the argument the next 
three chapters will follow: of the social education restorative discipline already provides, 
and a means by which it could still be improved. The core proposal made is that restorative 
discipline primarily attends to empathy and the repair of emotional harm, when it would 
better aid the development of good school discipline also to give more attention to the 
rational consideration of what outcomes might be fair. 
Chapter three explores the nature of restorative discipline in detail, both theoretically and in 
its implementation. It is a relatively recent innovation, having been introduced to schools 
less than twenty years ago, and considered mainstream for still fewer. The benefits of this 
approach illustrate that there is scope for genuine progress in the development of discipline 
systems, in contrast with the slight repackaging of existing systems presented as radical 
change (as is apparent in some of the works considered in the previous chapter). This 
chapter then evaluates how New Zealand is currently implementing a policy entitled 
‘Positive Behaviour for Learning’ which involves the institution of restorative practices as 
part of its programme. It concludes that this policy looks well-matched to meeting what 
theorists of restorative discipline consider vital components of restorative implementation, 
and then makes the proposal for attention to the rational consideration of fairness in 
restorative discipline as mentioned above. 
Chapter four performs much of the theoretical work necessary to justify the claim that this 
attention to fairness is desirable for the better achievement of the goals of school discipline, 
rather than being an alternative approach that only those with a limited set of theoretical 
commitments would find desirable. It requires only the acceptance of the value of 
rationality, of the existing compulsions of certain nation-states, and the conceptual analysis 
of discipline as made in chapter one to render the proposed attention to fairness necessarily 
desirable for better education in a pluralist democracy. To do this, the chapter devotes 
significant attention to the nature and value of rationality, the distinction between morality 
and fair political authority, and the role of public institutions. It further progresses to defend 
how such improved school discipline comprises better education for democratic citizenship 
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(by the deliberative formulation of Gutmann and Thompson: 1996) and that this comprises 
good citizenship education. 
Following the establishment of the desirability of better rational education about fairness, 
chapter five introduces a family of models which can be used to better explain how conflict 
resolutions are justified in the restorative discussion of disciplinary situations. Social 
contract theories are defended as being a fitting starting point for exploring the rational 
justification of fair outcomes in a democracy, and more importantly as a simple way in to 
exploring a complex topic that is accessible to secondary-aged children, for it is to 
mainstream secondary schools that this argument is directed. Such theories can be 
introduced simply and explored to a level of depth that makes a restorative solution appear 
reasonably justified — rather than implemented by the personal authority of the teacher, 
which would undermine a central principle of restorative practices. It presents how models 
exist that can suit students with different levels of concern for the experiences of others, 
and work to develop students’ appreciation of the value of fairness from their different 
starting points. Equally importantly, it emphasises how the knowledge needed to frame 
such questioning and educational discussions is not extensive; the training required for 
effective restorative discipline is something to which the current policy under discussion has 
already committed, and to which the rational consideration of social contracts could be 
added fairly simply. 
Having made an argument for the philosophical desirability and practicality of developing 
the incoming model of restorative discipline, Chapters six to eight defend it against three 
lines of attack: from the status or rights of children, their cognitive capabilities, and the 
privileging of the rational over care-based forms of engagement. 
Chapter six addresses the claim of parents, teachers, and other adults to be able to gainsay 
a child’s right to education about principles of democracy, secularity, and justice when these 
principles conflict with their own personal views. It examines the concept of childhood, and 
the legal and philosophical grounds for the authority of parents, teachers, and other adults 
over children. It identifies significant problems with a philosophical distinction between 
these groups, and argues that a legal distinction is not a normative argument. The chapter 
fits this argument to common claims about children’s rights, and describes how faith schools 
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(and other schools which might privilege an adult’s beliefs) are not problematic for this 
argument in principle, but that there are certain conditions of equality that need to be met 
for the equal respect of young citizens and their potential development. 
Chapter seven elaborates on the issue raised in chapter five of the differing development of 
various children’s abilities to recognise the value of the interests and perspectives of others. 
It revisits Kohlberg’s seminal work on cognitive moral development and argues how both his 
theories and experimental data support the argument of this thesis. His model of cognitive 
moral development can help teachers judge how to pitch restorative discussions of fairness 
at levels that are accessible and developmental for particular students, and his data suggest 
that both pupils and teachers have the capability to benefit from this proposal. Elements of 
Kohlberg’s work are sufficiently analogous to the conversations about justice proposed here 
as to suggest that the progress he identified as resulting from developmental discussions 
may arise similarly from the discussions of fairness proposed for restorative conversations. 
Furthermore, the major criticisms and obstacles his ‘Just Communities’ faced are far less 
significant issues for discussions taking place as part of restorative discipline in a ‘Positive 
Behaviour for Learning’ framework. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the current 
policy initiative appears to be a more fertile environment for encouraging the development 
of thinking about fairness than the classrooms of Kohlberg’s initial experiments, and that 
there are additional factors to suggest that any positive developments that result are more 
likely to be persistent and sustainable. 
Chapter eight addresses the challenge from care: the position largely associated with the 
feminist argument that certain (rational) ways of thinking and relating are privileged in the 
consideration of morality, when care merits equal or greater attention. It explores the 
claims of care theories, and then clarifies a distinction between empathy and sympathy —
the former being a more emotional, the latter a more cognitive concept — in order to 
explore how both can contribute not only to moral motivation but also to the disposition to 
act in accordance with just authority that good school discipline requires. The chapter 
argues that sentimentalist approaches to morality can coexist alongside rational approaches 
to justice, and concludes that addressing both in restorative discussions makes an important 
contribution to good school discipline. 
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Overall, the thesis makes a substantial initial claim that suggests a small and nuanced 
change to school discipline policies. This change, however, is rigorously grounded and 
conceptually significant, and may have a considerable impact on the effectiveness of 
restorative communities, the quality of critical thinking skills encouraged in students, and 
their preparedness for adult democratic society. Such a change involves a degree of respect 
both for that which is rationally justifiable and for other people’s differences in belief, 
qualities which look likely to be of increasing importance in the operation of successful 
democratic societies. 
This is a thesis which begins with a conceptual analysis, and develops from it a suggestion 
for the extension of a current education policy — an extension that not only works to 
correct misconceptions about the nature of school discipline, but that also performs 
democratic citizenship education through classroom management in time which is often 
considered to have little educational value. 
This thesis does not make an explicit claim to one particular theory of learning. How 
restorative discipline leads to learning is not the focus of the thesis — and may be better 
addressed in works on standard restorative theory — but rather how a modified restorative 
discipline better models certain democratic principles and structures. There is an implicit 
social constructivism underlying much of the thesis, but forging closer ties with one 
particular theorist would not advance the core arguments, and might take on additional 
philosophical problems that are not strictly necessary through the adoption of specific 
positions. Experiencing restorative practices is considered to constitute learning. By 
involvement with elements of democratic life students become better prepared for adult 
democratic citizenship, and an argument for practical civics as citizenship education is 
mounted in chapter four. Pupils in restorative communities conduct their own rational and 
emotional explorations of how conflicts can be resolved. 
In addition to practical engagement with social contracts this thesis also argues for their 
abstract consideration, and teachers may at times be considered cognitive guides of pupils’ 
learning. Chapter seven builds on Kohlberg, who draws in turn on Piagetian stage theory, 
and the mental reframing of conflicts is encouraged to consider both whether or not a 
solution feels caring, and what outcome might be fair. Translating all such elements overtly 
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into a constructivist framework would be tangential to advancing the core argument of this 
thesis: that restorative discipline would be improved by greater attention to fairness as well 
as to empathy. 
A note on the use of examples 
This thesis makes use of thought experiments to consider situations in which the extended 
model of restorative practices proposed here may be employed. These situations are 
simplified and idealised to illustrate the key points under discussion in each example 
without introducing too many extraneous factors. Such conversations are likely to be 
significantly more complex in practice. 
The use of thought experiments is preferable here to qualitative data analysis not only 
because of their more direct address of theoretical arguments, but also because of the 
unsuitability of existing datasets for illustrating the methods described here. Examples in 
the literature illustrate standard restorative conversations rather than ones with a greater 
focus on theoretical discussions of fairness such as this thesis proposes. Examples of such 
extended restorative conversations may become available in the future, especially if this 
thesis leads in due course to a pilot implementation from which data on their practical 




Purposes and understandings of ‘school discipline’ 
This chapter explores the confusion around the concept of ‘school discipline’ and its 
purpose. It draws a distinction between discipline and classroom management, and argues 
that good school discipline entails more than the maintenance of classroom order alone. 
Explaining and justifying the grounds for authority in disciplinary situations can increase 
engagement and is more socially educative for students than its unexplained imposition. 
These concepts are then contrasted with understandings of discipline and classroom 
management held by teachers and the general public, which are sometimes incoherent and 
can suggest the employment of practices in contradiction with an individual’s wider 
educational goals. The chapter concludes with three goals it is desirable for school discipline 
to achieve: the maintenance of good order to enable learning, education about just 
authority, and developing the disposition to act in accordance with such authority. This 
informs the critical reading of the literature on school discipline and classroom management 
methods that follows in chapter two. 
Differing conceptions of discipline and its purposes 
Discussion of school discipline is complicated by a lack of clarity over what the concept 
involves. Different professionals’ understandings of what discipline and behaviour 
management should involve can be contradictory and incomplete. While they are far from a 
philosophical analysis, dictionary definitions highlight consistent themes and ambiguities in 
common English usage of the term. A classic English set of definitions might include the 
following under the uses of ‘discipline’: 
 To train by instruction and exercise; drill.  
 To bring to a state of order and obedience by training and control.  
 To punish or penalize in order to train and control; correct; chastise. 
(‘Discipline’, 2016) 
The thread of control is clear. None of the definitions has a focus upon the mind of the 
recipient, or the ability to make active choices. They appear to treat the recipient more as 
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the object of an action than a participant in a developmental process. These are also all 
understandings that are enacted from an external locus of power, as apart from ‘self-
discipline’. Indeed, in teacher conversations, it is all too frequent to hear discipline referred 
to as something done to others, rather than as a collegial endeavour. 
When used in partnership with school, as ‘school discipline’, one might expect a much-
reduced set of possible definitions, primarily related to the maintenance of good order in 
the school or classroom. This is somewhat language specific: native speakers consider the 
German word ‘Disziplin’ to have much more focus on the internal quality of self-discipline, 
highlighting the overlap of these ideas in concepts of classroom and behaviour management 
(Teschers, C., personal communication, 2013). 
Ambiguous terms can lead to different applications of the same concept in different 
situations. When the goal of discipline in the classroom is unclear it becomes even harder to 
make progress in debates on the best policies to support it. 
There is a confusion of purpose at the heart of the theory and practice of classroom 
management: does it aim towards responses and behaviours to be trained, consequent 
ends to be achieved, or some developmentally educative purpose? These are all tied in 
various ways to different conceptions of discipline. The moral purposes a practitioner may 
hold for their teaching may be in contradiction with regularly occurring actions they take, or 
at the very least philosophically inconsistent (Butchart & McEwan, 1998). Classroom 
management actions can become so routine that this tension is taken for granted, rendering 
reflective progress more difficult. Such issues are not addressed by practically-focused 
guides that feature little philosophical content — and many guides aimed at practising 
teachers fit this description, sacrificing conceptual exposition for clarity and a focus on 
technique. 
Many narratives, particularly guides to ‘practical skills’, refer to discipline when they mean 
punishment for enforcement. A selection of these will be considered below. Works which 
address discipline as a separate concept feature a range of different understandings of what 
it entails. The following authors are representative of key positions on discipline that are in 
tension or wholly incompatible with each other. Goodman (2006) writes with a focus on 
discipline in relation to a structure of school rules. This article is an exemplar of a 
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philosophical approach to discipline that considers the scope of possible definitions, and yet 
still focuses primarily on considerations of rules and order to the detriment of other aspects 
of discipline that this thesis shall highlight. Goodman recognises that different concepts are 
addressed by the term, and puts forward three justifications given for discipline: that it is 
part of becoming a good thinker; that it leads to order, which finds justification in its 
consequent enabling of learning; or that discipline is an independent good in itself. She 
demonstrates a nuanced understanding of the social effects of classroom management 
policies, but adopts a practical definition of discipline as related to sanctions to secure 
submission to rules (with the understanding that this leads to skills and subject knowledge). 
This understanding of discipline has a storied history in the philosophy of education. Peters 
(1976) supported the ‘rules’ conception, which was fairly typical of the period in which he 
was writing. Much of Peters’ work was focused on the development of the analytic 
philosophy of education, in which particular attention is given to precision in the 
understanding of words and concepts. It is understandable, therefore, that his analysis 
carried considerable weight. It is a comparatively recent development in mainstream 
practice for schools to be considered as anything other than institutions where teachers 
transmit their knowledge to the young, and where they have the right to maintain order by 
force.1 This is not to suggest that Peters was promoting the obedience of the Victorian era. 
He carefully distinguished concepts of discipline and punishment, and would have been well 
aware that Dewey rejected discipline as submission to legitimate authority as an end in 
itself. For Peters it was rather the goods that discipline enabled that gave it justification. To 
claim that discipline as obedience to rules is good because it engenders good outcomes 
requires that the principles behind the rules being followed are good. This is a claim which 
one may be uncomfortable to make for all institutions in a pluralist climate when schools 
can promote widely differing values. Peters recognised the imprecision around the concept 
of discipline (‘discipline is a very general notion connected to conforming to rules’: 1970, p. 
267) and wrote in greater detail about the justification of punishment, but observed that 
discipline is directed towards the establishment of order to enable the progress of learning 
(p. 266) and necessarily requires submission to rules or some kind of order (p. 267), whether 
                                                        
1
 While theorists of education have proposed alternatives to such a model throughout the history of writing on 
the subject, it has persisted as a mainstream public understanding of the school in practice. 
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rules of an academic field, a method of study, or some external environmental factor that 
enables learning. Peters observed the distinction between internally and externally imposed 
discipline, and the benefit for the authority of a teacher of getting pupils to identify with the 
aims of a school (p. 258), both considerations on which this thesis’ argument shall build. 
Foucault’s analysis of the school as a disciplinary institution (1975/1995) has significantly 
affected the understanding of the term, and it is important to clarify that this is quite a 
different understanding of discipline from that which shall be adopted here. There is lexical 
overlap of the terms because of the traditional understanding of discipline as obedience 
that this chapter challenges. Foucault’s discipline consists of a series of techniques by which 
institutions exercise power to control bodies and order them for the efficient performance 
of tasks. In their moulding of students to enter society and the workforce, schools are a 
fertile ground for such an analysis. Addressing non-Foucauldian uses of the term ‘discipline’ 
does not entail disagreement with his analysis, rather a focus on positive understandings of 
discipline towards which educators would be happy to claim they strive. This includes 
educators who consider good education to be enabling individuals’ own conceptions of their 
development, rather than fitting them for tasks in modern industrialised society and 
beyond. Foucault’s discipline works to create ‘docile bodies’, a goal which can work in 
harmony with securing submission to rules in the school. This does not, however, optimally 
enable learning if one accepts that enlisting a student’s intrinsic motivation is a factor that 
makes a positive contribution. 
Foucault deploys Bentham’s panopticon2 to illustrate how the ‘unequal gaze’ can support 
the efficient completion of desired tasks. When individuals (such as students in school) are 
aware that they may be being observed, but unaware of whether or not they are being 
watched at any given moment, they act as though they are being monitored at all times. In a 
school context, the student’s internalisation of being subject to power can aid the efficient 
management of classroom order but at the cost of aspects of freedom that many teachers 
would value in their classroom. Of the concepts of discipline addressed here, Foucault’s 
discipline sits most easily with the maintenance of order to enable learning. Good school 
discipline, however, shall be argued to entail more than this, including aspects such as a 
                                                        
2
 In an institution built to such a model, one authority figure is able to observe any or all of the inmates at any 
time without them being aware of whether or not they are being watched. 
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critical awareness of the exercise of power that do not sit easily with an authoritarian 
environment. As a description of many school environments, Foucault’s analysis of 
disciplinary power is accurate and revealing, considering the effects of hierarchical 
observation, normalizing judgement, and examination. It is not, however, a description of a 
virtue that individuals would be happy to internalise as part of their own individual self-
discipline. There are two different concepts being addressed here: Foucault’s discipline 
resembles the force of a malevolent hidden curriculum, rather than the ‘good school 
discipline’ a head teacher would be happy to approve in his or her school prospectus. 
Snook (2003) makes a further distinction between two different concepts both present in 
non-Foucauldian understandings of discipline in schools. He describes discipline as both the 
means by which rules can be enforced and also as obedience to relevant rules (pp. 111–2). 
This separates the internal and external forces both present in the concept: discipline can 
denote both pressure from another to act in a certain way and the pressure which one 
comes to apply to oneself if well-disciplined. Snook argues that genuine commitment leads 
to self-discipline: pupils in schools may not have this, as they have often not made a 
conscious choice to be there for themselves, and so he consequently allows for and 
distinguishes between external and internal discipline as separated above. If a person knows 
what he or she should do, but does not act accordingly, then he or she is poorly disciplined 
and educative or retributive sanctions can then be adopted. 
These two concepts under the term of discipline may still lead to confusion, but good 
‘school discipline’ can be a unified concept that attends to both. An educational 
environment can attempt to promote the development of self-discipline in pupils while at 
the same time providing external conditions that incentivise acting in accordance with such 
a quality. Snook also notes that while discipline is probably the more important concept to 
discuss, punishment tends to receive more attention in the philosophy of education (p. 
114). Works addressing both can neglect to make this important distinction, or focus 
primarily on a Foucauldian understanding of discipline because of its clear links with 
punishment as a force to shape those subject to it (e.g. Marshall & Marshall, 1997). 
Wilson (1981) conducts a careful examination of different conceptions of discipline that 
highlights a key feature of internal (self-)discipline. He contends that there is confusion and 
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misunderstanding over discipline and moral education, and opts for a definition of discipline 
as ‘obedience to established and legitimate authorities as such’ (p.30). This is a key 
distinction: not obedience per se, but combined with a critical eye on the legitimacy of the 
request for it. Wilson highlights the importance of accepting rules not due to incentives or 
force but due to conscious respect for the rules themselves. He draws comparison to the 
better-disciplined subject willingly giving obedience, in contrast to an ill-disciplined soldier 
muttering about rules but following them anyway (p. 38). This respect for the legitimacy of 
the authority can be considered in the classroom, where order supported by some 
peripheral factor such as a personal liking for the teacher might not be considered good 
discipline. This conception suggests some classroom management systems may be better 
than others at promoting discipline in how they obtain their results, and this shall be 
addressed shortly. It also provides grounds for comparative evaluation of culturally-tailored 
classroom management practice: Noblit (1993), Delpit (1995) and others have written about 
the benefits of demonstrating personal authority, more than the authority of one's position, 
in working with African American communities. By this argument, such an approach may be 
attending less well to the development of pupils’ self-discipline unless the authority of the 
teacher is clearly justified. Working in a culturally-responsive manner can be done with 
attention to the development of self-discipline, but it is much harder when one is not clear 
what the concept entails. 
The argument of this thesis will build on this somewhat neglected aspect of Wilson’s 
analysis, and consider a well-disciplined individual to be one who understands and accepts 
legitimate authority; the better they follow it, the better self-disciplined they are. 
When speaking of groups, somewhat military connotations of 'disciplined' to mean 
‘controlled’ or ‘kept in line’ may readily come to mind. Wilson’s position can be developed 
to explore how the term ‘well-disciplined’ can vary in meaning depending on the size of the 
group being described. It illustrates how ambiguities in colloquial speech can hinder the 
construction of a clear, shared understanding of a concept, as follows. 
A ‘well-disciplined’ individual: When not used to describe one who is slavishly obedient, this 
is usually a description used for someone doing what is necessary to achieve a longer-term 
16 
 
goal. Obedience to legitimate authority can be understood as a part of this, with a necessary 
intermediate stage having ‘authority’ over the completion of a dependent goal. 
A ‘well-disciplined’ individual (as part of a group): This may entail further meaning in 
addition to the above, with a focus on being attentive to the restrictions on one’s own 
permitted actions for the better effectiveness of the group. Such an individual is thus at 
least tacitly accepting the group's goal: a threatened or cowed individual is not well-
disciplined. In the context of wider society, if an individual considers a secular government 
to hold just authority then that individual can be considered well-disciplined if he or she 
accepts certain restrictions that the state places on an individual’s actions, such as the 
requirement not to act in accordance with a personal belief if such action violates the law. 
Obedience only to just authorities requires an understanding of which authorities are just. 
Consequently, schools need to educate pupils on how to evaluate whether authority is just 
in order to enable them to be well-disciplined. This is therefore an important component of 
good school discipline, and shall be expanded upon as this thesis progresses. 
Usage of the phrase ‘well-disciplined individual’ can seem to carry some implications of ‘one 
who obeys effectively’. This suggests that a move away from using the term ‘discipline’ 
might be beneficial, concentrating instead on its component aspects. Thus far in the school 
context these appear to be external inducements to behaviour that develops self-discipline, 
and adherence to just authority, which requires a developed awareness of what authorities 
are just. These can be recast as three key components of good school discipline: the 
maintenance of good order to enable learning, education about just authority, and 
developing the disposition to act in accordance with such authority. In evaluating the 
success of various systems of classroom management in promoting good school discipline, 
this thesis shall consider whether they promote the achievement of all of these goals. 
When discussing a well-disciplined member of a group, the legitimacy of the group’s 
authority may be being presumed. The subject's discipline is to their place in the structure, 
and the legitimacy of the structure is often not examined when discipline is discussed 
colloquially. Better school discipline, entailing better education about just authority, would 
aim to challenge such presumptions. 
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A ‘well-disciplined’ group: This is a group that works together, obeying the authority held to 
be the relevant, local source of just authority. Understanding the source of such authority is 
critical to evaluating whether a group is well-disciplined to a just cause, or marshalled to an 
unjust one. In the classroom, pupils typically understand such authority to be inherent in the 
teacher's role and instructions, rather than from the learning which the teacher's 
instructions are meant to enable or from the improvements in society such learning is 
intended to bring about (Nucci, 2009). This is an understanding that develops with age, and 
can be developed in older students by the way teachers engage in school discipline. Most 
young children will process adults as having fiat power, and obey because the adult said so. 
Older teenagers may be more invested in enabling their learning, or achieving social 
outcomes they desire. This understanding can be developed beyond making simple 
assumptions that the current extent of the authority of the person in office is justified, and 
later sections of this thesis attend to how this goal can be addressed as part of classroom 
management practice. 
With a poorly-understood concept communicative accuracy is important, and usage of the 
term ‘discipline’ may be impeding the development of clearer understanding of what this 
field should involve. When attempting to communicate effectively, individuals ought to 
allow for what meaning they expect others to draw from a choice of word or phrase. 
Relevance Theory in linguistic pragmatics describes how an audience, in searching for 
meaning in any communication, will process possibilities as far as is necessary to meet their 
standards of relevance, and then stop (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Consequently, speakers 
may assume they are aiming for similar goals when they agree on an umbrella term such as 
‘good discipline’ even though their understandings of features beyond the most central may 
be radically different. Beyond an utterance itself, expected referents are also similarly 
subject to presumptions according to what a particular party perceives to be relevant. This 
explains how much disagreement or confusion can go unnoticed when two parties discuss 
someone who is ‘well-disciplined’, and unrecognised differences can develop. Even if 
interlocutors share an understanding that the relevant authority ought to be just, the 
identity of that authority is not established and both parties can understand it to be a 
different entity. In verbal communication, groups with unjust authority thus are likely 
continue to be described as ‘well-disciplined’ without their justification being considered 
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sufficiently salient to the definition. This suggests using unambiguous terminology wherever 
possible. 
In school discussions, there is potential for confusion as different teachers can consider 
there to be different grounds for just authority. A well-disciplined pupil could be such both 
on the grounds of respecting the legitimate authority of a teacher and of being committed 
to the learning involved in being a pupil. The two overlap here as the teacher's authority 
may be argued to come from the fact that they enable the learning, which further explains 
why some of the conceptual confusion exists. This seems all the more reason for clarity to 
be desirable in education on just authority. 
In conclusion, when considering the importance of just authority, obedience seems less of a 
central requirement to discipline than Wilson considers it to be. He encourages an element 
of prompt obedience to authority (Wilson, 1981, p. 43) when this authority might merit 
questioning. Obedience can still be prompt, but given to someone one has judged to have 
authority in relevant domains. Practically, one does not evaluate the authority of a trusted 
source at every moment, and consequently in many cases there is nothing wrong with a 
default attitude of trust towards a teacher. However, Wilson's broader embrace of 
obedience is more prone to be understood as including an unhelpful element of the 
'control' sense of discipline as a common cause of such collaboration. When just authority is 
established, obeying it can be well-disciplined, but the swiftest response includes elements 
of both acceptance and conditioning. Both may be present in the common understanding of 
the term, and there is benefit to their separation. 
Thus an examination of the concept of discipline that considers just authority exposes that 
less focus should be placed on rules themselves, rather on their sound justification. It 
undermines traditional force-based methods of classroom control when they do not have 
justified grounds, as their end is not the creation of a well-disciplined environment as 
understood in more depth. Aspects of discipline can be educational objectives in their own 
right, and not just facilitators for education. As this thesis continues it will explore how 
these educational goals might better be met. Discussion of ‘good school discipline’ can be 
prone to misunderstandings, and it would enable clearer progress to address the three key 
components isolated above instead: the maintenance of good order to enable learning, 
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education about just authority, and developing the disposition to act in accordance with 
such authority. The next section shall suggest a further reason it would be beneficial to do 
this, as substituting goals of good discipline with consideration of ‘classroom management’ 
is likely to lead to some of these goals being neglected and for this to go largely unnoticed. 
Returning to the everyday understanding of ‘discipline’, it is specifically helpful to refer to 
Wikipedia here because of its ‘community’ editorial procedure. Iterative revision will tend to 
settle on a core on which the community of editors agree. The article on child discipline 
claims that ‘While the purpose of child discipline is to develop and entrench desirable social 
habits in children, the ultimate goal is to foster sound judgement and morals so the child 
develops and maintains self discipline throughout the rest of his/her life’ (‘Child discipline’, 
2016). It recognises the concept contains something of social education, of prompt response 
(habit), of judgement (whether authority is just) and also something about moral education, 
which this thesis shall go on to distinguish carefully from education about just political 
authority. It is child-focused, and concerns their development. After detailed and repeated 
consideration, the global consensus is very close to that which is developed here — and 
considerably distant from the everyday usage of the term.3 
Discipline and classroom management, and their justifications 
‘Classroom management’ is a term often used to describe teachers’ actions aimed at 
establishing either order or some broader conception of discipline in the classroom. This 
section considers whether attending to classroom management instead of considering a 
wider understanding of discipline neglects some of the important goals revealed by the 
analysis above. It concludes that classroom management approaches alone tend towards 
providing practical toolkits, and tend not to consider the justification of authority. This 
omission addresses fewer educational goals than attending to a broader conception of 
discipline. 
Recent manuals on classroom management have moved away from the word ‘discipline’, 
which has come to sound archaic and early twentieth century in all but the most traditional 
                                                        
3
 Such a consensus is an example of the promise of using the best of public reasoning to solve disputes, an idea 
which shall be explored in depth in later sections of this thesis. 
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British English. One distinction unhelpfully masked by the language change is the loss of the 
moral dimension allowed for by the word ‘discipline’: ‘classroom management’ is a specific 
set of skills, and that these skills must be used is presumed, so the moral question is 
avoided. 
The history of specific developments in classroom management is marked with major 
milestones and theoretical shifts, and has been given book-length treatments. Often such 
histories are student texts (such as Scarlett, Ponte and Singh: 2009), or a precursor to an 
author’s own project and preferred approach. Summaries of the history of discipline and 
classroom management in New Zealand specifically are given in Marshall and Marshall 
(1997) and Macfarlane (2007), while a volume edited by Evertson and Weinstein (2006) 
summarises many contemporary issues. Specific systems of classroom management and 
their suitability for promoting good school discipline are addressed in chapter two. There is, 
however, no overriding theme or consensus in the summary literature of what the most 
effective systems are, and much less on the theoretical assumptions they should 
encapsulate. Differing cultural contexts have some responsibility for this,4 along with a 
willingness to devolve decisions to those with experience in a specific environment, but this 
lack of a consistent philosophical base is not always accompanied by an acknowledgement 
of the importance of the issue, including by those with the expertise to write comparatively 
about the whole field of school discipline and classroom management. Books in the 
behaviourist mould such as the works of Canter and Canter (1993) describe an ends-focused 
approach that handily illustrates the belief that discipline is to enable the delivery of 
learning, rather than that teachers are taking responsibility for the developing of specific 
qualities in their students. Marland (1993) and Cowley (2006) are examples of works of 
methodological guidance aimed at an audience of teaching practitioners. Intended to be 
useful and practical, by writing from within a system they still reveal to the attentive reader 
where its boundaries are. Swift solutions to short-term problems are understandably 
popular with overstressed teachers, but the potential philosophical inconsistencies 
highlighted above may serve to hinder the achievement of their own broader educational 
goals. This is not a criticism of these works in themselves, nor of their aim to give detailed 
                                                        
4
 The final section of Evertson and Weinstein (2006) covers six examples of this, and practical guidance for 
dealing with such is given in chapter nine of Scarlett, Ponte and Singh (2009). 
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practical advice (at which they often succeed from their own particular perspectives); it is 
rather an attempt to highlight the danger of concentrating on the practical and tactical level 
when the strategic picture is unclear — a danger that can potentially undermine one’s 
whole educative mission by following such anti-reflective descriptions as ‘matching the 
behaviour management theory you learned in college with the reality of being in the 
classroom’ (Cowley, 2006). 
Reflecting their purpose, the above works are often light on their justification, focusing 
instead on practical techniques and either assuming knowledge thereof or neglecting it 
entirely. The maintenance of order through classroom management is not too complex to 
justify through the enabling of learning — a core function of schools. This does not, 
however, attend to broader developmental aspects of discipline. A productive approach to 
considering the justification of such activities will be reflecting on classroom management as 
a subset of broader restrictions: namely, why there should be limits on individuals’ actions 
or preferences when they conflict with those of others. Later chapters in this thesis will 
explore principles of co-operation and fairness in greater depth; for the question at hand it 
is instructive to look at how deeply the authors of works on classroom management seek to 
justify their goals. 
Many take tacit justification from the current status quo of compulsory education. 
Mandatory school attendance is predicated on a belief in the importance of certain goals, 
rights, or values. If these have trumped the student's right to make autonomous decisions 
about their attendance, it is likely that the same arguments would be used to justify actions 
to better enable the achievement of these goals, and thus the question of how classroom 
management is justified is subordinated to a larger question of compulsion in education 
(which shall be addressed in later chapters of this thesis). This runs a significant risk, as 
introduced above, of both obscuring existing moral failings and leaving teachers without 
easy recourse to justify their actions to non-compliant pupils. Obedience-based approaches 
can clearly fall prey to this criticism: whether seeking to find the right 
authoritative/authoritarian balance, or masking coercion with choices and 'natural' 
consequences, the discussion is typically one level removed from an overall goal of good 
discipline, concentrating rather on increasing a reader’s efficiency at maintaining order for 
whatever their consequent goals may be. Furthermore, there is also nothing inherent to 
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many ecological or context-responsive approaches that compels exploring any deeper 
justification for order-maintenance activities. As Butchart (1998) argues, we should not ask 
what works — all manner of barbarity 'works' for sufficiently reductive goals — but rather 
ask to achieve what ends, or with what consequences? One end can be the maintenance of 
order, but there are other ends; and there will be side effects to approaches to classroom 
management aiming solely at that. The inadequacy of such approaches is further explored in 
the next chapter to highlight the contrast with school discipline systems that aim for goals 
beyond the simple maintenance of order. 
If school attendance were voluntary,5 it would be easier to conceive of a lively discussion 
over the justification of enforced order in the classroom. One would need to consider for 
what reasons students were attending, and what classroom conditions and regulations 
would best help them achieve their goals. Some of these goals would come into conflict 
with the goals of other individuals. One would then have to argue which goals should take 
precedence, and why. Actions which disrupt learning in the classroom may be considered of 
subordinate priority to actions which support meeting goals that school attendance is 
primarily considered to serve. The preferences, beliefs, and moral perspectives of various 
parties can be considered. One could argue from the cost of lost opportunities — students 
can socialise loudly in a number of environments, but the opportunity to learn French 
effectively afforded by a knowledgeable teacher is less available elsewhere. The collective 
preference of the people in the room may be for that end to be achieved.6 Perhaps some 
compromise would be reached, allowing for the importance to the individual of certain 
types of play. If students' voices are given value, even to a limited degree, different moral 
perspectives can be considered and the justification for classroom management can be 
better understood. A more open approach to the justification of classroom behaviour 
management can enable pupils to better understand it, and thus exhibit good discipline in 
obedience to it, rather than merely responding to coercion. These are questions of justice 
                                                        
5 For practical purposes, one can build a strong argument here even if school attendance is compulsory by 
locating the compulsion outside the realm that teachers can reasonably address: for example, building on 
‘because your parents make you come to school’. Transparency is, however, more educative about adult 
society, as this thesis shall go on to argue. 
6
 The issue of preference in a given moment, when one might be in an altered emotional state, compared to 
one’s reflective preference at leisure is one that troubles issues around consent and consequence in all 




and conflict resolution, and this thesis develops an argument that learning about these in 
school is better preparation for life in adult democratic society. 
Following the above argument, classroom management approaches which place order 
above almost all else are not ideal — and yet the most ‘practical’ behaviourist guides eclipse 
more thoughtful systems in popularity and public consciousness. When even books that 
provide an overview of the whole field of classroom management do not highlight the 
importance of factors other than order in the classroom, it is no surprise that some 
teachers’ understandings of good discipline are limited to the practical maintenance of 
order. Conflating the concept of classroom management with attention to discipline can 
licence an overly reductive approach to discipline that only addresses the maintenance of 
order, which is not only insufficient but also masks its being so by narrowing the target to 
something more technical and easily measurable, yet incomplete. 
One might argue that traditional references to discipline can be just as prone to a reductive 
focus on behaviour. Even when reading a work with a traditional focus on discipline as rules 
and control, however, one may still draw an understanding of school discipline that allows 
for discipline to include broader goals than the necessarily reductive focus of classroom 
management. Goodman’s (2006) theoretical analysis of discipline considers it to lie closely 
to conceptions of rules and classroom management. In ‘School Discipline in Moral Disarray’, 
she claims that: 
School discipline appears to rest on three justifications: 
 Discipline is intrinsic to academic mastery, embedded in the learning 
process itself. 
 It establishes order in the classroom and order is the gateway for 
learning. 
 It is an independent good – no school discipline, no obedience, no 
self-discipline. 
(Goodman, 2006) 
How can discipline as supported by school disciplinary codes, as is Goodman's focus, still be 
read to entail the conception of discipline as adherence to just authority? 
1) Discipline as intrinsic to academic learning. When recast as 'rules for how to learn', which 
is what the context suggests, these rules are domain specific: good discipline for learning 
will be different in different fields of study. If one’s moral code contains any degree of 
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consequentialism it is thus impossible to consider discipline for learning always to be good, 
as one could be disciplined within a system that does not work for the greater good. 
Discipline can support effective schooling, but the moral status of that rests on effective 
schooling being a good, and some environments may lead to outcomes which are not. The 
justification of the learning taking place is important, and pupils who better understand and 
accept this demonstrate better self-discipline. 
One can draw support from Dewey (1913) here. For Dewey, interest is the link between an 
individual having the means to act, and the undertaking of the action. Goodman quotes that 
for Dewey this is ‘inseparable from the interest and attention a child brings to an 
endeavour’ (Goodman, 2006). Conceptions of discipline as punishment do not promote 
interest in learning, and without interest a pupil lacks the drive to transform his or her 
means to act into action.  If understanding and intrinsic motivation lead to better self-
discipline in education, a system that encourages these is better than a simple behaviourist 
‘management’ system of incentives and sanctions alone for promoting learning in schools. 
Disciplinary resolutions are better when explained, so that pupils are not merely subject to 
them but feel some engagement with and motivation from a system which justifies them. 
2) Establishing order in the classroom to enable learning. In context, this is not intended to 
be entirely a description of externally imposed order for the sake of management, but 
rather as a gateway to further virtuous and desirable outcomes, which are justified on their 
own merits. This fits well as an element of a full conception of discipline, though not as the 
whole of it. 
3) Discipline as an independent good. Goodman is considering disciplinary rules here, and it 
is a small step from ‘rules justified by order...to rules justified for their own sake’. This is an 
uncomfortable conclusion, for a number of reasons. She reminds us that ‘The infusion of 
school rules with elevated moral status was central to Durkheim’s classic work on school 
discipline’ (Durkheim, 1925/1961). Durkheim considers some restraint of natural impulses 
as a good in itself. If one believes that submission to political authority when it goes against 
one’s individual will is good, then there is traction in this: as discussed above, well-
disciplined individuals are able to act in ways that do not accord with their own immediate 
desires. Yet it is only political authority, rather than mere force, when it is justified: 
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consequently, this notion of discipline still requires one to be able to evaluate the 
justification of the demands made of oneself. Durkheim's notion of being effectively 
autonomous while under the control of rules requires specific attention to how 
independent one must be to be considered autonomous. This complex topic is addressed in 
greater detail in later chapters with discussion of children’s rights and liberal conceptions of 
the individual. 
Discipline so considered as an independent good seems intuitively questionable as while 
obedience to good rules may be good, not all rules are good rules. Obedience in itself may 
not be a desirable quality due to its context dependence: the moral worth of obedience 
depends on what it is to which one is obedient. Submission to sanctions becomes the focus 
in practice when obedience to rules is itself considered a virtue, and this can lead to a focus 
on gaining compliance rather than on examining or explaining the justification for a ruling. 
Much conflict can arise in the classroom in response to requests for compliance that appear 
to be unjustified. The encouragement of understanding needs to come in tandem with the 
maintenance of classroom order. 
In summary, a system that is able to explain the justification of rules rather than attempting 
to elicit unquestioning obedience promotes better discipline in students. A good model of 
school discipline should not only maintain order, but also serve an educative function. This 
thesis shall go on to explore how a conception of discipline where rulings are explained and 
justified serves as better preparation for adult democratic life. Classroom management is a 
part of effective school discipline, but should not be confused for the whole of it. 
Many good classroom management practices do not need to be applied in a context where 
order is almost the only goal. Attention to developmental goals of discipline is not 
necessarily impractical. Reminding pupils of a previously-resolved and temporarily-forgotten 
focus, diverting interruptions, or heading off conflict need not solely be techniques for 
attaining temporary peace. A swift reminder of a rule can refresh an existing understanding 
of a principle. This thesis argues that attempts to elicit desired responses without aiming to 
engage intrinsic motivation are a poor approximation of good school discipline. One can add 
explanation for pupils of why particular rules are good. Teachers can explain why order 
leads to learning, and highlight that goal, rather than focusing on order without justification. 
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Although such a position differs substantially from Goodman’s on the value of simple 
obedience, there is common ground to be found on an argument for presenting publicly 
justifiable positions in conflict resolution. She writes that: 
Discipline policies are weakly linked to the moral and educational purposes 
of schooling … (and) 
 
Going public with the moral goals of education would afford students the 
opportunity to align themselves with moral purposes now obscure. Without 
such an alignment, students are likely to perceive much of school authority 
as illegitimate, punishment as undeserved, and obedience as involuntary. 
(Goodman, 2006) 
Consequently, presenting the justification for discipline might be desirable even for those 
solely committed to classroom management, as authority which appears justified incites 
less rebellion than arbitrary coercion. 
Common conceptions of discipline and classroom management 
With so much difference to be found between those making a serious moral and conceptual 
investigation of school discipline, one might expect great degrees of separation between the 
positions held by working classroom professionals where thinking seriously about such 
things is usually not the primary concern. A practical focus on improving school discipline 
needs to consider teachers’ approaches to the problem: while important, an ever finer 
dissection of concepts in contemporary journals will likely have less impact on lives than 
communicating a strong and nuanced understanding to those interacting with children 
every day in schools. Consequently, these next sections examine both how the general 
public and the teaching profession understand school discipline, and how specific models 
may promote greater clarity around authority and conflict resolution in the classroom. 
Measuring the ‘public understanding’ is not precise; representative samples are only 
representative according to the variables considered significant, and only provide a 
snapshot from which extrapolations can be made. Nonetheless, one can be aware that 
some groups may be disproportionately featured and draw conclusions accordingly. 
Similarly, coverage in the popular press does not represent a ‘general’ view, but at least 
enables a reader to examine the terms in which discipline is discussed in one sphere of 
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public discourse, while acknowledging that the understandings many people have of it may 
well be significantly different. 
There are many outside the education sector who primarily want teachers to instil quiet 
obedience into children: they trust education, as they variously understand it, to take place 
in schools as long as attention is being paid to the teaching. The banking concept of 
education7 is still alive in the public consciousness, and this may seem to require only what 
is distinguished above as classroom management rather than a fuller understanding of 
school discipline. News directed at the public focuses on current issues such as policy reform 
and local change rather than overarching questions of the nature of education and key goals 
it ought to achieve. This enables such outdated understandings to linger on longer than they 
otherwise might. 
Much of the debate in New Zealand over the last fifty years has been over the subordinate 
question of whether or not ‘discipline’ (meaning punishment) should be physically imposed. 
One does not have to look far into the past to find the adage ‘spare the rod and spoil the 
child’ in regular use, and a few months’ attention to newspaper editorials would reveal that 
the recent anti-smacking legislation in New Zealand is not universally popular (‘Anti-
Smacking Polls : Family First NZ’, 2014; ‘Opinion: Anti-smacking law still fails children, 2015; 
‘Spanking Can Be an Appropriate Form of Child Discipline, 2014). There remains an abiding 
belief that physical interference from an authorised third party is not acceptable, but 
parents are somehow exempted from this — alongside a hostility towards other parties 
participating in the social correction of one’s children (‘When Another Parent Disciplines 
Your Child’, 2011). Existing conventions and power structures often go unchallenged, and 
may be at odds with the principles of governments and social structures established to 
manage adult societies. Identifying the infinite sources of influence upon socially-embedded 
individuals is an impossible task, but some parties typically enjoy public sanction of greater 
levels of authority over children, such as parents by relation, or teachers by their role in the 
education system. This influence over children’s lives is an area where greater precision and 
justification in public discourse8 would be helpful, as it may be accepted as the status quo 
rather than its justification being questioned — similarly to the idea of school discipline, and 
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 In which teachers actively deposit knowledge into passive students’ minds (Freire, 1968/2000) 
8 This concept shall be explored in chapter four, alongside its role in democratic processes. 
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how it may be discussed by two parties with very different conceptions of what it entails but 
believing they are discussing the same thing. Chapter six will address these concerns of 
adult authority over children in further detail. 
Such traditional physical approaches to discipline and classroom management may be 
supported by the inertia of established methods and attitudes, by the concerns of practical 
convenience outweighing those of empathy, or simply as the most practical way of getting 
the measurable outcomes beloved of politicians. If it would be wrong for a group of adults 
with similar capabilities to children to be institutionalised and physically punished, then for 
children to be considered a special exception there needs to be a specific argument 
contingent on their childhood. Existing practice or the power to do so without retaliation 
are not compelling reasons in isolation. Teacher education can productively touch on moral 
issues such as these; the argument affects the lives of many vulnerable children, and a legal 
or de facto compulsion is less convincing than one with an intrinsic justification an individual 
accepts. Discussion of whether discipline and punishment should be physical or not misses 
the deeper point that the immediate targets of maintaining order or achieving short-term 
goals are only part of a complete conception of classroom management, let alone the 
development of discipline. 
There has not been a large scale survey of teachers’ opinions on the meaning and purpose 
of discipline since Wilson’s Discipline and moral education: A survey of public opinion and 
understanding (1981). Specifically related phenomena have been addressed, such as how 
idealism and theory-orientation9 in new teachers reduce in the first few years after 
qualification, but not positions concerning the theory and justification of classroom 
management itself. Wilson provides quantitative data to highlight how people’s conceptions 
of discipline at that time mostly focused on good order imposed via a top-down structure, 
with more abstract and liberal views increasingly apparent in accordance with progression 
along a continuum of age and theoretical engagement: from young children to older 
children, adults, classroom teachers, head teachers, and university researchers respectively. 
When staffroom discussions focus on immediate problems and effective maintenance of a 
quiet environment, the commercial ‘toolkit’ approaches can seem an ideal solution, 
                                                        
9 Which may support careful consideration of what good discipline entails. 
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regardless of their theoretical underpinnings, or lack thereof. Without an awareness of 
broader goals of discipline beyond classroom management, teachers’ interests in simple 
classroom order are not fully aligned with the developmental interests of children, as order 
may come at the cost of other important aspects of discipline such as developing intrinsic 
desire to engage with one’s learning. Even when teachers are engaged with the rationale for 
a particular approach to classroom management, they may not be fully aware of what 
philosophies their chosen models are designed to support. Thus, even when attempting to 
act in line with a specific philosophy, their disciplinary actions can undermine the messages 
they are trying to convey elsewhere — and due to the disconnect between disciplinary 
theory and practical works on classroom management they may not become aware of how 
their efforts in one domain might be being undercut by well-intentioned efforts in another. 
Furthermore, this is besides the practical concern that teachers may often not have the time 
or energy to look beyond achieving an ordered day in the classroom, and to consider or care 
about issues of philosophical consistency. 
A clear understanding of what discipline entails could be a great help to teachers’ 
consciousness of why they are carrying out certain classroom management actions, rather 
than their maintenance of authority becoming mere habit. This can be helpful even from a 
simple behavioural perspective as clear reasons for disciplinary actions can encourage pupil 
co-operation, as discussed above. If it is not clear why certain disciplinary procedures are 
being followed, then a pupil may well see them as the arbitrary exercise of power rather 
than something with a justification they might find acceptable. 
This is an important argument for adopting a comprehensible and transparent model as 
subsequently proposed in this thesis. A consistent and simple understanding of why certain 
disciplinary actions are justified can lead to clearer decision-making and be more accessible 
for discussion, which is more conducive to the engagement of understanding and 
motivation desirable in good school discipline. A concealed set of beliefs in tension with 
each other and without clear justification achieves this goal less readily. It may be hard to 
have a consistent explanation ready of why classroom management promotes discipline for 
an effective learning environment, which in turn leads to some conception of education, at 
the same time as carrying out the many demands of classroom teaching. A simple model 
may be a distinct improvement over an oversimplified understanding of a complex one. The 
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goals for a fuller conception of discipline as stated above (the maintenance of good order to 
enable learning, education about just authority, and developing the disposition to act in 
accordance with such authority) could be expanded to note the importance of educators 
having an understanding of them. The next chapter shall explore which systems of 




School discipline systems in the review literature 
The previous chapter examined widely held conceptions of discipline, and ideas of what 
elements a school discipline system should feature. It explored how there is widespread 
confusion over what a school classroom management system should achieve, and 
furthermore what ‘good school discipline’ actually entails. The chapter concluded that the 
management of school discipline should aim for three primary goals: the maintenance of 
good order to enable learning, education about just authority, and developing students’ 
dispositions to act in accordance with such authority. 
This chapter examines how these goals are often neglected. Popular behaviour 
management systems generally target the first of these three components of good discipline 
and treat the others as optional extras. When all three goals are considered to be equally 
important, a review of available methods reveals that particular families of systems are 
much more fit for these purposes than others. 
The first part of this chapter examines how books that classify and summarise classroom 
management systems are not drawing important distinctions between them. The purposes 
of school discipline beyond the maintenance of order are not being addressed sufficiently 
directly to leave readers prepared to make well-informed decisions about which classroom 
management system(s) to adopt. Choices are often devolved to a teacher’s own ‘style’ or 
even ‘philosophy’ when particular options are necessary requirements of good discipline 
systems. Many readers will not have further philosophical knowledge to inform their 
choices about classroom management systems, and may be encouraged to prioritise only 
the practical maintenance of order by their immediate needs and environment. Such an 
approach may be in conflict with their broader educational aims. 
The second part of this chapter argues that some classroom management systems are 
better suited than others for meeting the wider goals of good school discipline, particularly 
restorative discipline systems. It argues that community-based systems which seek to justify 
the grounds for authority in school discipline are performing social education that better 
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prepares students for adult life, and introduces how discussion of social contracts can 
support this. 
Attention to the broader goals of discipline 
An extensive number of discipline and classroom management systems are available to 
teachers. Teachers in training are often exposed to books that aim to provide an overview of 
the range of systems available, and their particular strengths and weaknesses.  Many such 
books aim to provide guidance for teachers in choosing systems or methods that align with 
their own individual preferences, convictions and philosophies without consideration of 
whether or not these might be coherent.  Such books often treat the sole important feature 
of good discipline to be the maintenance of order, with all other aspects as optional and 
open to the teacher’s choice. While devolving decisions that are merely matters of 
preference to the individual practitioner is a defensible course of action, there are purposes 
to classroom discipline beyond the maintenance of order that may be neglected if not 
highlighted as important features of good classroom discipline. Studying only such books 
can leave beginning teachers under-informed about what good school discipline involves, 
and ill-equipped to make a choice that leads to the consequences they desire. If classroom 
order is highlighted as the only key goal of good classroom discipline, then a writer’s 
attempt to adopt a neutral position can come at the cost of leaving his or her readership 
with a weaker link between their choice of discipline system and their overall educational 
purpose. 
This section examines Ramon Lewis’ The discipline dilemma (1997) in some detail, as it 
addresses the goals and justifications of school discipline systems to an extent that 
illustrates this well. More anchored in theory than many other comparisons of discipline 
systems, it is still aimed at the teaching professional, and is presented as such: ‘practical 
ways … to cope — underpinned by sound theory’ (Lewis, 1997, back cover). This chapter 
then proceeds with an examination of a recent example of a course book for teachers in 
training that aims to provide perspective on the field. It concludes that the same issues 
persist, and are perhaps even more pronounced in a work without as strong a commitment 
to engaging with theoretical justification.  
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Lewis breaks disciplinary approaches into three general families: teacher oriented, student 
oriented, and group oriented approaches. He invites the reader to select elements that 
appeal the most to their convictions and disciplinary style (p.146).  He goes to some length 
to warn of the risks of philosophical inconsistency inherent to a ‘pick-and-mix’ approach, but 
it is only in the final chapter, added in the second edition, that this issue and its 
consequences are addressed. It suggests that it is quite likely that Lewis would make a 
committed case for democratic principles to underpin discipline, but — at least in the body 
text prior to the second edition — that he was writing with palatability for a broad audience 
in mind. 
It is only on a fairly close reading that this position becomes apparent. On an initial perusal, 
the book appears to be grounded simply on the practical desire to maintain order typical of 
many such guides. The cover illustration supports such a reading: the three different 
approaches to disciplinary systems he isolates are being mixed as if in a kitchen, stirred 
together in a bowl to form ‘classroom calm’. This appeal promotes a reductive idea of what 
classroom discipline is to an audience of educators: hitting only the goal of order 
maintenance, as opposed to other goals also established in the first chapter (awareness of 
the justification of authority, and the disposition to act in accordance with such). 
In the earlier parts of the text, Lewis acknowledges that teachers are adopting more 
democratic practices (p.2) but ‘seeking control techniques that work’ (p.4). Lewis’ 
contention is that (in Australia in 1997) teachers appear willing to adopt democratic 
processes, but largely for authoritarian purposes. He acknowledges his own preference for 
more democratic and less authoritarian processes, yet it is not clear from the outset which 
particular aspects of democratic processes or their outcomes he prefers. His endorsement 
of a ‘range of approaches’ (p.7) steers away from making a firm commitment to what a 
discipline system is trying to achieve beyond classroom order. While devolving such 
decisions to the ‘time and place’ is consistent with being sensitive to cultural context, also 
being responsive to the ‘individual teacher’s personality’ may leave too much scope for 
inferior methods to be chosen if many teachers do not have a clear idea of the goals of 
classroom discipline beyond the maintenance of order itself.  
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While initial teacher training programmes continue to provide a broad foundation in 
classroom management programmes and their rationales, there remains a risk that all are 
seen as equally justifiable if their overarching goals are not discussed. For example, a 
continuing attention to authoritarian methods, even if only to present them in contrast to 
techniques which also consider the development of pupils’ understandings (such as the 
community methods described in the second part of this chapter), can make such methods 
appear still to be within the realm of acceptable practice. It is instructive to make students 
of education aware of them if they remain widespread in teachers’ practice, yet there is a 
concomitant risk that some readers will see this as presenting an option that the authors 
find worthy of consideration. It would be preferable to reach a point where such methods 
no longer need mentioning as a potential solution, just as it is desirable not to mention that 
physical brutality is still effective at securing compliance while neglecting to mention its 
ineffectiveness at promoting other educational goals. 
One of Lewis’ stated goals is to show teachers the ‘assumptions about students on which 
different discipline approaches are based’. This can also be accompanied by explanation of 
the assumptions about school societies such systems make. Ideally it would be accompanied 
by a clear explanation of the incoherencies of some systems, yet textbooks such as this go 
to great lengths to present an appearance of studied impartiality, and to let the reader 
make a critical judgement on the evidence presented. This is misleading, and not possible in 
principle as judgements have been made on what material should and should not be 
included in the text. Mention or omission of the social goals of classroom discipline affects 
the realms of consequences readers are likely to consider when they make a choice of 
discipline systems to adopt.  Discipline systems come with implicit goals, and omissions as 
well as inclusions have significant impact on a reader’s likely thinking. Perhaps the lack of 
trenchant theoretical criticism alongside some systems as they are presented is due to the 
level at which such books are pitched; readers may be considered to be working at their full 
potential to absorb all the core factual material, and material on justification may be 
considered to be too demanding. However, if such is the case it would be consistent to omit 
the most problematic programmes, rather than to include them but with insufficient 
criticism. While one might hope all teachers would have the ability to evaluate programmes 
marketed to them with an eye for unpresented shortcomings, readers (especially young 
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teachers in training) cannot be expected to have the knowledge, the criticality, and the 
capacity to consider all the relevant concerns when evaluating a discipline system, as well as 
not to be primarily influenced by that which is put most accessibly in front of them, and the 
explanations alongside it. The goals that are considered to be of importance for school 
discipline should be raised alongside systems that conspicuously address them, or fail to do 
so. 
Lewis’ chapter on developing school discipline policy is particularly relevant to these 
concerns as it is aimed at those with management responsibility in schools, who are making 
a considered decision about adopting methods that are both theoretically and practically 
sound. Here again there is encouragement of a considered approach, but no attempt to 
establish particular educational goals towards which school discipline systems should aim. 
The principle of devolving decision to the reader seems to be considered more valuable 
than overtly establishing principles of educational purpose that may be universal, but not 
universally recognized. Lewis argues for a more democratic discipline in chapter ten, and the 
principles behind such have to be more important than that which is not ‘unacceptable to 
school communities in western democratic society’. Such a limit would constrain the ability 
of any work to be theoretically led, if what is currently held to be acceptable carries such 
strong weight. It narrows the field of possibility considerably, and leaves the reader’s 
existing notions of acceptability in the driving seat. Lewis’ text goes on to advise 
consideration not only of the teacher’s beliefs and preferences, but also ‘the political and 
human values you wish to cultivate in students’ (p.146). While the details of this may be an 
area suitable for debate, there is the risk that these may be confused with values that are 
presumed to be necessary, but not stated. 
This book illustrates the balance one has to find to be accessible, useful to a wide audience, 
and developmental without being confrontational. Without knowing one’s individual reader, 
there is a risk of driving away more casual readers who perhaps could most use a toolkit to 
move them away from authoritarian discipline by making too involved an argument for a 
position quite different to that which they already hold. Lewis appears to have judged this 
level of engagement the best for kindling ideas and eliciting change as opposed to making a 
complete argument for some of his pedagogic values. 
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While the book does little to guide its readers to an understanding of certain goals as critical 
for good school discipline, in the final section Lewis clarifies some factors that might prove 
problematic in a discipline system for a school’s overall educational mission. These final 
pages — added in the second edition —  appear to be more addressed to educational 
leaders, discussing that there may be a need to convince teachers of the educational value 
of allowing children to participate in decision making, rather than presented to the core 
audience in the earlier body of the text. 
Lewis provides a quotation (p.164–5) from Bagley (1914) which shows that some educators 
were aligned with what is argued here as long as one hundred years ago: that there are two 
goals for discipline, the maintenance of order and the preparation for adult society. He 
clarifies the existence of and issues with the hidden curriculum, and recognizes that in 
allowing for the views of parents from diverse cultures there is a risk of being overly 
relativistic when some principles ought to be insensitive to cultural considerations (p.166–
8). Recognising the influence of parents as at odds with some classroom management 
techniques (e.g. the authoritarian home does not sit well with a facilitator in a democratic 
classroom), Lewis claims that this precludes the use of such techniques. However, if the use 
of such techniques is necessary to uphold values which ought not to be subordinate to 
judgements of acceptability within a particular culture, then the desirability of adopting 
them outweighs the difficulty of addressing cultural differences. On the content of such 
principles, Lewis references Gutmann (1987/1999) concerning the difficulty of giving either 
parents or teachers control of the educational process. When particular values are in 
conflict between home and school, Gutmann addresses the broader domain of the 
democratic state and the role of the school within it. She stipulates principles applicable to 
all members of a democratic state that enable the judgement of competing claims in such 
situations, specifically principles of non-repression of ideas and non-discrimination among 
students. Understanding the justification of authority is one of the goals of good school 
discipline, and, in situations where there is reasonable moral dispute, the impartial 
justification of authority will depend upon certain principles of political authority. This 
argument is developed in detail in chapter four, and links good school discipline with 
education about (and thus preparation for) adult society through developing pupils’ 
understandings of how authority is justified in situations of disagreement. It is permissible 
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for certain models of discipline to override the preferences of parents in an analogous 
manner to how the interests of justice may override an individual’s desire to act against the 
law with impunity. Grounding the justification for authority in rational political principles 
that are applicable to democratic states such as New Zealand is a key argument that this 
thesis shall go on to mount. As with a justice system, there are aspects of a discipline system 
that should not be devolved to the preferences of the groups or individuals implementing it. 
There is the risk of cultural discrimination in imposing discipline systems on the unwilling, 
but there is also the risk of cultural relativism in the other direction. While many 
democracies militate against cultural discrimination, they cannot accommodate principles 
that would undermine democracy itself, and so certain discriminations must be made.10 
Good discipline, in exposing these principles, can serve as a part of an education for 
democratic citizenship. Discipline systems have some reign to be culturally sensitive, but not 
a free one when in conflict with principles of a democratic state of which they are part. 
Lewis draws similar conclusions, yet the argument about typical omissions in such texts is 
again pertinent: he does not explore what these democratic principles are in a way that 
makes it clear to readers of the text what their obligations might be. Teachers cannot make 
choices in accordance with principles of which they are not aware. 
By way of example, it is not problematic that Lewis does not define what an ‘unethical 
behaviour…that might require immediate teacher-led intervention’ is (Lewis, 1997, p. 171). 
This is because ethics is a field under dispute, and not one on which our state must 
necessarily have a singular position. This question can be left open to local exploration and 
interpretation. However, the principles of democracies such as New Zealand place 
requirements on our social structures — including on the way schools operate — that are 
necessary if our practice of education is not to be inconsistent with the values and goals of 
our state. To fulfil the purpose of a state education institution optimally, requirements can 
be placed on the teacher to create an environment in accord with certain principles. While 
cultural sensitivity may be considered important, it is not a principle critical to the 
coherency of the system. 
                                                        
10
 This is not to say the exploration and expression of such ideas is necessarily a problem, only their adoption 
when it might lead to contradiction or incoherency in principles of governance. 
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Lewis quotes a 1992 statement from the Directorate of School Education, Victoria, Australia, 
requiring an ‘education for active citizenship….an increasing commitment to democratic 
values and fair processes and concern for the common good’. Lewis comes closer than most 
to taking a clear position on this first step, but is still likely to leave many readers with the 
impression that the principle of education for democratic citizenship is an optional extra, 
and, like in so many other works, a clear link to necessary components of good discipline is 
missing. Lewis writes that the ‘type of approach selected by a school community should be 
consistent with the values it wishes to promote in the school’ (Lewis, 1997, pp. 178–9) — 
yet without making the crucial distinction between values which are moral, and values 
which are structurally necessary. When a teacher struggles to make these links, their 
choices of discipline framework will be inadequately informed. 
The final section of The discipline dilemma, from the second edition, asks what values a 
school community wishes to promote within the school — how much should this be a free 
choice, and what should be constrained or compulsory. Lewis makes the argument that 
participation in decision-making is a necessary component of children’s education (p.180), 
strengthening his position from that expressed in the first edition, but this message is not 
interwoven within the rest of the text. He concludes that for democratic education, 
classroom management systems need exploration. 
McDonald’s Classroom management (2013) is a more typical collation of disciplinary 
methods; typical in that it does not feature Lewis’ explicit attempt to attend to principles of 
social justification. While this work does address theoretical questions, it does so in a 
manner common to overviews of discipline and classroom management systems: in relation 
to the author’s own central framework, rather than questioning how systems relate to 
necessary requirements of education in a democracy. 
This contemporary text provides both a review of the range of approaches taken to 
classroom discipline and a way of evaluating systems through its own unifying framework 
for understanding and classifying classroom management techniques. However, such an 
analysis only addresses goals of discipline related to classroom management, and such 
frameworks can inhibit a reader’s awareness of broader goals against which to measure the 
effectiveness of classroom management systems. 
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The preface suggests that the book will not be engaging with underlying issues of authority 
in a progressive way: ‘Student misbehavior becomes a problem when students … challenge 
the authority of teachers’. Either this initial statement endorses an approach in which 
teachers claim authority in all realms at all times, or is written with less attention to 
conceptual detail than is desirable in a book which engages with the theoretical grounds for 
discipline, and describes classroom management as a ‘purposeful philosophical, ethical, and 
theoretical code of conduct’ (p.xi). Such an example is typical of the attention given to the 
justification and purpose of school discipline beyond classroom management in works that 
evaluate and summarise different classroom management systems. 
This text, aimed at practising or beginning teachers, introduces the notion of ‘acceptable’ 
student behaviours: language very much associated with top-down, teacher-centric 
management techniques. McDonald conducts his overview from the perspective of the 
‘Positive Learning Framework’, a ‘model of delivery for teacher educators, based on 
qualities identified as necessary for growth’. From the perspective of meeting the goals 
identified earlier in this thesis for school discipline, this does little more than reframe 
techniques aimed at order within a positive psychology framework. It remains an order-
focused agenda, rather than a drive towards improved understanding of justified authority, 
and consequently, as shall be defended in greater detail in chapter four, democratic 
citizenship.  McDonald lists ‘assumptions and beliefs in this text’ (McDonald, 2013, p. 24). 
One is that ‘The goal of classroom management is to promote quality learning environments 
that foster self-discipline and personal responsibility’. McDonald’s ‘self-discipline’ appears 
not to entail the notions of discipline above for which chapter one of this thesis argues, and 
to be much closer to the notion of personal responsibility used in his book. Once one 
considers the broader goals of school discipline, the lack of commitment to an underlying 
principle of good social education in a text such as this becomes striking, and as an 
important theoretical requirement for educational institutions seems too significant a 
principle to devolve to the judgement of individual, non-expert school boards.11 
                                                        
11
 Chapter six of this thesis explores the limitations of which aspects of schooling can be devolved to sub-




The overarching goal in McDonald’s text, the ‘Positive Learning Framework’ (PLF), appears 
to draw on positive psychology’s emphasis on personal growth for another composite 
approach in which a teacher can choose a response they consider appropriate from a range 
of options. There is some parallel in how choosing from a restricted range of 
recommendations is analogous to the constrained ‘choices and consequences’ approaches 
often given to students: such choices are framed as ‘free’, yet are heavily constrained by the 
environment. The beginning teacher’s choice will be similarly constrained; and yet 
Classroom management links to Alfie Kohn’s work as a resource, Kohn generally being cited 
as the standard-bearer for criticism of such situations. His work is presented as being an 
alternative perspective, so this reference can be read as the admirable recognition of a 
critical voice rather than inconsistency, but when new and learning students (such as the 
presumed audience of teachers-in-training for this work) are exposed to a message that 
appears coherent, consistent and effective for the majority of their time with the book, a 
link to alternative material for ‘further reading’ seems more likely to lead to cognitive 
dissonance and rejection than a fair hearing for an alternative position. 
McDonald does give a thorough treatment elsewhere to a comprehensive range of 
disciplinary approaches, and the focus highlighted above is not a critical flaw, as the author 
will have been aware of how an educator’s use of a course book can have as much or more 
influence than elements of its organization. However, it is an opportunity to highlight how a 
text can influence through omissions, focus, and indirectly-suggested values. This tension 
over choices opens up complex questions about freedoms for students in formal education 
which are not addressed in the text. To have some position on this question is necessary to 
make an informed choice of discipline framework, or even of classroom management 
framework, and yet a comprehensive textbook on the subject does not address the 
problem. McDonald does claim that it is essential ‘that your selected theorists match your 
philosophy’ (McDonald, 2013, p. 289), but this is in a context where ‘philosophy’ is more 
likely to be read colloquially as ‘style’, or as values that are personal preferences rather than 
necessary commitments to a coherent educational vision. Given that short-course and 
postgraduate routes into teaching do not typically feature compulsory classes in the 
philosophy of education, it is implausible to wave these issues away as something that 
should already have been covered elsewhere. 
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Classroom management is typical of other works that are positioned as primers and 
overviews. It explains the reasoning behind certain systems and philosophies, yet does not 
anchor them to specific positions on the purpose of educational environments, which would 
make it easier for the reader to evaluate different systems in accordance with their success 
at meeting particular goals. Given the range of literature currently available, many readers 
are not going to be clear on what the goals even are. 
Both texts addressed in this section illustrate different ways in which overview works on 
school discipline can have a clear conceptual framework, yet not delve as deeply into 
theoretical foundations as is necessary to clarify the link between disciplinary actions or 
frameworks and more broadly-scoped educational goals. While goals beyond the simple 
maintenance of order are often considered, the link to firmly-grounded theoretical positions 
is often strikingly absent. 
In summary, individual theorists sometimes take positions on pertinent questions in their 
work, but the textbooks written for teacher educators appear to defer responsibility and let 
students make choices. Some student agency may be desirable, but choices about certain 
aspects of classroom management cannot justifiably be devolved when they might conflict 
with social values outside of the schoolroom. For example, if writing for a culture where 
extreme corporal punishment is commonplace, few other than relativists who believe local 
acceptability justifies such behaviour would desire to present an impartial menu of choices 
to new practitioners, and risk their untroubled selection of the status quo. The values that 
are generally undermined are subtler than this, and principled arguments about individuals’ 
personhood or rights in our democracies need to be made, as is the focus of chapter six of 
this thesis. While it is practical to write in a manner acceptable to one’s target audience, 
there is a point at which legal, constitutional, or national policy requirements of justice 
cannot be brushed aside for the sake of easier communication with a broader readership. 
While morality remains subject to reasonable debate, and is a field in which schools may 
promote various different positions,12 there are questions of justice intrinsic to the structure 
of our societies which can be subject to discussion, but philosophically or legally require 
implementation. As with links to broader goals of education and schooling, there is little 
                                                        
12 This is further addressed in chapter six. 
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attention to these in summary works on classroom management systems. This lack of clear 
goals for discipline systems is problematic if one wishes to enable a critical evaluation of the 
ideas underlying any of the theories. If some of the positions are at odds with a core 
commitment of educating democratic citizens, this should be clarified. Allowing space for 
the maturation of a teacher’s position and their selection of methods in line with that is 
admirable in principle, but there are necessary elements on which one must build, and in 
terms of social education for a democracy this baseline requirement of discipline systems 
does not appear to be widely recognized. 
Presenting all — or any — beliefs in a value-neutral manner is not possible. An illustrative 
example might be ‘teaching the controversy’ over evolution vs. creationism, or whether or 
not global warming is occurring. Let us assume one holds a commitment to the 
philosophical principles that undergird science (e.g. non-contradiction and the preference of 
theories that best explain existing data), as one would hope a school that teaches science 
would do.13 It is then inconsistent to teach that global warming may not be occurring 
(beyond a low level of probability) unless one highlights that holding this view is inconsistent 
with principles one is likely applying elsewhere — and that logical inconsistency itself is a 
problem!14 One must be careful not to give undue weight to an argument because it is 
popular, well-lobbied, or attractive for some other reason when it would be logically 
incompatible with the rest of one’s position. Similarly, principles of our democratic societies 
which a school professes to support should necessarily not be abandoned in the practice of 
classroom management if we are sincere in our adherence to them. 
The next section of this thesis will argue the merits of different discipline systems, and 
highlight the strength of restorative discipline practices at meeting the goals discussed so far 
                                                        
13 The discussion of schools with extreme faith-based ideologies and their attempt to teach science from a 
different set of foundational commitments — such as that a divine force can violate the rules of logic and that 
two mutually inconsistent propositions can both be true — is beyond the scope of the discussion here, but is 
later addressed in chapter six. 
14 An excellent example of this recently arose in particle physics: results were obtained in 2011 and then 
replicated in 2012 of neutrinos travelling faster than the speed of light. The scientists reported their findings 
‘to promote further enquiry and debate’. Because these results would challenge a cornerstone of the standard 
model of physics, they considered it sensible to highlight possibilities of as-yet-unidentified errors rather than 
immediately to assume that their experiments were overturning such a well-supported principle, even in one 
very specific situation — whilst also being open-minded to the fact that this was definitely a possibility. In due 
course they isolated conditions that had caused an error in their data, but the caution with which they 
presented their findings was exemplary of a sensible way to do so in such situations (Stephens, 2015). 
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in contrast to most other systems. The regular absence in summary works of the links 
between discipline systems and the goals of education in a democracy may be a 
contributing factor to restorative discipline not yet holding a pre-eminent position among 
discipline theories in the view of education theorists. If individuals were more conscious of 
the justifications behind certain positions, then the strong synergy between restorative 
discipline and democratic citizenship might attract still further support. 
Management systems that achieve goals beyond the maintenance of order 
This section introduces a survey of which discipline and classroom management systems are 
well-suited to achieving goals beyond the simple maintenance of order. Some are much 
more suitable for meeting the broader goals of good school discipline than others. There is 
an increasing body of evidence in favour of adopting progressive, developmental, and 
community-based discipline systems for the achievement of good classroom order (Bryk & 
Driscoll, 1988; DeVries & Zan, 1994; Goodenow, 1993), and many of these methods can also 
lead to other disciplinary benefits. It is hard, however, to envisage the production of an 
authoritative work evaluating the merits of different approaches to school discipline when 
understandings of the concept remain so clouded, as already discussed. Books which attend 
to social education and focus on communities, such as Macfarlane (2007), whose 
methodological approach to restitution has echoes of Kohlberg’s Just Community (Power & 
Higgins-D’Alessandro (2008), may find themselves considered as a special-interest subset of 
disciplinary methods —perhaps ‘community discipline’. This is because the philosophical 
argument about why certain types of management are necessary, and how they are 
justified, has not spread widely enough. Authors continue to write within particular 
branches of the field, but criticism of its entire shape, which marginalises certain types of 
work because of the social and political status quo, has not yet gained sufficient widespread 
traction. In spite of this, debates about discipline are increasingly attending to long-term 
social good. The public debate does seem to consider what might produce the best 
outcomes for children and for society as well as the easiest day for teachers. 
In all school interactions, social learning is taking place (Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 
1993). Dewey describes society as an ‘organic union of (social) individuals’, and the school 
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as a ‘mode of social life’, where moral learning takes place through necessarily relating to 
others. With a reductive approach to the maintenance of order rather than good school 
discipline, many systems give social learning less attention than academic curriculum 
content. Because children draw lessons from what an adult models, giving reasons for taking 
disciplinary actions is of clear importance. It is undesirable to model that you can impose 
arbitrary restrictions on other people by your personal power, presuming that these are not 
values one would want children to reproduce in adult society. Explanations of why certain 
consequences are necessary are important factors in classroom management if teachers 
want to give the impression that they have authority for any other reason than their relative 
size and power. Only some classroom management systems address the justification of 
authority, an important component of school discipline. 
Kohn (1996) has argued that many of the popular relational approaches of the late 
twentieth century (e.g. Cooperative Discipline, Discipline with Dignity) are still coercive 
practices, in which adults use consequences to control children in a similar way to 
punishments but more subtly. Rather than acquiescing to the teacher’s order to do 
something, children are required to choose from a limited range of possible options. In 
these situations, the coercion is concealed by an apparent choice, although it is a restricted 
one. It is more socially educational for children to be overtly made aware that there are 
justifiable reasons for certain controls of everyone’s behaviour in societies, rather than that 
‘might makes right’. 
If it is part of the desired outcomes of schooling to maximise social as well as academic 
learning, one can look to adopt systems described as being in the traditions of 
developmental, democratic, and community discipline (rather than as holistically effective 
discipline systems, which might be more accurate). Much of classroom management is 
considered not to be educative time, yet some of this time can be used to develop children’s 
social understandings, rather than repeatedly neglecting to engage their thinking and 
modelling the same examples of unjustified force. 
Raising such issues for pupils’ consideration can launch a number of further discussions, and 
further connecting the social and the moral may touch many unspoken needs. Many 
teachers might be energised by seeing clear moral elements to their classroom 
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management work. Sanger (2012) provides a number of references supporting the claim 
that the core of the current prevailing educational ideology is grounded in ‘the task of 
education [being] fostering students’ basic academic learning’ (Olsen & Sexton, 2009), and 
criticising that view. More learning takes place in the classroom than of academic material 
alone. Sanger highlights a growing body of literature addressing the lack of moral language 
in teaching and teacher education, and his quotation from Sockett and LePage is striking in 
juxtaposition with one of his own observations: 
Teachers do not lack moral sophistication because they are not moral 
people. Just the opposite, most teachers are drawn to teaching because of 
their moral commitments. 
(Sockett & LePage, 2002) 
 
Moral language is missing in classrooms, but it is also missing in the seminar 
rooms and lecture halls of teacher education … the dominant discourse of 
teacher education continues to reflect a largely technical view that typically 
obscures teachings’ [sic] moral dimensions, contributing to its 
impoverishment. 
(Sanger, 2012) 
There is a gap between teachers’ desire to work in the moral domain and the practical 
orientation to learning a craft of classroom management. Systems which promote a 
complete conception of school discipline beyond simple order maintenance go some way to 
addressing this, as many would see developing pro-social behaviour as morally good.15 
Classroom management systems and their suitability for meeting the broader goals of 
good school discipline 
Given the lack of overt attention to overall educational goals in summaries of classroom 
management systems, a consideration of these systems with the fuller goals of discipline as 
a primary concern is enlightening: that is, how well do particular systems work to develop 
students’ understanding of authority and its justification, thus preparing them for 
democratic citizenship, as well as maintaining order to enable effective learning? 
                                                        
15
 The distinction between political authority and personal morality is made with greater nuance in chapter 
four, as there are conceivable situations where anti-social behaviour is morally praiseworthy. Reference to 




There are hundreds of systems for understanding and managing classroom discipline and 
behaviour proposed in both professional and academic literature, and analysing every 
proprietary system individually would either be repetitive or address differences at an 
overly particular level — a side-effect of the authors’ attention to detail in some overview 
works on classroom discipline systems. Many systems differ from each other primarily in 
matters of technique or emphasis, and the core (if sometimes unspoken) theoretical 
commitments remain similar. An analysis of different families of systems is more 
appropriate. 
While different authors base the distinction between families on different aspects of 
discipline systems, certain characterisations recur, and are commonplace in the secondary 
literature. By way of example, in the texts analysed above Lewis considers the most salient 
feature of systems to be their focus: whether on the student, the teacher, or the group. 
Certain techniques sit more easily with certain foci than others, but the emphasis on who is 
the centre of concern is the key distinguishing factor between systems for Lewis. 
McDonald’s classification of systems more broadly concerns the locus of authority in the 
classroom: in his extensive summary table (pp.93–97) he describes the majority of systems 
as ‘authoritarian’, ‘egalitarian’, or ‘mixed’. A division by power dynamics, as opposed to the 
nature of presentation, is well-suited to describing whether individual actions under certain 
families of systems meet the goals established above for classroom discipline. 
A recurring assumption of such classificatory summaries is that the maintenance of order is 
a goal one can take for granted of each system: strengths and weaknesses of each system 
concerning this goal are often highlighted, and contrasted with the strengths of a system in 
other areas. Suitability for student social development is often framed as an optional extra, 
for educators that way inclined. This thesis, in contrast, considers educating students about 
the justification of authority to be a core component of good school discipline. When such 
development is considered alongside order maintenance as a goal of parallel importance, 
starker distinctions and some judgements can be made when comparing the field of 
theories. 
McDonald’s classification is helpful for highlighting pertinent factors here due to its division 
according to the locus of authority in the classroom. Systems considered autocratic or 
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authoritarian, often dubbed ‘traditional’ or ‘realistic’ (Canter & Canter’s Assertive discipline 
(1993) is very commonly cited as a professionally-focused example of this type of 
disciplinary theory, with Skinner’s behaviourism as the theoretical grounding) mostly leave 
the authority of the teacher unexamined: whether it is perceived to be maintained by age, 
the authority of the teacher’s role, the established order, being in loco parentis, fear, or 
physical or emotional threat, the justification of both power and authority are typically left 
unexamined, and such systems do little to prepare students to understand the grounds for 
any similar authority outside of the particular society of school. There are many aspects of 
adult society for which such a system neither prepares students nor provides a model. 
Systems which have some focus on the authority of the teacher, but where it is not absolute 
and the sole key driver of order, are characterized by McDonald as ‘mixed methods’. These 
may have socially educational aspects, or may only be similarly authoritarian approaches to 
the above with more socially equitable veneers. Kohn highlighted examples of the latter 
type in his (1996) analysis of disciplinary approaches featuring concepts such as ‘natural’ 
and ‘logical’ consequences, or the offering of choices to students that are so constrained as 
to little deserve the label of choices at all. ‘Would you like to do your homework, or would 
you like to spend the next hour in detention?’ can be understood as a threat — an exercise 
of power — masked as a more egalitarian offer. Ellis and Tod (2009) claim ‘consequence' is 
used as an alternative term to sanction in such situations (Dreikurs, Grunwald, & Pepper, 
1998, p. 157; Hook & Vass, 2002; Lee Canter & Associates. & Canter, 1993), and suggests 
that the pupil is making a choice through their behaviour. It is conceivable that these 
choices are constrained to the point that such language is practically deceptive; ‘natural’ 
and ‘logical’ consequences especially so. Hook and Vass (2002) claim such consequences 
should be fair, reasonable (matched to the event), predictable, and in the best interest of a 
pupil making ‘more useful choices’. ‘Useful’ stands out as underspecified here, as it does not 
specify by whose judgement the choice should be more useful: the judgement of the school, 
the state, the implementing teacher, and the pupil him- or herself may well be different. An 
additional problem with such methods is that a ‘natural’ consequence may still require 
intervention from teachers with a duty to protect students from certain types of harm. An 
unbending implementation of full ‘natural’ consequences can leave students subject to 
excessively damaging outcomes, such as emotional or physical harm that persists for many 
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years as a result of a small infraction or misjudgement. Logical consequences are teacher-
defined, and for Kohn (1996) the choices that lead to them are only pseudo-choices: one 
does what the teacher wants, or faces consequences imposed by his or her interpretation of 
logic, nature, and fairness. Such systems are insufficiently open about the grounds for their 
claimed authority to best prepare children for reasoning participation in democratic life. 
Some of these techniques may feature more genuinely democratic features (e.g. Ginott’s 
(1972) respect for individual dignity, Dreikurs’ (Dreikurs, Cassell, & Kehoe, 1972) 
‘Democratic Teaching’), but they generally do not relinquish the placing of the teacher in a 
privileged position above the student in ways that are not open to examination or 
challenge, and are thus not optimal environments for students’ exploration of the grounds 
for authority in a democracy, and consequently attention to a full conception of school 
discipline. 
The grounds for classroom authority can be obscured in a variety of ways that are common 
features of practicing classrooms. An emphasis on smooth transition and management (e.g. 
Kounin, 1970) keeps attention constantly diverted from the rules and restrictions in effect. 
An emphasis on co-operation (e.g. Albert, 1989) does not entail any less oppressive a power 
dynamic when one has to co-operate with what could be a repressive or dictatorial regime. 
Co-operation does not entail an equal or proportional respect for different parties’ goals. 
Nelsen, Lott, and Glenn’s Positive discipline (2007) is a good example of a system that works 
towards student development, but neither examines nor emancipates students from the 
authorities underlying the teacher’s control of a pupil’s activity. Helping students develop a 
sense of meaningful agency and capability may serve to mask the existence of systemic 
restrictions of which they — and indeed their teachers — may be unaware. Similarly, Kagan, 
Kyle & Scott’s Win-win discipline (2004) addresses co-operation, and the development of 
self-responsibility — but rules and restrictions of the school environment determine how far 
pupils can have agency, and thus the extent of their responsibility. In a democratic 
environment this might be considerable, but in other environments a student may merely 
be responsible for how well they co-operate with and meet a set of unbending, externally-
imposed standards. Mixed methods remain highly susceptible to authoritarian 
implementations as the teacher can retain considerable authority, and attention to pupil 
choice can be cosmetic and insignificant rather than the provision of meaningful agency. 
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Egalitarian methods, by McDonald’s classification, are those which leave more space for 
open consideration of why instructions should be followed, or why certain people or 
positions should have authority. This has the potential to enable active, participatory 
citizenship as opposed to passive subjection to a system. If one is unaware of being subject 
to particular forces, it is harder (or impossible) to evaluate, question, or challenge them. 
Systems in this family have greater potential to educate about citizenship as well as 
maintain order.  
Curwin and Mendler’s Discipline with dignity (1988/2008) considers individual situations, 
rather than applying unbending rules; an approach naturally conducive to the consideration 
of context, and the ethics behind the system. Teachers are also expected to model 
classroom values, demonstrating a certain level of equality before social requirements. 
Kohn’s aforementioned suggestions feature class meetings, and a clear idea of a community 
‘constructing learning that moves students to deeper levels of thinking’ (Kohn, 1996). This is 
a consideration to which this thesis will return. 
Labelling a system as ‘democratic’ does not necessitate that it has all the features of a 
democratic adult society, and significant differences between schools and adult societies 
will be examined in chapter six. The relevant aspect for the development of good discipline 
is whether such systems expose the justification of authority for evaluation and debate. 
Dreikurs’ model is described as democratic teaching, but categorized as ‘mixed’ by 
McDonald; one can educate for a democracy without fully modelling democratic values. 
Gathercoal’s Judicious discipline (1993) is classified as ‘mixed’; even though it is focused on 
preparing for a democratic society (it is founded on the principles of the US Bill of Rights), it 
promotes adherence to law rather than helping students develop an understanding of the 
justification of the authority that the law bears. Evaluation of just authority requires not 
accepting something simply because it is a legal requirement, but rather being aware that 
some laws may not be well-justified.16 For example, the Apartheid laws in South Africa may 
                                                        
16
 The conflation of the legal and the right can be considered as a stage of moral thinking beyond which one 
can develop. This is specifically addressed in chapter seven by reference to Kohlbergian frameworks for 
understanding cognitive moral development. 
50 
 
be considered to have been unjustified on the grounds of not treating all citizens as free and 
equal — one of Gutmann’s democratic principles, as explored below.17 
Democratic systems not only recognise that there is a social and governmental context to 
school discipline, but also directly engage with it. The primary authority they give to 
democratic process would be in tension with unjustified authoritarian methods, though they 
do not necessarily explore the justification for authority beyond an acceptance of the 
democratic vote. Restorative discipline systems, by contrast, bring the justification of 
authority into focus through their employment of restorative conversations and 
conferences. These typically explore why further actions should justifiably be taken, while 
still maintaining a flexibility in application that can serve to make such systems attractive to 
an increasing number of school boards and leaders. The nature of restorative systems, 
which are ideally embedded in a restorative school culture beyond a set of disciplinary 
practices, encourages conversations that explore the nature of restitution, and thus justice, 
and even the authority from which our obedience to justice springs. These features make 
restorative systems superior for promoting social education — among both students and 
adults — and thus, combined with the data that support their excellence at maintaining 
order, suggest that they deserve primary attention in the pursuit of meeting the goals 
established in chapter one for a school discipline system. Other systems can create 
opportunities for exploring the nature of school society and the justification of authority, 
but restorative discipline inherently features and encourages such exploration. It is 
restorative practices that currently have the most promise for meeting the goals of school 
discipline for citizenship education. 
The following chapter shall outline the nature of restorative discipline systems and their 
current implementations in New Zealand, before the argument progresses on how to 
develop such systems to meet particular educational goals still more effectively. 
 
 
                                                        
17
 This thesis will go on explicitly to accept the laws of the nation-state as a necessary limit upon proposed 
modifications to education systems. This does not, however, mean that the justification of such limitations 
should not be overtly considered or challenged.  
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Community discipline for social education 
This section provides an introduction to why community and restorative discipline systems 
provide a superior education for democratic participation. Social education for a democracy 
is politically charged in itself. Societies are not morally neutral entities, and a state can 
educate its citizens to learn to fit into — or be fitted into — it; to be subject to it, and 
conditioned into its reward and punishment systems, or to develop some sort of critical 
understanding and be able to evaluate and potentially modify it. While some societies work 
more smoothly with a citizenry that is not as understanding of the exact power structures by 
which they operate, such as corrupt oligarchies, this thesis addresses democracies 
(specifically New Zealand) where free and equal participation of citizens in democratic 
governance is an important ideal. This involves understanding the justification of authority, 
as does good school discipline, and this shall be further explored below. A citizen educated 
in the means of social interaction in which he or she will participate in adult life is better 
prepared for it, and more able to fully engage. To deny the value of learning how future 
adult citizens live together is to deny the role of education as preparation and practice for 
adult life, as this includes society as well as the factual and skills content of curricula. 
Work on discipline, classroom management, and schooling as social and community 
processes has been steadily increasing in influence since its inception. Kohn’s ‘attempt to 
overturn the whole field of classroom discipline’ brought these ideas to audiences beyond 
the specialist in Beyond discipline (1996). Works in this tradition evaluate learning 
environments as communities, where the recognition and inclusion of the points of view of 
other individuals is important; fertile environments for the discussion of politics and justice. 
Group discussions of rights, co-operation, and restitution of harm done in the community 
can be common occurrences within such systems, as the following chapters shall explore. 
Community-based systems’ specific suggestions can feature geographical, cultural and 
philosophical differences: Margrain & Macfarlane (2011) make suggestions tailored to Māori 
communities, Gathercoal (1993) to the USA, and, while many such systems are based on 
social constructivist pedagogies, Summerhill and Sudbury Valley democratic schools follow 
discovery-based models. A comparative study of these approaches found ‘far more of core 
importance in common to many systems than significantly different between them’ 
(Watson & Battistich, 2006). Community approaches typically place emphasis on: 
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 Relationships as central to the community, 
 Relating to each student as an individual. 
 A positive, developmental view of children. 
 Recognising students are embedded in a social context. 
 A student-centred curriculum integrated with community values; and 
 ‘Minimal or noncoercive disciplinary strategies’. 
(Watson & Battistich, 2006) 
Whether in group settings or a one-to-one discussion between an educator and a pupil, 
these systems are much more suitable for exploring discussions of conflicting preferences 
and authority than environments which would be destabilised if students successfully 
challenged the decision of a teacher. 
If a state, teacher, or administrator18 wants classrooms to prepare pupils for adult 
democratic life, there are then systems to assist with this. Educators that work within such 
models report high levels of classroom order, as well as more socially and morally aware 
environments (Watson & Battistich, 2006). Despite such positive outcomes, a number of 
potential difficulties may inhibit adoption of such methods, such as training issues, teacher 
habit, and existing school culture (Watson & Battistich, 2006). The next chapter addresses 
how a current policy initiative in New Zealand seeks to overcome these problems and 
develop such environments. There is also the issue of local political will; such systemic 
changes take root more effectively with active and continuing support from school 
management. Even outside of such systems, however, progress can be made. 
Contextualising the community effects of other classroom management actions can 
encourage thought about living in a social environment in similar ways. 
Within such systems, there are different reasons underlying why an authority is considered 
to be justified, and different possible defences of the value of compromise and negotiation. 
The grounds on which these defences are founded, however, may not be being discussed in 
the classroom. Without a deeper examination of the political principles on which the best 
resolution to an issue for the community is determined, pupils and teachers may still lack 
understanding of what justifies the undertaking of certain classroom management actions. 
Unspoken values which one is bound to accept are coercive in themselves, as in Kohn’s 
                                                        
18
 The level to which it may be ethically correct to devolve such decisions shall be addressed in chapter four on 
the different obligations of justice upon individuals and institutions, and chapter six on the consequences for 
local education governance. 
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argument about restricted choices and consequences above, and are still used to justify 
arguments in many community-based systems. This thesis goes on to propose a structure 
that encourages overt discussion of social contracts to open up educative discussions of 
justice, authority, and why school discipline actions might be fair. Over time, all parties can 
explore satisfactory justification for fair restrictions on their behaviour to the depth they 
desire. Through such a system, classroom management systems can meet the broader goals 
of good school discipline and contribute to social education for the development of 
democratic citizens. 
Social contract theory and the justification of authority 
Social contract theory can serve as a model from which to begin to explore conflict and co-
operation because it is an approach to political theory that is simple enough to understand 
at a basic level, but one that can be developed to help students understand the justification 
for the authority of governments and schools to some depth. It can be presented at a level 
that enables children to understand and participate productively in the discussion of 
democratic principles and requirements. Social contract theories are explored in detail in 
chapter five, but introduced here in order to illustrate their place in the argument for 
citizenship education through good school discipline. The teaching profession does not 
typically appear to be explaining the justification for discipline, and needs to do so to 
dismantle the enduring conception of arbitrary power being imposed from an educator’s 
chair. Without such explanations school discipline systems are not as socially educative as 
they could be, whether already employing community discipline methods or some other less 
transparent or responsive approach. When a child asks ‘Why?’ a simple framework provides 
something to look to for a swift and justified answer. To answer simply that the organisation 
of the state or school decrees it is hardly an answer in keeping with the exploratory and 
open ethos behind such systems, but one that many would struggle to find a way beyond 
without some simple principles on which to draw. If one wanted simply to educate, for 
example, citizens who already accepted the principles of American democracy, one could 
fall back on the rights granted by the Constitution as in Gathercoal’s system; but in many 
democratic societies these rights and their justifications are under ongoing debate and 
discussion. What grants the Constitution the right to be the foundation of political values? 
To close off conceptual exploration with a simple decree such as this is a weak stimulus for 
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political inquiry as it stands on legal rather than philosophical grounds. This is still ultimately 
coercive, although at a level further removed than before, if exploration of these 
philosophical grounds is not permitted and encouraged until a satisfactory justification is 
understood. If someone does not understand why a certain principle is valid or necessary, it 
is little better than an arbitrary decree if they are forced to adhere to it.  
Discussing social principles also allows for the evaluation of potentially unjustified forces, 
such as the extent to which teachers and adults have authority over children’s choices. 
Through exploring ideas of the social contract pupils can come to understand the 
justification of restrictions on their desires, rather than being expected to obey them 
without question. This can thus contribute to a fuller conception of school discipline by 
enlisting pupils’ understanding rather than coercing them. 
Discussions to support school discipline can be much less complex in practice than they 
might sound in the abstract. For example, a teacher might trace justification for upholding a 
classroom rule as far back as a wall-mounted classroom contract, leaving the impression 
that the right to alter it ended with the conclusion of the discussion in which it was agreed. 
Such negotiations often take place at the very start of a school year, when a teacher might 
secure agreement to any number of things from pupils still unsure of a new environment. If 
a teacher still forces a contract’s use when the collective will is to change it, this is hardly 
any less coercive than insisting on absolute authority. If the justification beforehand was the 
collective will of the class, then the contract’s justification might be undermined when the 
will of the class has changed. Discussing why it might be right to change it is a step towards 
conflict resolution systems in democratic schools, where such regulation becomes an 
exercise in practical politics. Taking the time to go over again why the class agreed not to 
play football in the classroom, and ask whether they still think that is fair, is likely to have a 
more lasting effect than a simple injunction from doing so when the reasoning behind the 
rule is now disputed or has been forgotten. Sometimes the reasoning can be very simple, 
and a reminder thereof is all that is really necessary: pointing out the glass fish-tank, the 
breakages last time people played in the classroom, and the closeness to the playground 
might elicit renewed agreement that this is a reasonable rule; or alternatively the mention 
of some previously unconsidered point, the address of which might resolve the 
dissatisfaction. If other children are restricting a group’s access to the ball games area, then 
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a simple discussion has uncovered the root of the problem in a way that a hurried and 
unresponsive injunction would not have done. 
Situations can be explored and explained to different degrees at different times, so as not to 
interfere with the timetabled work of the school. This is similar to how restorative 
conversations can either be brief and informal or longer and more structured, as described 
in the next chapter. In day-to-day disciplinary interactions a swift resolution can be sought, 
with fuller discussion postponed to a regular gathering such as form time if sufficient 
agreement is not reached. In time, the knowledge a teacher will strive to be fair begets its 
own short term compliance, which he or she would be wise not to abuse lest it be proved 
unjustified and undermined. The immediate resolution of issues can remain swift enough to 
deal with problems efficiently, while follow-up conversations can further engage pupils, 
discuss justifications for a proposed solution (encouraging reason and not blind obedience), 
and be transparently based on principles that reflect the values of a school society. 
These discussions can form part of a discipline that engages participants’ reasoning and 
motivation, develops their understanding of just authority, and maintains effective 
classroom order — key components of good school discipline.                                                         
Many similar discussions currently take place under restorative discipline frameworks, on 
which the next chapter focuses. A recent education policy in New Zealand promotes the 
introduction of such approaches, and, while the motivation for such a policy might in large 
part be for effective classroom management, the potential for social education as part of 
good school discipline is considerable. With the addition of political thinking to disciplinary 
discussions, both teachers and students can develop their understanding of fairness as 
separate from personal morality: a socially-aware understanding of how to work with others 
and to compromise around irreconcilable disagreements when others hold values different 
to your own. 
In conclusion, due to the confusion over what good school discipline entails, and the 
tendency of classroom management works to masquerade as complete coverage of the 
domain, disciplinary models and procedures are not well connected to goals beyond the 
simple maintenance of classroom order. Democratic, community, and especially restorative 
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approaches to discipline are well-placed to meet these goals, as well as having potential for 
development to do so to a still greater degree. 
This thesis goes on to propose the development of a comprehensible means to explore the 
reasoning behind conflict adjudication that is compatible with a current policy initiative and 
looks beyond a presumption of unspoken shared values, engaging with sources of 
justification beyond a teacher’s preference and the status quo of society. In a democracy, 
different interest- and belief-groups hold to different bodies of facts as well as values. As 
well as governments based on religious fundamentalist principles, Republicans and 
Democrats in the USA tend to hold radically different public positions on the reality of global 
warming and factors that contribute to gun crime. Developing an understanding of how to 
work across such divides, and from where an argument draws its authority, are increasingly 
important skills for negotiating democratic change. School discipline can contribute to this 





Restorative discipline and Positive Behaviour for Learning 
This chapter begins with an exploration of the theory of restorative discipline systems and 
their origins in restorative justice. It builds on the conclusions above that such systems 
appear well placed to attend to social education and the development of good school 
discipline as well as the maintenance of classroom order. 
The second part of this chapter examines how such systems are currently being trialled in 
New Zealand under the ‘Positive Behaviour for Learning’ initiative, and whether this 
implementation is likely to adhere sufficiently closely to restorative theory to meet these 
goals effectively. It concludes that this implementation looks a promising foundation for 
transforming school cultures to better meet goals shared both by academic theorists and 
policymakers at the New Zealand Ministry of Education. 
Given the desirability of a change to restorative practices, and the strong potential of the 
incoming system for implementing them effectively, the third and final part of this chapter 
introduces the argument that drives the remainder of this thesis: that while the incoming 
system is a significant step forwards, there is a way to develop the implementation of 
restorative practices that may provide significant further benefit at minimal cost beyond the 
Ministry’s current commitment. 
Restorative discipline 
Restorative discipline (RD) describes systems that prioritise responding to harm by focusing 
on how to repair the damage done rather than on assigning punishment. Emphasis is placed 
on the restoration of relationships rather than on retribution. It may be more useful to 
describe it as an approach to conflict resolution rather than a means of ‘managing 
behaviour’; arguments deployed later in this thesis will weigh children's interests alongside 
those of teachers, and language which might suggest that the teacher has very wide-ranging 
authority over his or her students is not ideal. Restorative practices feature a responsive set 
of tools rather than top down, unexplained rules. 
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Despite differences in the detail of specific approaches, which shall be considered alongside 
New Zealand implementations below, some elements feature centrally in all the literature 
on restorative practices. Hendry, Hopkins and Steele describe the core features of 
restorative approaches through a series of contrasts in focus with what they term 
authoritarian approaches. They describe restorative practices as focusing on: 
 Harm done rather than rules broken. 
 Responsibility and problem solving rather than blame or guilt. 
 Dialogue and negotiation as opposed to adversarial positions. 
 Repair rather than deterrence. 
 (Being) interpersonal rather than impersonal. 
 Meeting needs and putting things right, as opposed to imposing fixed 
responses. 
(Sellman, Cremin, & McCluskey, 2013, p. 265) 
While elements of responsive and restorative practices can be implemented in a range of 
environments, they sit most easily within a school culture that embodies restorative values 
more broadly than in the realm of behaviour management alone. It can be challenging to 
encourage the valuing and development of relationships in cases of conflict when aspects of 
school policy might seem to ascribe little value to them in other situations. Restorative 
discipline is more an alternative way of thinking about discipline and behavioural issues than 
a toolkit for dealing with issues that arise — even though it can provide quite detailed 
guidelines for how to respond to certain situations. Use of specific language is no substitute 
for a genuine attempt to respond to a child's needs, and build stronger, more reciprocal 
relationships across a school community. RD is designed to support both a school's 
classroom learning and citizenship learning more broadly. 
RD has a philosophy of collaborative and co-operative problem solving based on mutual 
respect and understanding. A number of excellent concise introductions exist,19 and rather 
than replicate their work this section addresses the core features that inform how RD 
supports the education of democratic citizens. Rather than being a set of rigid, top-down 
practices, RD requires listening to the voices of those involved in a disciplinary situation, 
both teacher and student, and valuing their experiences and feelings. It is a system that 
                                                        
19
 See Zehr (2002) for a presentation of restorative justice, Amstutz & Mullet (2005) for a concise introduction, 
and Hendry, Hopkins, and Steele (Sellman, Cremin, & McCluskey, 2013, pp. 264–268) for a booklet with a 
succinct summary of core ideas. 
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aims to encourage a sense of being one member of a community with other individuals 
worthy of consideration. 
Guiding questions suggested for thinking about incidents in a restorative manner illustrate 
this: 
 Who has been hurt? 
 What are their needs? 
 Whose obligations are they?  
 What are the causes? 
 Who has a stake? 
 What is the appropriate process to involve stakeholders in an effort 
to put things right? 
(Amstutz & Mullet, 2005, p. 14) 
Answering these questions well often involves taking a third-person perspective to inform 
decision making. This is an important skill for political thought in many models of 
democracy. When individual questions are posed to an electorate, it may sometimes be 
ideal for all voters to vote in accordance with their own interests; but there are other 
situations in which an external party (such as a body designing the populace’s education 
system) might desire participants to vote in the interest of the greater good, even when it 
does not work to their own immediate benefit. For example, a community of adults may 
have the opportunity to vote on the construction of a new dam, which will bring them 
immediate profit but destroy their environment (and their environment’s profitability) in 
the longer term. An observer who values the interests of children and future citizens who 
are not currently able to vote would wish for the participants in this system not to vote 
merely in accordance with any personal desire for profit. The role of the elected 
representative can also be construed as requiring this ability: evaluating the concerns of a 
diverse electorate, and the likely consequences on different groups within it, rather than 
siding with a simple majority regardless of consequences. Thinking about incidents in a 
restorative manner is not about blame and punishment, but about the exploration, 
understanding, and collaborative implementation of solutions. The ability to consider 
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perspectives other than one’s own is useful to the democratic citizen, and developed by the 
thinking required in restorative discipline.20 
Non-restorative responses to a disciplinary situation may require less of a shift in thinking, 
but quick retribution often does not solve underlying problems. ‘Restorative discipline helps 
misbehaving students deal with the harm they have caused to individuals and to the school 
community’ (Amstutz & Mullet, 2005, p. 10). Restorative discipline demands active follow-
up from those involved to repair any damage done, and is distinct in emphasis from many 
other methods of response. Confronting harm to repair it is forward-looking, as opposed to 
punitive action through which one dwells on the mistakes of the past. Sellman, Cremin, and 
McCluskey claim that through RD pupils learn ‘social responsibility, and interpersonal and 
problem-solving skills’ (Sellman et al., 2013). 
The problem-solving skills used are likely to require both empathy and logical thought, 
concepts which are analysed later in this thesis. It will prove pertinent to highlight how 
presentations of the goals of restorative practice often focus on empathic and emotional 
development, with the cognitive and analytical appearing secondary considerations. This 
description by Amstutz and Mullet is representative — the goals of RD as they see it include 
the following: 
 Understand the harm and develop empathy for all [parties to a 
conflict] 
 Respond to the needs on both sides 
 Community reintegration 
 Create caring climates 
 Change the system where it contributes to the harm 
(Amstutz & Mullet, 2005) 
Only the last of these points necessarily involves deployment of logical reasoning and 
thought about political structures as a primary concern. The others may be interpreted as 
primarily requiring emotional connection.  
RD arose from restorative justice practices used initially in the field of criminal justice 
(Amstutz & Mullet, 2005, p. 3), and it is worth drawing a distinction between RD and 
restorative justice because of significant differences in the power dynamics to which 
                                                        
20 This claim is further defended by arguments from empirical data in chapter seven. 
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participants are subject. New Zealand is considered ‘world-leading’ (Carruthers, in Sellman 
et al., 2013) in the implementation of restorative conferencing in response to criminal 
activity, notably in the youth justice system, and while such recognition is given to non-
indigenous implementations it is notable that such systems are highly analogous to 
traditional Māori approaches to justice through community restoration — Amstutz and 
Mullet (2005, p. 52) note specifically that circle processes first entered the field from 
‘certain indigenous communities’. The Family Group Conference was introduced to New 
Zealand youth justice after the Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 1989 
(Sellman et al., 2013, p. 23), and subsequently restorative justice conferencing was first 
introduced into New Zealand schools in the late 1990s following a Ministry of Education 
programme called the Suspension Reduction Initiative. This initiative was a qualified 
success: it was followed by a reduction in suspensions, as was desired (Sellman et al., 2013, 
p. 28), but the number of ‘stand-downs’21 increased, which rendered the results somewhat 
equivocal (Drewery, 2007). Further pilot projects involving restorative practices have 
followed (The Restorative Practices Development Team, 2004), and the Ministry is now 
embarking on the largest-scale introduction of such techniques yet nationwide, as described 
in the following section. 
While they serve the different goals of education and criminal justice, the principles behind 
the practice of RD and restorative justice are similar. Both address harm that has been 
caused, though RD does not require an event to have been illegal for a restorative 
conference to be implemented. A noteworthy distinction between the two is that 
restorative justice is an alternative pathway to the threat of serious legal consequences. This 
can be seen as a problem in a manner analogous to Kohn’s criticisms of ‘choices and 
consequences’ in school discipline as discussed in chapter two: a restricted choice forced 
upon one by a powerful body is far from a free choice, whether such restriction is by a 
schoolteacher or by a court of law. Pupils may, however, perceive the consequences in a 
school community to be just as serious as those of the law, and restorative conferences in 
schools — and restorative practices in general — may equally be practically difficult to opt 
out of. The threat of the law is not necessarily more significant than that of parents or a 
school community in the eyes of an individual child. Furthermore, in a well-run restorative 
                                                        
21 A disciplinary alternative to suspension or expulsion which was newly available to schools at the time. 
62 
 
conference the emphasis should be on the fixing of problems rather than the avoidance of 
punishment, and so the different consequences of a failure to find resolution should be of 
little significance. In both systems, an encounter between the harmer and the harmed — or 
the offender and the victim in justice terminology — is important for developing 
understanding of the perspective of others involved in the incident. Cremin (Sellman et al., 
2013) highlights the importance in both settings of correctly-handled conferencing to 
facilitate genuine engagement, rather than a tokenistic response in a manner desirable to 
the facilitators, and quotes Braithwaite (2002, p. 131) about the educational goals of such 
conferences that this thesis shares: that ‘disputing over daily injustices is where we learn to 
become democratic citizens. And the learning is more profound when those daily injustices 
reveal deeply structured patterns of injustice.’ 
RD in New Zealand schools is increasingly recognised by practitioners as a means of 
relationship management rather than behaviour management. This requires cultural 
change, and not just one-off staff training on classroom management (Drewery, in Sellman 
et al., 2013, p. 41; Thorsborne & Vinegrad, 2008). Drewery argues that a system needs to 
develop within each school and its people, and consequently that restorative practice will 
look different in different environments. Sellman, Cremin, & McCluskey (2013, p. 3) claim all 
models of RD are culture-bound, and should be built from the bottom up, by communities 
assessing their own needs and resources. This requires those involved with a particular 
implementation of RD to understand its principles, rather than simply to follow a 
nationwide prescription. There is substantial guidance available on this, much of it local to 
New Zealand.  Amstutz and Mullet (2005) is mentioned above as a concise treatment of key 
issues; the paired volumes by Meyer and Evans (Meyer & Evans, 2012a, 2012b) provide 
detail for school leaders and teachers separately; Sellman, Cremin & McCluskey (Sellman et 
al., 2013) provide contemporary perspectives and debate; and Margrain & Macfarlane 
(2011) describe a number of New Zealand implementations as part of broader commitments 
to effective social transformations. 
Key to the practice of RD are restorative conversations and restorative conferences, the 
latter being more extended and formal versions of the former. These are structured to 
develop the thought and empathy of those involved in an incident for: 
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 The perspective of others involved 
 The effect of the actions 
 How a situation might be resolved 
 Whether steps can be taken to stop similar incidents from recurring, and 
 How harm may be repaired. 
Restorative conversations can be formal or informal, from spontaneous chats to discussions 
in a classroom group to carefully pre-planned conferences involving communities beyond 
the school. Staff are trained both on the principles of what such conversations are trying to 
achieve and on specific ways of doing so, sometimes through the deployment of specific 
scripts to prompt the desired forms of reflection. Kete 2 of the New Zealand Ministry of 
Education’s Positive Behaviour for Learning training pack consists of detailed training 
guidelines for how to develop and structure restorative conversations (‘Restorative Practice 
Kete Book Two / PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning’, 
n.d.). These help to provide significant guidance in both the micro- and macro-aspects of 
restorative practices, due to the desire to facilitate whole-cultural change rather than 
scripting isolated encounters that may prove less effective without a supportive 
environment. RD is supported by a school culture which encourages discussion of why 
disciplinary outcomes may be justified, actively listens to and respects children's positions, 
and involves them in a healing process rather than forcing solutions onto others in a top-
down manner.  This thesis argues that such discussion and explanation of fair outcomes in 
disciplinary situations can meet the second goal of good school discipline, education about 
justified authority. Chapter four explores the link between treating people as equals and the 
justification of political authority in support of this claim. 
With respect to the first goal of school discipline, maintaining classroom order, there is a 
growing body of data in support of the effectiveness of restorative practices. While there is 
a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence,22 this must be tempered by the knowledge 
that negative results in general are less likely to be widely disseminated, and particularly so 
on a topic where those involved with a new project are keen to hear supportive data. The 
1999–2000 Restorative Conferencing in Schools trial showed positive changes in academic 
outcomes as well as in relationships, and the Suspension Reduction Initiative of 1990 and 
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 e.g. The Restorative Practices Development Team cites Zammit (2001) concerning the remarkable drop in 
office referrals for discipline, fights, and truancy rates in one school over a three-year period after the 
implementation of restorative justice in their discipline system. 
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the Waikato project mentioned above (The Restorative Practices Development Team, 2004) 
both provide a substantial body of data in support of the effectiveness of restorative 
discipline practices (Adair, V., Dixon, R., New Zealand Ministry of Education Research 
Division, & Auckland UniServices, 2000). Policymakers at the New Zealand Ministry of 
Education now regard the body of evidence for RD as more solid and less grounded in 
anecdote (Corrigan, cited by Drewery in Sellman et al., 2013, p. 45), and this may well have 
contributed to the ongoing larger-scale deployment of restorative practices in New Zealand 
schools. 
There are also supportive data from outside New Zealand. In Scotland, a pilot project on 
restorative approaches in 2004 involved 18 schools over a two year period. An evaluation of 
the pilot in 2007 claims that results were best where schools aimed to ‘improve school 
ethos by creating and maintaining positive relationships throughout the school community’ 
(Kane et al., 2007). Such data support the aim of transforming communities rather than 
teaching behaviour management techniques in isolation, especially when viewed alongside 
work showing punitive and zero-tolerance responses to misconduct to be ineffective in the 
long term (American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008). While the 
positive reports on restorative practices are not uncontested (see Acorn, 2004; Johnstone & 
Van Ness, 2007; Zehr, 2002 — though much of the criticism refers primarily to restorative 
justice rather than restorative practices in schools), if anything, the environment in New 
Zealand should be more fertile than in Scotland for such approaches, given how well 
community-focused approaches fit with traditional Māori values and means of conflict 
resolution (MacRae & Zehr, 2011). 
Increasingly-widespread implementation suggests that restorative practices may be moving 
from being viewed as a progressive alternative system to a mainstream framework for 
managing conflict and improving relationships in schools. Society’s appetite for restoration 
as opposed to retribution increases from a low base, but the legal implementation and 
theoretical support for restorative processes are in place alongside an expanding evidence 
base in support of their efficacy. Ten to twenty years ago restorative practices and ideals 
were discussed as either new approaches or radical alternatives, whereas contemporary 
books refer to an existing ecosystem, ongoing trials, and ideas for how to build restorative 
elements into environments still not ripe for full transformation. Now increasingly seen as 
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‘field-tested (and) … productive’ (Meyer & Evans, 2012a, back cover), restorative practices 
are becoming more widespread and gradually pushing against years of inertia and 
traditional methods in many staffrooms. The New Zealand Ministry of Education sought 
initiatives both theoretically well-supported and evidence-led for inclusion in their Positive 
Behaviour for Learning action plan, the focus of the next section, and restorative practices 
now well meet these criteria. 
As argued in chapter two, restorative discipline appears one of the most effective 
frameworks for meeting the goals for school discipline established in chapter one: the 
maintenance of an environment conducive to effective learning, education about just 
authority, and developing the disposition to act in accordance with it. The following section 
on the Positive Behaviour for Learning initiative examines whether the way it is being 
introduced in New Zealand includes the features of RD necessary to meet these goals, what 
goals the policy writers appear to have in mind, and consequently if it looks likely to lead to 
an approach to school discipline that is a better education for democratic citizens. 
Positive Behaviour for Learning 
In New Zealand, the Ministry of Education is currently overseeing the nationwide 
implementation of a new suite of behaviour initiatives in schools. This optional programme, 
called Positive Behaviour for Learning, consists of a number of different elements targeted 
both at promoting whole-community cultural change and at improving individuals’ teaching 
practice. Positive Behaviour for Learning (henceforth PB4L, as it is abbreviated) sets out its 
aims as to ‘address problem behaviour, improve children's wellbeing, and increase 
educational achievement’ (‘Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning’, n.d.). While a 
frequent emphasis of the PB4L literature is on addressing school behaviour problems, it is 
not the sole goal of the initiative. It also aims to attend to other key targets of the New 
Zealand Curriculum including cultural diversity and community engagement (Ministry of 
Education, New Zealand, 2007, p. 9). 
Restorative discipline (under the banner of restorative practice) is one strand of PB4L as part 
of a ‘school-wide approach to changing the culture and relationships within schools.’ The 
language of the policy documents, as presented below, suggests it is not being deployed 
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solely as a behaviour management technique. Restorative practice is a pilot project within 
PB4L that is considered complementary to the aims of school-wide cultural transformation, 
rather than as a compulsory element. It is currently (as of 2016) being trialled in 21 
secondary schools,23 with a view to expand to 200 in 2017 after further development and 
continuing evidence of its efficacy. The previous section of this chapter referred to the 
Ministry’s positive view of the evidence in support of restorative discipline. It presents the 
benefits of RD under PB4L as follows: 
 A calmer school environment, with less classroom disruption and 
more time for teaching 
 An increase in the engagement and learning of students in the 
classroom 
 Growth in relational and problem-solving skills, both for adults and 
students across the school community 
 Improvements in attitudes and relationships across the whole school 
community 
(‘What is PB4L Restorative Practice? / PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - 
Positive Behaviour for Learning’, n.d.) 
Numerical data are presented in support of this in the 2013 PB4L update document with 
statistics on the improvement in stand-down rates, retention rates, and NCEA level 1 
achievement rates in participating schools (Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2013).24 
PB4L arose from a desire to implement initiatives with a strong evidence-base to improve 
pupil behaviour. In 2009 the Taumata Whanonga behaviour summit presented New Zealand 
educators with a proposal for a number of initiatives to tackle growing behaviour problems 
in public schools. The rationale of the project was to take an evidence-based approach to 
addressing behavioural issues, on a whole-school basis, and to bring theoretical best-
practice tools and techniques into implementation. 
Evidence-based policy might appear to be a universally desirable objective, but it should be 
approached with caution in the context of educational policy. In some situations evidence is 
invaluable, such as when a policy is popular but claims to produce outcomes in 
contradiction with existing data. ‘Evidence-led practice’, however, can still be used to 
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 These schools are primarily lower-decile schools which chose to opt in to this aspect of the PB4L project (an 
up-to-date list can be found on the pb4l.tki.org.nz website). 
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support certain agendas over others. Firstly, this can be through a constrained definition of 
what types of results are considered evidence. Some changes might be considered 
unquantifiable, and other variables which might be critical to those with different priorities 
may be left unmeasured. These can go unremarked as papers do not include an exhaustive 
list of the infinite number of possible variables that are not considered significant. Such 
incomplete measurements are not a neutral and objective tool when the definition of 
experimental limits can itself be loaded. Secondly, some outcomes are hard to quantify and 
consequently often lack supporting data. A careless or unscrupulous reporter can hold this 
lack of evidence up against a variable for which evidence is more easily collected, and claim 
that the latter is better supported. It is much easier to measure the improvement in test 
results that a policy produces than the increased warmth of a social atmosphere, for 
example. Also — critically — costs and losses in these hard-to-measure domains can be 
ignored when set against quantifiable gains. A policy that raises grades slightly but 
produces, for example, considerable resentment and hatred in schoolchildren may be 
lauded by some groups for tiny academic gains, while a cost that is arguably more significant 
proves hard to quantify and thus is not held up against it. There may be a tendency to look 
at discrete variables that are easily measured such as test scores, stand-downs, and 
suspensions rather than qualitative data in support of a more caring atmosphere and 
increased social consciousness. Despite this, a commitment to theoretical and practical 
support is preferable to the enactment of policy that flouts strong evidence against its 
efficacy, and alongside the recent campaign in the UK for evidence-led education policy 
(Goldacre, 2013) there is cause for optimism that academic thought is increasingly being 
given weight in the consideration of social issues with empirical outcomes — issues that are 
sometimes led by ideological commitments without any reference to data. 
At the Taumata Whanonga behaviour summit, educationists selected from a range of the 
most well-supported potential solutions, and the collective implementation of these 
decisions now comprises the Positive Behaviour for Learning Action Plan. 
PB4L Restorative Practice is described in the Ministry's literature (available from Te Kete 
Ipurangi: ‘Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning’, n.d. ) as ‘based on a set of best 
practice tools and techniques to support a consistent and sustainable approach to managing 
positive, respectful relationships within the school’. The emphasis on a culture of care and 
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positive relationships may be informed by the results of Te Kōtahitanga studies (a 
programme to support teachers in improving Māori students' learning and achievement) 
focused on changing the ways teachers in particular use authority and the way they form 
relationships with students; there is strong groundwork in New Zealand to support the 
implementation of more democratic and responsive methods for dealing with conflict and 
misbehaviour. Restorative practice also supports the five key competencies of the New 
Zealand Curriculum (Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2007), where the development of 
the self within the community is explicitly encouraged. 
Restorative Practice was established as a PB4L initiative in 2011. ‘Its value was evidenced in 
research commissioned by the Ministry of Education in 2012 on RP's impact on student 
engagement and the stand-down and suspension rates in New Zealand secondary schools’ 
(Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2014). Designed to complement the school-wide 
strand of PB4L (which also aims to transform the culture of whole school communities), the 
quotations below from the Ministry's own handbooks and update documents on PB4L 
highlight the reasons and justifications they present for promoting restorative approaches. 
As a trial strand, Restorative Practice receives just half a page in the 2013 update document 
on the progress of PB4L (Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2013, p. 26). This is because 
conclusions are still being drawn as to its efficacy, and data collection and evaluation is 
ongoing. The introductory material is, however, illuminative about the theory and reasoning 
behind its introduction: 
Internationally, restorative practice principles have their roots in restorative 
justice, a formalised, relational response to offending and victimisation in the 
criminal justice system. 
New Zealand schools have been using RP approaches in varying forms since 
family group conferences were introduced in 1989 as part of the Children, 
Young Persons and Families Act. 
(Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2013) 
This acknowledgement of the roots of RD does not specifically show whether the focus of its 
implementation here is on just outcomes, cultural transformation, or techniques in 
classroom management. As McCluskey argues (Sellman et al., 2013), RD can sometimes be 
used primarily for behaviour management, rather than total cultural change. The following 
description contains some ambiguity: 
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PB4L is built on the foundation that positive behaviour can be learnt and that 
environments can be changed to improve behaviour and support effective 
teaching and learning. It also reflects the belief that schools play a major role 
in creating safe, healthy societies. 
(Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2014, p. 4) 
‘Positive behaviour’ here is an imprecisely defined term. It could be understood as 
behaviour which fits with what the teacher wants, behaviour that is satisfying to both the 
teacher and the student, or behaviour that enables the school to better meet its stated 
goals. It could even be understood in terms of positive psychology, as behaviour that 
promotes happiness and demonstrates desirable cognitive activity in students such as 
learning and creativity. Readers of this document with a preference for authoritarian 
classroom management could understand ‘positive behaviour’ to mean that which supports 
a teacher’s goals even when they are in opposition to the interests or needs of a particular 
student. There is also no suggestion that behaviour is not the only important metric in this 
situation, and that cognitive activity is equally or more important. Conversely, one reading is 
that ‘positive behaviour’ is left for a school or teacher to define as suits their specific context 
and environment, and the concept is deployed here with minimal explanation to enable 
flexibility in its interpretation beyond the meeting of desirable behavioural goals. 
There are, however, elements of behaviour management that should not be devolved fully 
to the preference of participant schools. Certain goals of our schools need to be mandated 
in accordance with overarching guidelines such as national policy or human rights. If positive 
behaviour is construed by one participant school as consisting of silent obedience to a 
teacher at all times, then this will be in contradiction with other principles that are accepted 
as part of a commitment to restorative discipline (such as conflict being managed in 
consultation with students, as opposed to done to them). Certain aspects of ‘positive 
behaviour’ can be devolved to the judgement of individual communities, but others are 
required for the overall programme to remain coherent, as described in the previous 
chapter. This conflict is further explored in chapter six with reference to the nature of 
special-interest and faith schools. 
In contrast, the part of the above statement which expresses support of ‘effective teaching 
and learning (and) creating healthy societies’ fits well with the broader goals for discipline 
systems established above. It is possible that it is politically useful to leave room for 
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interpretation in some concepts deployed in such policies. That is, a tighter definition may 
be more clearly objectionable to some parties, and so it can be left to the detail of 
implementation work to clarify. A definition of what 'positive' or 'healthy' entails would 
likely be taking on an additional struggle unnecessary to the core goals of getting a 
particular policy implemented. There is enough elsewhere in the PB4L documentation to 
suggest a full understanding of the goals and prerequisites of restorative practice, as there 
are plentiful quotations that leave little room for the misunderstanding of critical elements, 
such as ‘(viewing) problems as problems, rather than people as problems ... Building and 
managing relationships .... resolving differences and conflict’. These suggest a commitment 
to a full formulation of restorative discipline that is consequently likely to meet the goals of 
a full conception of school discipline as expressed in chapter one. A different description 
introducing the same set of policy documents suggests this even more clearly: 
Restorative practice is a relational approach to school life grounded in beliefs 
about equality, dignity, mana, and the potential of all people. The Positive 
Behaviour for Learning (PB4L) Restorative Practice model focuses on building 
and maintaining positive, respectful relationships across the school 
community and offers school staff best-practice tools and techniques to 
restore relationships when things go wrong. By building and maintaining 
positive, respectful relationships within a school, staff to staff, staff to 
student and student to student, issues are more easily managed. 
(‘PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning’, n.d.) 
By including restorative practice as an element of PB4L, rather than a separate initiative, the 
congruence between the community development goals and simple behaviour management 
is tacitly acknowledged. The following presentation of PB4L principles appears more focused 
on specific behavioural outcomes, yet is not incompatible with placing community 
development at the heart of meeting such goals through programmes of restorative 
practice, and the third principle suggests at the very least an approach sensitive to 
classroom ecology, if not a fully community-oriented one: 
PB4L is based on a number of principles: 
• Positive behaviour is a prerequisite to improving the engagement and 
achievement of our children and young people. 
• Positive behaviour can be learnt and difficult and disruptive behaviour can 
be unlearnt. 
• Individual children are not a ‘problem’ – we need to change the 
environment around them to support positive behaviour. 
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• Punishing and isolating children doesn’t bring about long-term and 
sustainable changes in behaviour. 
• We need to concentrate on a small number of evidence-based 
programmes and frameworks that we know work. 
• There are no quick fixes. Behaviour change takes time. 
(Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2012, p. 4) 
The four key principles for PB4L: Restorative Practice (PB4L:RP) as presented in the 2013 
PB4L update directly address social and community goals: 
• Positive interpersonal relationships are a major influence on behaviour. 
• A culture of care supports the mana of all individuals in the school 
community. 
• Cultural responsiveness is key to creating learning communities of mutual 
respect and inclusion. 
• A restorative approach leads to individuals taking responsibility for their 
behaviour. 
(Ministry of Education, New Zealand, 2013) 
While the meaning of ‘positive interpersonal relationships’ can be queried similarly to the 
meaning of ‘positive behaviour’ above, this set of principles clearly focuses on how cultures 
inform behaviour. As behaviour is the primary goal of PB4L, and Restorative Practice is an 
optional strand, this may seem to suggest that the cultural and social aspects of the policy 
are an optional part of addressing the ‘behaviour problem’. Within the Restorative Practice 
materials it is made clear that this is not the case for schools managing situations with 
restorative techniques, but as not all schools participating in PB4L are adopting restorative 
practices this message may not be as strongly transmitted elsewhere. 
The following quotations from the Ministry's Introduction to PB4L Restorative Practice 
illustrate that their understanding of what is necessary for restorative approaches to be 
successful is well-aligned with the academic consensus as described above. 
Restorative Essentials embody the approach of the PB4L Restorative Practice 
model at the grass roots level - the everyday, informal actions that place 
emphasis on relationships, respect, empathy, social responsibility and self-
regulation. The Restorative Essentials are a relational approach to effective 
communication skills and Restorative Conversations. A relational approach is 
grounded in relational theory (Downie and Llewellyn, 2011) and aligns with 
the five key competencies of The New Zealand Curriculum. 
72 
 
In addition to using the same language of relationships and respect, this policy directly 
references relevant contemporary theory on the effective implementation of restorative 
practices. 
The Restorative Essentials supports teachers and adults within the school 
community to approach problems in a restorative way and equip staff with 
the skills needed to de-escalate situations successfully, enabling all staff to 
‘keep the small things small’. 
Emphasis is placed upon treating the problem as the problem, rather than the person as the 
problem, and embedding restorative practices in everyday school life. 
Restorative Circles support all staff and students to develop and manage 
relationships and create opportunities for effective teaching and learning 
time. They are a semi-formal practice requiring some preparation. They 
provide teachers with a range of processes to build relationships with and 
between all people in a school community, maintain those relationships, and 
enhance positive communication. 
 
There are three types of Restorative Conferences in PB4L Restorative 
Practice: Mini Conferences, Classroom Conferences and Formal Restorative 
Conferences. Although they differ in formality, numbers participating and the 
severity of the related incident, all three types require the phases of 
preparation, participation and follow up, and all three use Restorative Scripts 
and fair process. Restorative Conferencing is a process that provides schools 
with ways to repair harm and restore relationships. 
The PB4L implementation of RD adopts the standard model of three broad levels of 
restorative intervention, all well-structured, from the everyday conversation through the 
structured circle to the formal conference. This description of three levels of formality, some 
requiring little preparation and others a considerable amount, suggests an intention for 
such techniques to be used throughout a school as part of a culture of responding to harm-
causing incidents rather than being kept for use only as an escalated response to major 
behavioural incidents. Emphasis is appropriately placed on the goals of Restorative 
Conferencing being to repair harm and restore relationships rather than to provide short-
term fixes for behavioural problems. 
It uses the stories of those involved in an incident and the people close to it 
(e.g. students, staff and whanau) to: 
 
 explore what has happened and who has been affected 
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 hold those who have caused harm accountable for their actions 
 provide support to those who have been harmed, and others 
involved. 
This maps well onto the Thorsborne and Vinegrad formulation of Tell—Explore—Repair—
Reach agreement—Plan follow-up for restorative conversations (Thorsborne & Vinegrad, 
2008). 
Schools involved in PB4L Restorative Practice receive: 
 
 Restorative Essentials training for all staff within the school, including 
non-teaching staff 
 Restorative Circles training for teaching staff 
 Restorative Conferences training for selected staff 
 resources and reference material to support the implementation of 
PB4L Restorative Practice 
 ongoing professional support. 
(above quotations all ‘What is involved? / PB4L Restorative Practice / 
Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning’, n.d.) 
The policy acknowledges the need for effective training of staff to implement restorative 
techniques, and how such practices can ‘create opportunities for effective teaching and 
learning time’. The training and ongoing resourcing offered is a clear attempt to build lasting 
cultural change rather than a brief nod to implementing recommended practices with 
insufficient foundation. 
The PB4L formulation of RD appears both to fit contemporary theory and feature the key 
practical elements it requires. It acknowledges the need for effective training and 
preparation, and appears prepared to avoid the pitfall McCluskey highlights (Sellman et al., 
2013, chapter 13) of underprepared and isolated areas of implementation failing. The 
stimulus for the PB4L initiative was the desire for an evidence-based system to assist with 
behaviour management, but the policy itself emphasises the role of cultural change in 
restorative discipline, of which improved behaviour is a by-product. While the principles of 
the RD section of PB4L are much more focused on cultural transformation than the overall 
statements of PB4L goals, in combination they closely reflect the changes recommended by 
academic research on restorative discipline theory. PB4L policy provides sufficient specificity 
on critical components of RD that necessary cultural changes should not be overlooked in 
the implementation of recommended techniques. PB4L:RP looks to follow academic models 
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of restorative practice sufficiently closely to meet the goals initially established for good 
classroom discipline: the maintenance of an environment conducive to learning, and the 
education of students for democratic citizenship. 
While some participating teachers may consider better ‘behaviour management’ to be their 
primary goal for the policy, it is clearly not the sole goal of PB4L. While the specific 
disciplinary goal of educating about just authority and thus preparing students for 
democratic life is not specifically addressed in the purposes of PB4L:RP, this should be 
compared to the similar omissions in the specialist comparative literature on the purposes 
of school discipline that was examined in chapter two. When even works such as these are 
unclear or incomplete on the goals of the field beyond behaviour management then it is 
unreasonable to expect a particular policy document to address this. Restorative practices 
are an excellent way to enable such education even when not specified as a primary goal of 
a policy, and the requirements of PB4L:RP seem well-suited to enabling schools to better 
meet these goals. 
The principles laid out in the policy documents establish some elements of RD that are 
considered critical under PB4L, and not open to local interpretation. As argued above, 
balance is required between a desirable bottom-up cultural responsiveness and principles 
which are necessary for both effectiveness and consistency with a state’s broader 
educational system and goals. As the PB4L:RP pilot expands nationally it will become clearer 
how variety in implementation is apparent in practice. In the early stages of policy 
implementation critical features of restorative practices are specified that should safeguard 
core principles, and thus begin to encourage the desired cultural shifts correctly. The 
Ministry’s restorative practice training materials and policy documents provide clear 
guidance on this, and it may become clearer in time in which aspects schools might benefit 
from more local sensitivity. Such nuances are not necessary components of the central 
policy statement beyond the stated commitment to responsiveness to local communities. 
The PB4L website promotes ‘a consistent best-practice approach across the whole school 
community that aligns with the school’s shared values’. Which values may be local, and 
which values are necessarily global for our democracy is an important issue to note, and one 
covered in detail in chapters four and six. In some situations, for example the specifics of 
running restorative circles, guidelines and values are mutually agreed (‘Restorative Practice 
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Kete Book Three / PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning’, 
n.d.). Exploration of the scope of these values, and what may or may not be open to 
democratic modification, is something that the suggestion for the development of RD below 
should only aid, and promote better understanding of in our communities. 
In summary, underspecified concepts in policy documents can be helpful: core elements can 
be formally established, but elements of their interpretation left to particular 
implementations and best-practice guidelines. The policy extracts above suggest that there 
is enough specificity in PB4L policy to establish the important elements of restorative 
theory, and avoid pitfalls such as piecemeal implementation that correlate with less 
successful outcomes. 
The detail of the policy and the guidance ketes is clear on aspects necessary to implement 
restorative practices effectively according to the latest theory, if slightly under-detailed on 
why they are so. The evidence that RD is effective for behaviour management was clearly 
important for the genesis of this policy, but a positive aspect of the documentation is that it 
is written in a way that does not describe the other benefits only as bonuses of lesser 
importance. Like the literature on school discipline systems, the policy documents do not 
specify further goals of restorative practice that contribute to good discipline, or how 
exactly this contributes to democratic citizenship. This avoids potentially challenging 
content that is beyond the scope of a practical document, and focuses on widely-accepted 
goals of school discipline that will be well-regarded by a large audience. PB4L looks well-
placed to introduce restorative discipline in a way that will meet the primary goals 
established above for school discipline, supporting behaviour management through cultural 
transformation as well as contributing to the development of socially-educated citizens — 
even if this last element is not presented as a primary aim of the policy. Given that PB4L 
policy documents are available to be read by the general public and that the broadly-stated 
goal of PB4L is improving pupils’ behaviour, it is notable that the Restorative Practice 
elements of the programme are as minimally focused on behaviour and as much on cultural 
transformation as they are — many readers may not initially consider such transformation 
to be a primary concern, but this emphasises the importance of not seeing a supportive 
culture as an optional extra to successful restorative practice. 
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A proposed extension to restorative discipline practices 
The above analysis suggests that PB4L should be an effective means of introducing 
restorative practices to New Zealand schools, which should in turn enable the better 
meeting of key goals of school discipline: the maintenance of good order, and the 
development of pupils’ understandings of the justification of authority. The next chapter of 
this thesis explicitly draws a link between this latter goal and education for democratic 
citizenship. While the PB4L policy documents do not specify the goals of school discipline, 
some restorative theorists refer more closely to these goals than the overview literature on 
school discipline does. For example, ‘A primary goal of schools in a democracy is to develop 
a community of responsible citizens’ (Amstutz & Mullet, 2005, p. 18). While ‘responsible’ is 
more nebulous than ‘democratically capable’, it is clear that at least some RD theorists 
recognise goals of school discipline beyond the simple maintenance of order. 
When this new policy initiative is considered alongside these overarching goals, there 
appears to be the opportunity for an extension to the implementation of restorative 
practices that could provide a still more effective education for democratic citizens. The 
remainder of this thesis will make this argument — that the incoming models of restorative 
discipline could still better serve our students by greater attention to the rational 
consideration of restoration, as well as the taking of empathetic or emotionally reparative 
perspectives. 
It is important to consider rational and logical factors when attending to the repair of harm, 
rather than just the feelings of those involved. The next chapter shall explore what exactly 
these factors might be, but it can be argued here that emotional restoration alone is 
insufficient. This is necessarily true if fairness in the distribution of goods other than 
happiness or other emotional states has a value that is not entirely subordinate to people’s 
emotional responses to it. If repairing feelings and relationships alone were adequate, then 
injustices in relationships of which people were happily unaware would be acceptable. This 
would be inconsistent with the critical approach to citizenship education explored in more 
detail below. If a student stole someone else’s property, and then experienced deep 
emotional suffering when his or her stolen goods were taken away, then a purely emotional 
restoration might justify their return to the thief. This problem is somewhat analogous to 
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Nozick’s utility monster (Nozick, 1974), where a utilitarian might face the problem of 
sanctioning a vastly unequal distribution of goods if one person were to receive 
disproportionate benefit at the cost of others. Without rational concerns of fairness 
featuring in restorative processes, there is the possibility of excess and injustice in 
attempting to restore someone to their prior emotional situation. If one person would only 
feel better by enslaving those who had wronged him, and perhaps others besides, then this 
situation would benefit from the rational discussion of fair outcomes as well as the 
empathetic acknowledgement of the emotionally distressing situation. Not all situations can 
be perfectly or even adequately restored, but adequate resolution requires discussion and 
reference to principles that are not solely concerned with the emotional impact of the 
changes. This is especially clear in the case of conflicting claims about what restoration 
should involve by the parties involved: an attempt to make an impartial judgement in such a 
case requires rational engagement with rational principles. 
The language used by some theorists in RD privileges the emotional response over the 
rational. See again the following quotation from Amstutz and Mullet: 
 Understand the harm and develop empathy for all sides of those 
involved 
 Respond to the needs on both sides 
 Community reintegration 
 Create caring climates 
 Change the system where it contributes to the harm 
(Amstutz & Mullet, 2005) 
The final point, and elements of the second, seem exceptions to an emotional focus. 
Developing ‘empathy for both harmed and harmer’ is listed as a primary part of the authors’ 
goals (p. 10), along with a central focus on community. While they write of an ‘ethos of 
care’, they mention the desirability of ‘self-reflection’, but it is unclear what form this should 
take. The PB4L approach to RD is less clearly focused on the emotional over the rational, 
though the example interactions in the training literature appear strongly focused on 
empathic connection. Kete 2 (‘Restorative Practice Kete Book Two / PB4L Restorative 
Practice / Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning’, n.d.) includes cognitive elements in 
the scripts provided: one (adapted from Thorsborne & Vinegrad, 2008) involves both what 
was happening and ‘what were you thinking when you did x’. This script features questions 
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centred around both affective empathy and logical thought, though the distinction between 
them is not always clear: a section beginning ‘This part of the script is aimed at developing 
empathy for others’ includes the decidedly rational-sounding ‘What do you think it must 
have been like for them?’25 One of the questions suggested in the ‘learning’ model script is 
‘Does that seem fair?’ (‘How fair or unfair is this on others in the class?’ in the skeleton 
model: p.68). This indicates that there is definitely scope to explore understandings of 
fairness in the PB4L implementation of RD. 
While attention to rational considerations is not excluded from restoration, these can be 
treated as minor factors when considered against the repair of relationships. The repair of a 
relationship ought not to be a primary concern independent of consideration of whether 
that relationship is a healthy, fair, or moral one. Greater attention to the rational in 
restorative practice would help better meet the second goal of good school discipline, that 
of understanding just authority. This is because attention to the justified way to resolve 
certain types of conflict in a democracy is governed by rationality: not by what feels fair, but 
what can be logically justified as fair. Discussing what might be a fair outcome in an 
implementation of RD provides practice at that. Restorative practices can explore ideas of 
fairness and justice as well as disharmony and harm, and better prepare students for a 
society that employs them in the resolution of conflict. 
The social institutions of many democracies apply rational principles in attempting to 
implement just outcomes. A superior social education would enable our students to develop 
their intellectual understanding of this as well as their respect for the emotional impact they 
have on other individuals. A superior education would enable our students not only to 
consider the feelings of others, but also to ask whether the resolution to a disagreement is 
fair or justified. The remainder of this thesis argues the surprising simplicity of a 
conceptually significant addition to current implementations of restorative practices that 
could enable them to better meet these goals. It presents a justification for this by rational 
and democratic principles that can be supported and explored by those of the widest range 
of ethical and religious commitments as part of the operation of the secular state, rather 
than being an imposition on an individual’s moral and ethical choices. 
                                                        
25
 This distinction is addressed more closely in chapter eight where elements of the emotional and the logical 
in empathy and sympathy are distinguished. 
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Students who can understand the reasoning behind fair conflict resolution as it is applied in 
social institutions are more likely to accept its value, and are also more capable of being 
party to such institutions’ potential modification through the democratic process in the 
future. Part of the core process of restorative classroom discipline reflects participation in 
the democratic state — encouraging students to be collaborative participants in disciplinary 
processes over situations of disagreement; understanding and even accepting why their 
society has to be so, rather than seeing authority as something imposed by the powerful to 
which they are merely subject. Schools often do little to educate teenagers about how 
authority is justified in adult society. Restorative practices can afford the opportunity to 
explore how states and institutions respond to and provide redress for harm, an opportunity 
which requires little modification of current methods to take and one that is eminently 
accessible for teenagers. At the very least, engaging students’ thinking about fairness aids 
the development of their taking of another person’s perspective, a useful skill for political 
participation. Empathetic social consciousness is desirable, yet so is the ability to stand 
outside one’s own position and logically examine what a fair resolution to a problem might 
be. This thesis proceeds by expanding in detail first upon these concepts and how they 
support both good school discipline and citizenship education in chapter four, and then on 
the detail of how social contract reasoning in restorative discipline can be used to support 




Rationality, deliberative democracy, and citizenship education 
This chapter links education about justified authority, one of the key components of good 
school discipline, with citizenship education in a democracy. It does so by justification of the 
role of rationality in adjudicating between differences of opinion in a pluralist society, and 
how public institutions are required to operate by rational means for their political authority 
to be justified. Understanding their operation, and developing the ability to participate in 
their modification, is an important part of being a capable democratic citizen, and educating 
citizens for this equally is an important principle that is not subject to the moral or political 
preferences of individual communities. Developing pupils’ capability of rational thought 
further through restorative discipline practices contributes both to better school discipline 
and better democratic citizenship education. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first explores the special role of rationality in 
cases of disagreement about fact, value, and morality between democratic citizens in a 
secular state. It specifies the understanding of rationality under discussion here, and 
defends its particular importance for the intersubjective space.26 Given an 
acknowledgement of the practical constraints of the existing forms of government in 
democratic states, and reasonable disagreement over value and morality, this section 
argues how understanding the justification of authority involves understanding the 
justification of political authority. 
Section two addresses how the principles in the prior section on finding intersubjectively- 
acceptable rational positions in situations of conflict apply both in schools and in wider 
democratic society, and how developing such reasoning and understanding is an important 
part of education for democratic participation. It (this section) does so by reference to 
theories of deliberative democracy, and highlights their suitability for framing the overt 
exploration of justified authority in restorative discipline discussions. 
                                                        
26
 This is not a purely subjective space, but makes no claim to be describing objective truths about the world; it 
is rather the space in which two or more subjective experiences of the world are perceived to interact. 
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Section three describes different understandings of citizenship education, and how 
deliberative democratic discussion can constitute an educational exercise in practical civics 
as well as a component of good school discipline. 
Rationality in the justification of political authority 
Education about the justification of authority was established in chapter one to be a 
component of good school discipline. This section explains why rationality is important for 
understanding this justification. Given a plurality of reasonable justifications for authority 
from different moral perspectives, and no society-wide agreement on moral positions or 
value systems, understanding a mutually-acceptable justification of authority is argued to 
entail understanding the justification of political authority in these situations of persistent 
disagreement, as it is political authority that can be mutually agreed upon in situations 
where other sources of authority are under dispute. Attention to the rational in conflict 
resolution situations such as in school discipline can support the development of this 
understanding. 
Reasoning according to rational principles is important for the justification of political 
authority due to its particular ability to adjudicate fairly in disputes between individuals on 
matters of reasoning or preference for which the other party or parties would not otherwise 
accept similar grounds. This section begins with clarifying the nature of the rational as 
referred to in this thesis, and its properties of intersubjective acceptability that non-rational 
forms of reasoning do not necessarily bear. 
Rationality 
Rationality is a term with a number of different specific understandings. In this thesis, the 
rational means that which is in accordance with logically consistent reasoning. The concept 
is used here primarily to contrast decisions made on such a basis with those driven primarily 
by other factors, such as emotional or affective impulses, that turn out to be irrational. It is 
used neither in the economic sense of making decisions to maximise one’s own expected 
benefit, nor in the specific philosophical sense of being in contrast with the empirical. In 
contrast with Scheffler’s (2010) understanding of rationality, which defends the emotions as 
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cognitive, it is used largely to highlight the distinction above. To quote Southwood, to whom 
the discussion of rationality will return, ‘being rational involves freely submitting ourselves 
to norms we acknowledge as independent of us and being disposed to honor and be guided 
by the force of reasons; it centrally involves openness and responsiveness to criticism’ 
(2008). This is the understanding of rationality adopted here. 
Not all reasons are necessarily rationally consistent. The distinction between reason and 
rationality, and one’s reasons to act rationally, are explored in more detail below. 
Rationality is insufficient as a complete picture of the type of thinking individuals require to 
negotiate their lives, but is argued here to be a critical part of justification of authority that 
other individuals can accept. Without rationality, and the attention to fairness to which its 
public consideration is argued to lead, attempts at restoration might restore situations of 
injustice as described at the end of the previous chapter. Rationality lies at the centre of 
Dewey’s philosophy of education, and was no less critical for philosophers of the London 
School such as Peters and Hirst, who saw for education ‘a specific end: namely, the creation 
of rational agents, autonomous, reflective and critical…rationality and autonomy at the apex 
of our educational ideals’ (Siegel, 2009).  
Two major objections to such a position are addressed by Siegel, and similar defences are 
adopted here. ‘A long tradition in the philosophy of education identifies education’s most 
fundamental aim and ideal as that of the fostering or cultivation of rationality’ (Siegel, 
2012). He proposes (1988) that the goal of education is to develop good critical thinkers. For 
him this involves the assessment of reasons and a critical attitude. A critical thinker is 
appropriately moved by reasons; having the disposition to act in accordance with reasons, 
and the ability to assess their force in situations in which reasons play a role. Such a 
rationality prepares students to participate meaningfully in democratic processes of the 
form described below, and by ‘explicitly (acknowledging) the desirability of the attainment 
by students of self-sufficiency and autonomy’ supports the principles on which it is 
grounded. 
Siegel addresses two major objections to the central role in education of the development 
of rationality. Both of these apply similarly to the defence of the role rationality plays in the 
justification of authority, and consequently in school discipline. The first he terms the 
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‘ideology objection’27. This is the position that critical thinking involving rationality is but one 
ideology, the value of which in comparison with other ideologies cannot be evaluated by 
ideologically neutral means. The argument against this, Siegel claims, is presupposed by the 
manner in which it is made. The form of engagement making such an argument involves is 
rational. Attempting to refute rationality by a rationalised position is self-refuting; in doing 
so, one implicitly acknowledges the importance of rationality (at least in the evaluation of 
such cases). This argument is not without its problems. It is impossible to begin from a 
wholly value-neutral position. Siegel’s claim presupposes a rational discourse of the sort in 
which academic debate occurs. It is possible to reject this foundation, but not in a manner 
which an academic thesis can express while claiming the value of rational evaluative 
methods. As a universal value, rationality can be challenged. It will suffice here instead to 
defend the subordinate value of instrumental rationality as a tool that can be of mutually 
accepted value even in situations of ideological disagreement. 
For practical instrumental rationality (that is, taking the action necessary to achieve one’s 
given ends), a logical engagement with cause and effect better enables us to achieve the 
ends we desire in domains where rational models have predictive power. If one has 
observed through inductive means that eating food causes one to feel less hungry, then, 
when desiring to feel less hungry, one should expect greater success at meeting this aim by 
pursing the rational course of action of eating food than by an irrational one, such as 
drawing a picture, all other considerations set aside. 
Thus, the reasons conception of critical thinking, even if it is an ideology, must be 
recognized at least for its value in such situations. Siegel claims it ‘as the best or most 
defensible one, for it alone sanctions the critical evaluation of all ideologies’ (p.75, emphasis 
in original). It may not be the ‘best’ from all perspectives, as it may be preferable for an 
individual to sacrifice some desires-ends correspondence for the sake of satisfying other 
values which they personally hold superordinate, but it still has a particular instrumental 
value. Even if rationality cannot evaluate all ideologies neutrally, it can evaluate those which 
claim to be grounded on rational and logical concepts. 
                                                        
27 Most prominently made by Feyerabend (1987, 1993) 
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While it is possible to challenge arguments of self-refutation in general, if this type of 
argument holds then a reasoned argument cannot undermine reason. In practical terms, 
once one has been pre-exposed to a society in which the benefits of rationality are made 
apparent then it is impossible to avoid such a presupposition. By participation in the reading 
or writing of this thesis then one is engaging with a domain in which the value of rational 
argument is presupposed. It is not practically possible to prevent pupils from being exposed 
to situations where there appear to be benefits to rationality. Regardless of the success of 
the theoretical defence, in practical instantiation such an objection could not practically be 
accommodated. 
The second objection Siegel addresses is that in order to teach students to be rational they 
must be predisposed to believe that critical thinking is important. Siegel argues that it is 
sometimes necessary and justified to inculcate some foundational beliefs without 
justification (p.89). This thesis mounts not a defence of rationality in general, but of its value 
in good school discipline. The argument in chapter one established developing pupils’ 
understandings of the justification of authority as one of the goals of good school discipline. 
The desirability of rationality (which this chapter requires in order to defend the above goal) 
is entailed by the presupposition that good school discipline is desirable, regardless of 
whether or not one accepts Southwood’s argument for the normativity of rationality 
presented below. 
This thesis is concerned more with the justification for institutions operating according to 
rational principles, on which the following sections elaborate, than the justification of 
rationality as important for an individual’s own decision-making. If institutions other than 
schools are required to operate rationally, then there is a further argument in defence of 
the development of rationality in education: that it better enables one to engage with and 
shape social institutions, and thus better participate in adult democratic life. 
Rationality as distinct from reason 
Kolodny’s (2005) paper Why be rational? has kindled considerable debate28 over whether or 
not we have good reason to be rational. The debate separates an individual’s (instrumental) 
reasons from the requirements of rational consistency. A recent paper from Southwood 
                                                        
28 See Broome (2013). 
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(2008) presents a justification for why it is that we ought to act in accordance with the 
demands of rationality on which this thesis builds. 
Southwood defends rationality as justified grounds for action with respect to the meeting of 
our own subjective goals. He considers Broome’s challenge, as he calls the generalised 
question of why to be rational as addressed by Broome and Kolodny, unlikely to be met. 
However, he considers their characterisation of the problem as unsatisfactory. Southwood 
recasts Prichard’s (1912) argument that external reasons are unnecessary for morality: 
morality’s reasons are internal. This fits well with the position on moral pluralism adopted 
throughout this thesis: that there may not necessarily be a compelling personal reason for 
pursuing actions in accordance with a particular moral set of beliefs, but there is good 
collective, public reason for the establishment of institutions that encourage the pursuit of 
rational courses of action, and disincentivise others.  
Southwood’s conclusion is expressed in language that effectively highlights the distinctions 
this thesis will make about the obligations of rationality on the individual and the obligations 
upon institutions to operate (ideally) rationally. He makes a distinction between the 
question of whether to obey rationality and the reasons of rationality. Obedience to 
rationality is the subject of external reasons, and the challenge he considers unlikely to be 
met.29 Similarly, this thesis does not claim reasons for individuals to act rationally. However, 
rationality itself entails reasons, construed by Southwood as consisting of the demands of 
our particular first-person standpoint (e.g. the desire for our achieved ends to closely 
correspond with our desires). Such internal reasons can be motivating reasons for 
rationality, and desires-ends correspondence is a powerful motivation for rationality to be 
followed in any social institutions our society collectively constructs. Consequently, the 
failure to locate an independent justification for following rational requirements should do 
nothing to undermine belief in motivating reasons for rationality. This thesis adopts this 
approach and considers one reason for rationality to be as follows: how I ought to behave to 
give full respect to certain wishes, capabilities and even obligations to myself. It is not 
something for which external justificatory reasons need necessarily to be found. In short, 
and in allusion to Scanlon’s work on the social contract as explored in chapter five, ‘if 
                                                        
29 This would be somewhat analogous to finding a defence of rationality as a neutral, universal value. 
86 
 
morality is a matter of what we owe to each other, rationality is a matter of what we owe to 
ourselves’ (Southwood, 2008, p. 30). 
Developing students’ rational capabilities is often argued to be a vital component of 
education, and is required for the understanding of just authority and full participation in 
democratic society; key goals of good school discipline, as the rest of this chapter shall go on 
to argue. 
The value of rationality in the intersubjective space 
Regardless of the subjective value of rationality, it has a particular value in communication 
between different individuals. It has intersubjective value: that is, without the necessity of a 
shared position on other questions of truth and value, rationality enables judgements of 
validity and acceptability to be discussed meaningfully in a way that irrational 
communication does not. 
Communication that builds from mutually acceptable claims with a consistent logic can 
provide intersubjectively-acceptable understandings of cause and effect, and consequently 
reasons for action. Logical grounds for an action can be communicated to an interlocutor in 
a way that they may consider also compelling for them. For example, ‘Don’t touch the stove; 
it’s still hot and may burn you’ conveys a more persuasive reason than a supernatural 
explanation of the same phenomenon founded on beliefs that the listener does not share. 
Full agreement is not necessary about facts and values in the world, but different principles 
and reasoning may lead to the same conclusion. This is rational convergence (where the 
same conclusion is reached from different grounds), rather than consensus (where grounds, 
reasoning, and conclusion align). These terms that will recur in the discussion of public 
reason that follows. 
In order to evaluate the generalisable acceptability of another’s causal claim, similarities in 
understanding of causal logic are necessary to make the conversation carry appropriately 
similar meanings for the speaker and the listener. If you, the reader, believe you can 
evaluate this argument in a mutually meaningful way, you presuppose a certain level of 
shared understanding of logic between us. The closer our logics are to identical, the more 




While he is not a theorist on which this thesis directly builds, this ascription of value to 
rational communication in an attempt to reach consensus bears considerable similarities to 
Habermas’ work on communicative rationality (Habermas & McCarthy, 1984) — work which 
is also concerned with decision making in deliberative democracy, the subject of the next 
section of this chapter. Habermas’ discourse theory considers the appropriate form of public 
discussion and debate over practical questions that confront political bodies. It aims to 
enable inclusive critical discussion in which interlocutors converse as equals in an attempt to 
reach a shared understanding on matters which affect them all. These principles are 
expanded and explained in considerable detail over the course of this chapter as 
components of public reason in deliberative democracy. 
While many of the concepts he addresses are deployed and explored in later sections of this 
argument, Habermas’ idealisation of the conditions for such discussions is slightly different 
to those in which this thesis works. This thesis is not an attempt to construct a generalised 
theory of communication, rather to establish a framework for developing rational capability 
through conversations that take place in restorative discipline. Similar principles of informed 
and fair co-operation in situations of comprehensive disagreement are adopted, via a model 
of deliberative democracy, though the scope of discussions and domain of those who can be 
considered to be affected is limited. 
Habermas summarises his idealised conception of practical discourse in the discourse 
principle, which may be understood as follows: 
A rule of action or choice is justified, and thus valid, only if all those affected 
by the rule or choice could accept it in a reasonable discourse. 
(Bohman & Rehg, 2014) 
While Habermas initially presented this as a moral principle, it can more generally be 
considered as a principle of impartial justification30 that holds for all types of practical 
discourse. This chapter goes on to deal with this distinction between the moral and that 
which can be impartially justified, and argues that impartial justification is sometimes 
necessary for just authority. 
                                                        
30
 This concept is addressed in depth in the next section with reference to Rawls’ original position (1971) and 
Smith’s impartial spectator (1759/2000). 
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Communicative rationality refers to the capacity to engage in such discussion under 
conditions as close as possible to this ideal, with the aim of achieving consensus. The 
argument which follows broadly adheres to this principle, though accepts convergence on a 
solution rather than consensus on the reasoning for how to get there in a classroom 
situation. Outside of this principle, the system proposed here bears closer resemblance to 
aspects of Rawls’ work than to Habermas’, and will be evaluated in comparison to his 
theories in due course.  
Claims and logic shared between individuals can help find agreement on models of cause 
and effect, and thus reasons for action. The fewer mistakes31 we make in formulating these 
models, the better their predictive power for future events. Better ability to predict events 
gives us better ability to choose actions more likely to obtain the outcomes we desire or 
value in the future. For a collective, rational communication has an intersubjective 
acceptability and predictive power that communication without logical reason does not. 
This thesis will proceed to argue that for conflict resolution in the public space, the value of 
rationality is grounds for fairness having authority in interpersonal disputes when wishing to 
allow pluralism over key matters of value under concern. 
Practical constraints 
Alongside the discussion of idealised models, this thesis accepts and works alongside the 
limitations of existing political situations: the existing compulsions of our nation-states and 
school governance systems. This proposal is for a practical and reasonable change to 
existing systems that is expected to lead to positive benefits, rather than an attempt to build 
a utopian32 system in isolation. Some of the foundations of the school policies or nation-
states in which we live may be unjust or irrational, though this does not undermine 
attempts to make incremental progress within an existing system. 
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 The notion of mistakes should not be particularly problematic: if one does not accept the axiom of non-
contradiction, finding shared meaning worth discussing in this or any academic writing is futile. A mutual 
engagement with this medium presupposes certain beliefs, and this argument does not need to isolate them 
all; rather to highlight those important for making the progress under discussion. 
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One key principle this thesis follows is that of the secular state — that government does not 
privilege one particular moral or religious position, or force it upon citizens. Understanding 
and accepting the collective need to adopt a particular policy over what an individual 
personally considers moral is a critical part of accepting the secular state, and necessary for 
the argument in progress.33 
When considering whether certain restrictions or resolutions are fairly justified, there will 
be practical limitations to the extent that conclusions can be pursued in the school. Some of 
these will be because of requirements of the government that are beyond the scope of what 
can be addressed within an educational institution. For example, a state school cannot 
institute rules which are against national law. Students can, however, at least be made 
aware of this, which serves as part of critical citizenship education in revealing power 
structures that bear upon them of which they were previously unaware.34 Such awareness 
may leave students better equipped to evaluate and participate in the shaping of national 
policy in later life, but for present purposes such restrictions must be accepted. The 
justification of compulsions upon students can be investigated, but they form a starting 
point for practical discussion. It is also worth noting the compulsion of membership of the 
democratic state in which one resides. There is only limited scope for an individual to opt 
out of certain aspects of their present state’s machinery, such as the justice system, and this 
is another principle that is accepted perforce rather than justified in this thesis. 
If one objects to aspects of inequality between nations, one can argue against the moral 
justification of national borders even if one lacks the power to change them. Similarly, a 
child’s desires may not be able to be fully respected in disagreements that take place at 
school. For many young teenagers, the law of the land combined with the will of their 
parents may provide an unsatisfactory answer to the question ‘Why do I have to go to 
school?’, but it is nonetheless a possible justification that can be exposed, and the justice of 
it can be discussed. The deeper exploration, discussion, and understanding of such problems 
are valuable elements of critical citizenship education, as discussed below. 
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 This precondition may seem to establish respect for rationality as an ideologically-neutral evaluative force, 
but it is only the instrumental value of rationality that is necessary for this thesis’ argument rather than any 
ascription to it of superordinacy to all other value claims. 




The secular state allows for individuals to have different views on matters of value and 
morality. In some democracies this is constitutionally enshrined, such as by the right to 
freedom of religious belief in the USA.  Individuals do not have to act logically, morally, or 
consistently. Consequently, to provide an intersubjectively-acceptable solution to situations 
of conflict, rationality is important when other grounds for finding agreement prove 
insufficient. If one remains neutral between conflicting values under discussion, rationality 
may be an important subordinate value on which it is possible for disputants to agree. While 
agreement will sometimes not be possible to find, and ongoing conflict or resolution by 
force may be preferable for some parties involved, rationality can at least provide a solution 
that a third party would accept as fair (on which more follows) when it is necessary to 
resolve a conflict as the costs to the community would otherwise be too great. This concept 
will be important for the discussion of democratic theory below. 
The holding of opinions and positions can be respected without those positions themselves 
being given respect. Upholding the right of an individual to hold a view of their choice is 
different from respecting the content of that view. The system of deliberative democracy 
that follows allows for a reasonable pluralism of positions. That is, it acknowledges that 
there are positions on which there is rational and reasonable disagreement. In Rawls’ 
words, ‘citizens who freely exercise their powers of reasoning will tend to pervasively and 
persistently disagree about their fundamental values and principles’ (Rawls, 2005). 
Reasonable pluralism does not necessitate respect for all divergent positions; a position 
which is demonstrably irrational35 does not merit weight being attached to it in the 
evaluation of fair compromise involved in the democratic process. This may seem an 
extreme statement if expressed colloquially, but is logically necessary. The reason it does 
not entail extreme censorship is that doubt over the irrationality of a position renders it 
admissible into the democratic discourse for its merit to be evaluated. If two different belief 
groups hold opposing positions that may both be rationally justified, then democratic 
deliberation can attempt to find fair resolution between them. If a view is held that is 
demonstrably self-contradictory, then this position cannot be assigned value within a logical 
                                                        
35
 This will be a small, and possibly non-existent, set: for example, beliefs which deny analytic truths (e.g. 
1+1=3).  If a position is not necessarily irrational, or if this is disputed, then it is a matter for democratic 
deliberation, as follows. 
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process with which it is incompatible. When positions are found to be unsound, then a 
rational debate ceases to allow space for consideration of their consequences. 
As described above, rational thinking has better predictive ability concerning the results of 
future actions and events than irrational thinking, and so better enables individuals to 
obtain the outcomes they wish. This is assumed to be desirable. Collectively, the same 
principle applies. It is assumed to be desirable to be better able to carry out that for which 
we collectively wish, given acknowledgement that democratic resolutions may be imperfect 
reflections of such. Better rational communication can help us better shape our collective 
decision-making to our shared wishes. 
Just political authority as superordinate to morality in a secular and pluralist democracy 
Justified authority, in some situations of disagreement over values, will therefore have to be 
based on rational principles to find an acceptable solution between two disagreeing parties 
in a situation of conflict. Understanding justified authority is one of the key goals established 
for good school discipline to meet. Even if agreement cannot be reached, individuals ought 
to recognise the pre-eminent role of the rational in attempting to find fair resolution 
between apparently opposed positions. Such rational reasoning needs to be based on 
principles that are either i) mutually accepted (such as shared understandings of cause and 
effect, or perhaps some mutually held values or rights) or ii) practically unavoidable in cases 
of reasoning to a practical rather than an ideal outcome (elements of the existing force of 
the state, or the school at a smaller level of scope). This justification of intersubjectively-
acceptable authority is the justification of political authority. Consequently, in some 
situations understanding the justification of authority will entail understanding the 
justification of political authority. Better rational capability enables one better to do this, 
and thus meet one of the key goals of school discipline. 
It is important to recognise that one can attach importance both to personal moral 
commitments and separately to governance which may override these commitments in a 
secular state. That a citizen may not have chosen to live in a secular state is a reasonable 
objection, though beyond the scope of this thesis which addresses education for 
democracies, with particular reference to New Zealand. It is possible for some schools 
within a state to adhere to specific moral commitments beyond these rational principles, 
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and this will be expanded upon in chapter six. There can be agreement of principles upon 
which to reason beyond that of rationality itself. 
Accepting governmental and social structures that may not follow one's individual beliefs is 
a reality of secular democracy, but one that brings a concomitant benefit — freedom from 
subjugation by other belief structures that might place restrictions upon individuals without 
having intersubjectively-acceptable rational justification for doing so. The ability to adopt 
and reason from a third-person perspective may make this easier to recognise, a skill which 
the suggested extension to restorative discipline aims to develop. 
Social institutions and their role 
Social institutions, including schools and criminal justice systems, are often required to 
make interventions between parties with opposed beliefs or values and find resolutions in 
situations of conflict. In a secular state, citizens have recourse to institutions which are 
neutral on such matters of dispute. A state which offers only faith schools or religious courts 
is not (as this thesis understands the term) a secular state. Such neutral institutions operate 
(ideally) according to the law, and seek to find outcomes to conflicts without preference for 
one belief system over another. If these outcomes are to be justifiable to those of the 
widest possible range of different moral commitments, then they have to be based on 
rational principles (because of the intersubjective acceptability of rationality).36 These 
institutions do not carry political authority without such justification as they exert force, and 
without acceptable justification such force is merely coercion rather than justified political 
authority. 
This position can be justified by arguments from first principles in political theory. A 
traditional approach based on hypothetical social contracts that fits the discussions which 
follow is to assume a ‘state of nature’, and freedom from interference from other 
individuals. The loss of these negative freedoms requires corresponding benefits to be 
afforded for an individual to willingly enter into a contract with a government that restricts 
some of their actions. While there are other models for the justification of government, the 
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discussion of classroom rules in restorative discipline can make such initial assumptions 
transparent and collaboratively build on them. The role of institutions in both a school and 
the state can be subject to rational deliberative discussion in a democracy. 
To summarise, the demands made of institutions are significantly different to those of 
private individuals in democracies. While democracies do not compel their citizens to be 
rational, if they choose not to be (as a simple example, it would be incompatible with 
freedom of religion, which includes the freedom to believe contradictory tenets), our 
institutions operate in the intersubjective space where rational justifications/arguments 
have value, as described above; and thus, logical reasoning behind decisions is valued. The 
justification for our social institutions such as our law courts, governing bodies, and schools 
must be rational in order to be widely acceptable to those of differing belief systems. While 
in practice these institutions fall short of meeting such ideals, our democracies also fall short 
(if they attempt to be deliberative as described in the next section) from the ideal of fair and 
fully informed communication that is free from the influence of power dynamics which 
would misshape the decisions. While some may consider the role of, for example, law courts 
primarily to consider emotional satisfaction, the ideals governing these systems are rational 
— even if their implementations can be imperfect. The weakness of a state at implementing 
its ideals is a consideration for practical justification, and democratic debate. 
If someone understands the rationality behind a particular judgement that overrules their 
individual desire, then they may be better disposed to accept it.37 A compulsion so justified 
appears less like the arbitrary exercise of personal power from which progressive classroom 
management theorists seek to move away in the understanding of school discipline. The 
authority of a fair discipline system that is worthy of such respect must, therefore, be 
contingent upon its rationality. While individuals are not required to be consistently 
rational, secular social institutions ideally ought to be so; and thus a benefit of developing 
one’s rational capability is the ability to better engage with and modify such systems 
through democratic processes in future adult life. Mutually acceptable rationality is at the 
heart of just resolution to conflict, and it is desirable for it to be seen and respected to be so 
in the implementation of discipline in the school community.  
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In conclusion, understanding the justification of political authority is a component of 
understanding the justification of authority that is important when attempting to find 
agreement or fair resolution in situations of conflict between people holding irreconcilably 
different value systems. This can be supported by greater attention to developing rational 
capabilities, and is a component of good school discipline that can be better attended to in 
restorative discipline, by means which the next chapter shall illustrate. 
Democracy and public reason 
This section addresses the links between the proposed extension to restorative discipline 
discussions and education for democracy. The principles above on finding acceptable 
rational positions in situations of conflict apply both in schools and wider society, and this 
section examines how overtly exploring the justification of resolutions to conflicts in schools 
contributes both to good school discipline and to education about adult democratic life. 
Impartial reasoning, public reason, and public justification 
Firstly, some clarifications follow on the nature of such reasoning and the compromise 
positions to which it leads. 
Such positions are described here as ‘compromises’ or ‘intersubjectively acceptable’ for 
clarity, but they may not actually be acceptable to either participant in a dispute. The 
individuals may have opposed (moral) beliefs that do not allow for compromise positions. If 
one person’s beliefs demand p, and another’s demand ¬p, then there is no rational position 
that allows for the satisfaction of both.38 Often it is important not to take a position on p in 
making a ruling in such situations, such as in the case of judgements on moral or religious 
positions at state level, and on judgements in ‘he-said/she-said’ situations in school conflicts 
without further supporting evidence in one direction or the other. In the resolution of such 
situations — when resolution is necessary,  such as in situations where taking no action is a 
worse outcome for all those involved — the position sought is that which is best justifiable 
to an impartial observer. 
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 A compromise on the satisfaction of neither would be possible if the law of the excluded middle is rejected, 
but addressing this approach is not necessary for the development of the argument at hand. 
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The impartial observer is a concept drawn from Rawls’ theory of the ‘original position’ 
(Rawls, 1971/2000). The principle is that in such situations one should choose (or resolution 
should be made) as if one were to decide an outcome, and then become one of the 
disputants, without knowing in advance which of them one would become. This allows for 
an evaluation of the relative effects of a decision on those subject to it. It engages one’s 
reasoning in terms of fairness, and provides grounds for decisions in certain cases where the 
costs or benefits of a particular resolution may seem particularly skewed in their 
distribution. If there are no moral or other grounds for decision in cases of irreconcilable 
conflict, fairness is a principle to which one can retreat which is intersubjectively justified by 
its rationality. 
It is important to note that intersubjectively-acceptable reasoning does not precisely 
produce fairness. Individuals do not reason from ideal situations, and may, for example, 
have lower expectations of how much an acceptable outcome would benefit them than that 
which is just. There may be inequalities or injustices which can be exposed in discussions, 
but not fairly resolved. The model of such reasoning does, however, provide grounds for 
working out what fair conflict resolution would entail in situations where neutrality over 
matters of value is important — in Rawls’ terms, where comprehensive doctrines are in 
conflict. 
This impersonal concept of fairness is at the core of Rawls’ conception of justice. Justice is 
not the object of pursuit here, but rationally justified authority in cases of conflict is. Direct 
reference to justice would involve further connotations, and specific inclusions and 
exclusions, but this aspect of the principle is the same.  
In school discussions that take place as part of restorative discipline, one can model and 
explain such reasoning in conflict situations, as described in the next chapter. Pupils can be 
involved in developing their capacity to think rationally from an impartial perspective. In 
many situations, collectively developing reasoning to the best-possible impartial solution on 
which participants can agree will be the most desirable outcome. This collective 
development of best reason in the public space is the core component of participation in 
deliberative democracy. School discipline can, consequently, actively prepare students for 
this model of democratic adult life. 
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The difference between the best acceptable rational reasoning, and the concept of ‘public 
reason’ should briefly be clarified. Rawls’ public reason involves justifying a position by 
means that those of different political or moral backgrounds could accept.39 A more general 
notion is that of public justification, where political rules are only valid if they are justifiable 
or acceptable to all those persons over whom they claim authority. The reasoning proposed 
for use within restorative discussions is the best collective rational position, free from 
subjective bias and undue influence of power, as the next section shall clarify. This ‘best 
public reasoning’ is distinct from ‘public justification’; a concept on which the democratic 
system that values it rests. 
Best reasoning in school conflicts is additionally only required to hold within a community 
that may be limited by other factors, such as enforced conditions that are counter to the 
principles which a community attempts to espouse. While restorative communities aim to 
reduce or eliminate these, some are likely still to be present (compulsion from one’s parents 
to attend school against one’s will can be a common example). This model of reasoning is 
something to which one can retreat when faced with contradictory statements of fact or 
belief systems. In practical situations, there will often be some agreement on shared 
principles of value and fact on which a decision can also depend. Reference to an impartial 
perspective will not always be required. 
Collective reasoning as described here is an attempt to iterate towards the best possible 
conclusion; to model how people ought, hypothetically, to reason. This concept of ideal 
reason fits with the model of deliberative democracy proposed below, but not precisely 
with the representative democracy that governs New Zealand in practice. The best reason is 
prioritised, rather than a simple majority of opinions. Despite this difference between an 
ideal model and current practice, developing the ability to reason about fairness from an 
impartial position is still education for the improved understanding of and ability to 
participate in adult democratic life. 
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This section explores the nature of the democracies that such reasoning can inform. 
Democracies feature active participation by their subjects in political life, a system for 
replacing governments by free and fair elections, protection for the human rights of all 
citizens, and the rule of law (Diamond, 2016). Beyond this, different sub-classifications 
distinguish features of their operation. Some democracies are direct, with citizens 
participating actively in specific questions of governance, while others are representative, in 
which individuals or groups are delegated to the task of making certain decisions on behalf 
of the people. This thesis focuses on one particular quality of democracies: deliberation. 
Either direct or representative forms of democracy can be deliberative. Deliberative 
democracy is distinguished from other types of democracy in that decisions are considered 
legitimate on the basis of ‘authentic deliberation’, rather than the aggregation of citizen’s 
preferences through voting. This section focuses on Gutmann and Thompson’s conception 
of deliberative democracy as it follows clear principles which fit the theories above, transfer 
to classroom situations, and support the argument of this thesis. 
The features necessary for deliberation to be considered authentic are formulated slightly 
differently by different theorists, though with substantial overlap on the core principles. 
Deliberation is considered authentic if it is public, sustained (i.e. decisions may be revisited), 
and free from the undue influence of wealth and special interest groups. Bessette (1980) 
was first to describe such discussions as part of ‘deliberative democracy’, although its roots 
can be recognised as far back as Classical Athenian democracy, where reasoned discussion 
was considered a critical preliminary to wise political action. Fishkin (2011) requires 
democratic deliberation to be informed, balanced, sincere, and not biased in its 
consideration by the identity or capability of a speaker. These features are all components 
of the ideal public rationality described in the first section of this chapter. To these Cohen (J. 
Cohen, 1989) adds the requirements of ongoing association of those involved in the 
discussion, an acceptance of pluralism as described above, transparency (a similar 
requirement to sincerity of honest, complete, and open discussion), and an acceptance of 
being governed by such a system. He also identifies deliberation as the key feature of many 
social institutions, in line with the arguments above about the rational duties they bear. 
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These conditions can all be met by the system described in this thesis, and can be applied in 
school discipline systems. 
Deliberative democracy presumes the existence of reasonable pluralism: that there are 
positions (notably moral positions) on which opposing views cannot reasonably be rejected. 
In these situations, the view of another party should be respected even if one is in 
disagreement with it. This is a consequence of allowing free and equal citizens to exercise 
their own capacities to reason (on which more below). In Gutmann and Thompson’s terms 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004), these are deliberative disagreements: disagreements 
over which it is desirable for discussion to take place in the public sphere to establish the 
best way to move forwards in situations in which two positions are arguably reasonable, yet 
in contradiction. 
Their formulation of deliberative democracy allows discussion of such difficult problems in 
any places where citizens come together to discuss matters of public interest on a regular 
basis, and reach collective decisions. The procedures and the reasoning behind the 
discussion of such problems are open to question, and this can be analogised to restorative 
discipline. If a child is instructed not to play on top of the high wall, a discussion of the 
reasons behind that injunction may develop his or her thinking about how the competing 
considerations of pleasure and potential injury interact. 
Gutmann and Thompson’s model is highly suitable for the description of both deliberative 
democratic government and classroom discussions that employ similar forms of reasoning. 
They describe a collective of free and equal citizens — either private citizens or their 
representatives — who provide each other with mutually acceptable justifications for their 
decisions. Deliberative democracy ideally models the best of the public reasoning described 
above, and this is most apparent in contrast with an aggregative system in which voters may 
follow their self-interest, and the majority holds sway. A deliberative democracy seeks the 
best possible rational solution, rather than the collation of preferences or ill-founded 
reasoning. While such reasoning is unlikely to be perfectly achieved, it is a governing 
principle for how deliberative discussions should be conducted. 
This description is condensed by Gutmann and Thompson into governing principles which 
are well-fitted to the language of rationality and public reason used above. They stipulate 
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reason giving and mutual acceptability, which fit the arguments for the value of rationality 
in the intersubjective space. They describe reasons as necessarily reciprocal — that is, they 
cannot be reasonably rejected, and would be acceptable from Rawls’ original position, as 
described above. Reasons must also be accessible; as with Cohen’s stipulation of ongoing 
association of the democratic community, this is to render judgements provisional, ‘with the 
aim of reaching decisions that are binding on all at present but open to challenge in the 
future’. Such a principle fits both the enactment of government policy and the creation of 
rules in a classroom community. In democratic and restorative classrooms, as in the state, 
communities are typically bound in ongoing association and with an expectation that they 
will keep evaluating and engaging with the conditions of their community. Restorative 
conversations keep principles of conflict resolution and their justification accessible. 
A key factor that makes Gutmann and Thompson’s formulation of deliberative democracy 
suitable for classroom discussions in a secular and morally plural state is that it makes no 
claims to present a comprehensive ethical doctrine of its own. Deliberative democracy, in 
their terms, is purely a ‘second-order theory’; a means of negotiating and evaluating other 
theories and matters of concern. ‘As a model for everyday reasoning, it does not need to 
presuppose any strong claims about ethics or epistemology’ (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 
p. 5). Both the principles and procedures of deliberative democracy can be considered 
provisional, and consequently open to adaptation by the resolutions of local communities. 
Deliberative democracy does not stipulate principles that impact upon the moral domain to 
which sub-communities may object beyond those of the secular state, which have been 
defended at length above. Gutmann and Thompson explicitly write that the ‘basic principle 
of reciprocity makes room for ongoing moral conflict’. This enables a deliberative structure 
to foreground rational reasoning as a means of adjudicating between other claims while 
opening its own principles to the same evaluation. In a similar manner, a restorative 
discussion can explore how a certain proposed outcome to a disciplinary situation is ‘fair’ 
and also discuss the grounds for the system itself. This will be applicable to the use of social 
contract theory recommended to help frame such discussions in the next chapter: it can be 
a starting point, and open to reform (perhaps moving between contractarian and 
contractual formulations as described) and even rejection through the process of 
deliberative discussion. Facilitators in restorative discussions can seek to resolve conflicts 
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while always being transparent about what rules and principles are being respected, and 
open to their discussion. 
In grounding such discussions, models of democracy differ over whether principles or 
procedures should be established as prior to the other. Deliberative theorists typically part 
from Rawls on these grounds, as Rawls stipulates justice as a primary value beyond the 
reach of democratic deliberation. This model is not specifically tied to one conception of 
justice, rather leaving it open to change according to democratic deliberation. The value of 
rationality is necessary, as defended above on the grounds both of its merit in education 
and its utility in reaching understanding between different individuals. Rationality itself may 
be re-evaluated within deliberative discussion, but it can be argued to be impossible to 
refute successfully in a primarily rational system. It can be challenged, but faces the 
difficulty of using rational means to discredit the rational, as Siegel argues against in the first 
section of this chapter. The discourse of co-operation in schools may be inescapably rational 
for its reasoning to hold any acceptability that is widely intersubjectively-acceptable. 
Other principles can be subject to initial stipulation and progressive change, like the 
procedures of the model, which renders deliberative democracy neither entirely procedural 
nor entirely principled. This is useful for a system that is to be applied in a variety of 
educational environments, some of which will necessarily face restrictions that may not be 
rationally well-justified. Gutmann and Thompson stipulate three initial principles of politics 
— reciprocity, publicity, and accountability — and three principles of policies — basic 
liberty, basic opportunity and fair opportunity —, all of which flow from reciprocity. 
Reciprocal respect for persons as reasoning beings is central to their free and equal status, 
and entails respecting one another by recognizing the obligation to mutually justify to one 
another laws and policies, in terms that permit reasonable disagreement (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996, p. 137). Meeting this requirement to justify laws to one another by terms 
another individual might accept (i.e. in the intersubjective space) requires learning about 
the rational justification for (political) authority. Consequently, education about justified 
authority, part of good school discipline, is an important component of education for full 
participation in democratic deliberation. This supports the adoption of disciplinary systems 
well-suited to model and educate about such systems in schools as preparation for full and 
equal participation in adult life. 
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This section concludes by noting two challenges to respecting the above principles in 
practice, and further specific benefits of a deliberative model for the classroom context. 
One practical challenge is the evaluation of whether state educational institutions in New 
Zealand and their discipline systems reflect the principles above. Principles of equal 
opportunity may be expected to be beyond the remit of a teacher’s personal preference in 
establishing the grounds for their classroom society; in practice, however, the manner of 
their interpretation may lead to disagreement over whether they are being implemented or 
not. For example, some may consider positive discrimination40 an important part of equal or 
fair opportunity, others a violation of that principle. Principles of liberty may be limited by 
conditions of the state (formal education at school or at home is compulsory), and 
reciprocity may be unevenly applied (consider what aspects of the status of teachers and 
staff may be thought to merit unequal treatment). 
Secondly, systems that protect children’s access to rational education about justified 
authority are important for developing their equal ability to participate in democratic adult 
life. A rejection of secularity in public institutions may endanger access to such education. 
Chapter six will discuss some arguments concerning faith schools, but it is illustrative to 
describe a particular legal case here that clarifies the importance of the development of 
children’s capabilities for democratic citizenship in the secular state. In 1983, a group of 
parents mounted an unsuccessful legal challenge against Hawkins County, Tennessee, in the 
USA. For religious reasons, they wanted their children not to be exposed to a textbook that 
aimed to teach both reading skills and the values of democratic citizenship. They objected to 
their children being taught to make critical judgements and being exposed to information 
about other ways of life, unless such information included a statement that the way of life 
prescribed by their own faith was the only true one. It was ruled that the children should 
‘receive the education necessary for developing their capacity as democratic citizens’ (to 
protect the liberties and opportunities of all citizens, including children and parents). Their 
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development and capacity for critical reasoning and making reciprocal claims was 
considered a public good that was not trumped by the private values of the parents 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, pp. 63–9). Democracy and disagreement claims that the 
‘state must educate for justice values … as part of enabling citizen development and 
participation’. Clear parallels between nation-wide and school-wide systems can help show 
where restorative models both do and do not mirror the resolution of disputes in adult 
society. 
Despite these potential obstacles, there are further advantages to deliberative models of 
democracy in addition to those mentioned. Deliberative discussion leads to less partisanship 
than aggregative models of democracy, and more sympathy with opposing views (Fishkin, 
2011). It leads to a greater respect for evidence-based reasoning over opinion, and 
discussion participants demonstrate greater commitment to the decisions reached than in 
other models of democracy. Deliberative discussions create greater opportunity for shared 
consensuses to emerge, consequently promoting greater unity behind controversial 
decisions and greater social unity between those of differing perspectives.  
In general, the better the rational capabilities of participants in a discussion, the less likely 
that conclusions which obtain consensus will be irrational. This strengthens the ability of 
democratic societies to achieve that which their members collectively will, following the 
argument above about the greater predictive power of rational over irrational thinking. As 
stated initially, deliberative democracies can be representative or direct; in the situations 
under discussion, representative models are more similar to how the state operates, and 
direct democracy may have more in common with school councils and discussion groups. 
Deliberative discussions in restorative discipline can prepare participants for both models of 
democratic engagement by exposure to the theory and practice of both models. 
An additional strength of deliberative models for classroom implementations is that as the 
best solution is sought, and not a simple majority, there is less need to defend the special 
status of the teacher if they are outnumbered in a class debate while proposing what is 
clearly the most rational solution. Although respect for rationality is not to be presumed, 
such a situation can be used to encourage consideration of both the merits and drawbacks 
of the proposed causes of action, rather than creating a situation that can easily be framed 
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as a rebellion against the unjustified authority of those in positions of power.  One weakness 
this situation highlights is the idealised nature of such discussions. In certain groups — 
especially of younger children — it may be difficult to recognise an irrational argument. 
While deliberative theory is clear that the model is an ideal which communities can attempt 
to model as closely as possible, the limited capacity of some individuals to participate 
meaningfully in deliberative discussions is a potential concern.41 Their limited development 
can in fact be part of the argument for the desirability of adopting such systems: Gutmann 
and Thompson’s principle of equality requires citizens to have the ability to mutually justify 
laws to each other in terms they might reasonably accept, and practices which seek to 
increase participants’ capabilities in this help to meet principles that may be considered 
basic individual rights as well as in preparing students for the activities of democratic adult 
life. 
Gutmann and Thompson acknowledge the importance of schools (and school boards) as 
places for preparation for deliberative democracy to take place, which in this thesis takes 
the form of restorative conversations that develop rational capabilities and model the 
conditions of democratic deliberation. They consider that ‘Deliberation should be extended 
beyond the boundaries established by procedural and constitutional democracy’ (Gutmann 
& Thompson, 1996, p. 49). Deliberative discussions can be a way of involving children in 
school disciplinary resolutions rather than imposing sanctions forcibly upon them, in line 
with the principle that restorative discipline should be done with students, rather than to 
them. Deliberative discussions encourage thought about mutually acceptable solutions 
rather than encouraging a teacher to exercise authority that may be poorly justified. 
In summary, deliberative principles can underpin rational elements of restorative 
discussions in school discipline, which can constitute education about and preparation for 
adult democratic life as well as contributing to good school discipline through developing 
the understanding of justified authority. By Gutmann and Thompson’s formulation of 
deliberative principles, such education is a necessary part of free and equal participation in 
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 Chapter seven addresses children’s capacity for rational thought, and deploys evidence that in the secondary 
age range under discussion their abilities are sufficiently developed for engagement with the model proposed 
in this thesis. 
104 
 
adult democratic society, and this is a strong argument in favour of its development through 
greater attention to the rational in restorative discipline discussions. 
Citizenship education 
This chapter has argued how rational consideration of justified political authority in 
situations of conflict resolution is an important component of good school discipline, and 
that a deliberative model of democracy is well-suited to framing it, enabling it, and 
illustrating its importance in preparation for democratic adult life. This last section explains 
how developing the above can be considered to be better citizenship education. 
Lewis explicitly describes part of the function of classroom discipline as to facilitate good 
citizenship (Evertson & Weinstein, 2006, p. 1193). Citizenship is, however, a concept with a 
number of different understandings. The Crick Report in the United Kingdom claimed that 
good citizenship consists of three components: social and moral responsibility, political 
literacy, and community involvement (Humes, in M. Peters, Britton, & Blee (eds.), 2008, p. 
45). Osler & Starkey (2006) seem to be describing something somewhat different when they 
evaluate literature on the promotion of rights and the understanding of national identity. 
Definitions of citizenship are typically divided into two categories (which also feature further 
subdivisions), namely ‘civil’ and ‘civics’ understandings of citizenship. This section shall 
argue that the ‘good citizenship’ that classroom discipline should facilitate is of the latter 
model. 
The widespread modern definition of citizenship was established by Enlightenment thinkers 
concerned with rights and responsibilities in the nation-state. Social contract theorists who 
held this understanding such as Hobbes proposed theories on which the next chapter 
develops in detail, but their understanding of citizenship is not necessary to adopt in order 
to build on their other work. A widely-referenced expression of this understanding is given 
by Marshall (T. H. Marshall, 1950) who divides citizenship into three elements. Marshall’s 
citizenship is a civil citizenship, concerned with the status of membership of (most typically) 
a nation-state. This citizenship consists of the civil, concerning liberties and rights; the 
political, concerning participation and representation; and the reduction of social inequality. 
This is commonly described as the ‘liberal’ model, and is not the focus of this section as it 
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concerns status, rights, and institutions; properties, as opposed to activities. This thesis is 
specifically concerned with one component of citizenship — education for democratic 
participation — and considers specific elements of citizenship to establish that the 
restorative discussions addressed contribute to it, rather than undertaking a comprehensive 
analysis of what conceptions of citizenship of lesser relevance entail. 
Civics (often ‘civic republicanism’), on the other hand, is concerned with activities, rather 
than states. It is a bottom-up model of citizen activity, rather than a top-down model of 
qualities and opportunities ascribed to them. The rational restorative conversations 
proposed in this thesis concern productive engagement with other people and systems, and 
the exploration of conditions that inform the best solution to problems. While such 
discussion and investigation can involve learning about specific rights and conditions of the 
state, it does not necessarily do so. Participation in deliberative democracy is about 
community involvement rather than developing awareness of specific conditions of state 
membership. As Tully describes it (in M. Peters et al., 2008), civics exists in relationships, 
and not institutions. This understanding also accords with the democratic theorists referred 
to above: at least part of citizenship education in a democracy should address developing 
the skills to participate fully in a democracy, as expressly stipulated in Gutmann and 
Thompson’s principles. Participation in civic citizenship can entail learning about the 
structures of the state, but learning about civil citizenship does not involve practical 
engagement with its structures. 
There is an argument that it should, given that Marshall’s third component of civil 
citizenship concerns the reduction of social inequality, and that this is a practical endeavour. 
Civic citizenship, however, can encourage a critical evaluation of social conditions and action 
in accordance with this. Restorative discipline is specifically suitable for developing such a 
critical understanding because the conflicts it addresses provide opportunities to consider 
fairness and the justification of authority. Outcomes are chosen with consideration for their 
effects on the whole community. Education for the reduction of inequality can be 
understood to comprise part of civic citizenship, and attention to fairness in the impersonal 
reasoning described in this chapter helps to promote this end. Civil citizenship education, on 
the other hand, can be limited in its criticality: it is necessarily situated within a specific legal 
or constitutional framework, and instruction about such frameworks will not necessarily 
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reveal if they are unfair. A limited factual education about the conditions of civil citizenship 
may comprise tacit submission to (near-) ubiquitous global frameworks, such as the 
justification of nation-states or the ownership of land. This is because opposition requires 
the ability to envision alternative structures. In contrast, under deliberative democracy such 
conditions and principles (like all other conditions and principles) are not placed beyond the 
scope of evaluation and democratic consideration. If discussion of social and economic 
structures arises then it is less educative not to raise arguments both for and against such 
structures, and consequently to raise the possibility of their inherent unfairness. Inclusion of 
education about a certain topic, and not of its alternatives, has effects beyond simply 
educating about that topic, as discussed in chapter two on the effects of the omission of 
consideration of the broader goals of discipline in classroom management textbooks. 
Deliberative democracy depends on informed participation, and a critical approach to social 
structures is consequently important as citizens are incompletely informed and potentially 
passive to the existing state without it. One is further removed from the ability to fairly 
evaluate the best rational outcomes of a deliberative discussion the more existing 
conditions of social life are considered immutable. It is the usage to which civil and civic 
citizenship education can be put in this context that renders the greater desirability of the 
latter the most clear: Humes (in M. Peters et al., 2008) writes that some use (civil) 
citizenship education to promote international understanding and welfare, perhaps through 
the comparison of the entitlements of different citizenships, while others may use it to 
extend economic and social advantage, by teaching certain principles without exposure of 
their alternatives. To promote citizenship education without examining what it is thought to 
entail can lead to confusion and disagreement over the intended goals. 
The concluding argument of this section is that discussing the justification of political 
authority can work to reduce injustice as part of practical civics. This builds on Sen’s (2009) 
approach to justice, because it accepts a reasonable pluralism of conceptions of justice in a 
secular state and allows discussions of these conceptions to follow Gutmann and 
Thompson’s deliberative democratic principles. A key feature of Sen’s model that enables 
this is his divergence from Rawls in not establishing justice as a principle of greater primacy 
than democratic conditions. This can be explained as follows: Sen’s model is concerned with 
making incremental improvements to people’s conditions through practical reasoning 
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rather than targeting a terminal vision of perfect justice. It focuses on the reduction of 
injustice rather than requiring a complete conception of maximal justice before working 
towards it. Actions in support of such reductions of injustice can be justified via convergence 
rather than consensus, as distinguished above, and subject to democratic deliberation in 
communities where there is disagreement over what justice entails. If faced with three 
plausible options where option 1 is less unjust than both options 2 and 3, for Sen it matters 
less to establish a ranking or rationale for evaluating all three than to take the action that 
comparatively reduces injustice the most. This seems a better fit for democratic debate over 
disciplinary actions in the school, where idealising each situation would be impractical. 
There is often a short timeframe for discussion and a need to take practical action. Sen 
illustrates the problem of different conceptions of justice with the example of which of 
three children should be allocated ownership of a flute (Sen, 2009): Anne claims she should 
be given it as the only one who can play the flute; Bob on the grounds that he has no other 
toys; and Carla on the grounds that she made it. By their different conceptions of justice, 
the utilitarian hedonist would award the flute to Anne, the economic egalitarian to Bob, and 
the libertarian to Carla. Sen’s position defends that these are all reasonable, and thus that 
there are a reasonable plurality of conceptions of justice. Therefore its conception should 
come after democratic discussion, following Gutmann and Thompson, rather than prior, 
following Rawls. If there is disagreement over principles of justice that it might be necessary 
to teach under a civil model of citizenship education, they can rather be engaged with in 
democratic deliberation. Consequently, discussion participants can develop and act upon an 
improved conception of justice as part of practical civic citizenship. 
It is worth noting that such reflexively challenging discussions can be encouraging of stability 
as well as criticality; the two do not have to be opposed. Discussing the rules of a 
community, shaping them, and evaluating the fairness or otherwise of the reasoning that 
underlies them can support a sense of community belonging, as well as enabling criticism of 
some of its aspects. If a system is open to responsive change, like all principles under a 
deliberative democracy, then one can be critical of it while still being a willing member of it. 
As well as developing intellectual understandings of the justification of authority, 
deliberative discussions are more likely to develop the disposition to act in accordance with 
it than comparable theoretical learning in isolation. This is because they lead to exposure to 
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its benefits in practice. Civics education programmes focusing on knowledge transmission 
alone have limited effect (Lewis, in Evertson & Weinstein, 2006, p. 1194).  Experiencing 
classroom democracy can serve as preparation for democracy in adult society, and 
deliberative democracy can be considered a complete theory of civics on its own. The 
practice of authentic deliberation in restorative conversations can constitute good civics and 
thus contribute to citizenship education, as well as addressing the second and third goals of 
good school discipline. 
This chapter has argued that in a school or society where a plurality of moral views is 
accepted, just authority will have a basis in justified political authority in the absence of 
moral agreement. Engaging in rational reasoning about justified political authority 
constitutes preparation for adult democratic life as understanding the operation of a 
society’s public institutions, and developing the ability to participate in their modification, is 
an important part of free and equal democratic participation. Deliberative democracy can 
constitute an education in practical civics, and restorative discussions that model and 
develop the capability for the above reasoning can develop the understanding of justified 
authority, a necessary part of good school discipline as much as simple classroom 
management. 
In conclusion, the extension of restorative practices to consider the rational justification of 
political authority leads to better school discipline, and serves as citizenship education in 
democracies which value public reason. The next chapter suggests a comprehensive yet 
comprehensible model by which this can be done as part of a classroom management 
strategy, rather than requiring academic teaching time specifically devoted to it, and one 




Social contract theory in restorative discipline 
This chapter examines theories of social contract, and proposes their usefulness for 
developing pupils’ understandings of rationally justified authority in restorative discussions. 
The first section defines social contract theory, outlines its benefits for restorative 
discussions, and then presents different formulations by which it can be understood. There 
is particular focus on contemporary contractual and contractarian theories of social 
contract, and how both of these can be beneficial in different classroom situations. This is 
followed by a description of how a teacher might choose between different ways of 
explaining fair outcomes in accordance with them. 
The second section discusses how social contract theories can fit into and support the 
questioning that takes place when considering fairness in a restorative discipline discussion. 
This section describes how the principles discussed fit with everyday language and how 
explanation of fair outcomes can be presented in a simple manner, with scope to explore 
them as deeply as is necessary or desirable for discussion participants. The practicality of 
the training required for such discussions is considered in comparison with the training 
required for other restorative interventions, and also the ease of having these educational 
discussions outside of timetabled academic teaching sessions. 
The suitability of social contract theory for exploring fair justification in 
conflict resolution in schools 
Social contract theory (SCT) is concerned with the legitimacy of the authority of the state 
over the individual. SCT can also be applied to smaller communities, such as the school 
environments under discussion in this thesis. SCT seeks to establish principles that can 
justify rules which underpin a society to which all involved parties would reasonably agree. 
These are important for developing an understanding of the rational justification of fair 
outcomes in conflict situations, such as those addressed by restorative discipline. SCT can be 
understood as asking what restrictions an individual would hypothetically accept to their 
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freedoms in order to have their other freedoms protected. The foundations of thinking 
about social contracts are themselves subject to vigorous philosophical contention. Two 
major areas of difficulty with establishing how parties would ideally reason are in 
establishing what principles can be justified to all reasonable citizens or persons, and 
whether a situation so stripped of value judgements is even possible. 
These are not problems for its adoption in practical reasoning in schools, however, as there 
is no universally accepted model or solution for the justification of social rules, and SCT 
provides scope for exploring other possibilities effectively. The claims behind an initial, pre-
contractual state are minimal compared to other models, and can be considered provisional 
and subject to alteration in the course of discussions in accordance with the model of 
deliberative democracy discussed above. This is important for such reasoning to be 
acceptable in a secular environment to those of a range of different moral commitments, as 
discussed previously. The aim of suggesting thinking in a contractual manner is to open up 
reasoning and discussion of fair outcomes, rather than to suggest that it is the ‘correct’ 
theory for understanding social co-operation. The discussion of a ‘state of nature’42, in 
which one has no obligations to others, is unlikely to reflect a state that pupils experience in 
reality, but as a concept for beginning discussion of the grounds for social obligation it is 
very useful, as pupils may often start from a claim or assumption that they are not obliged 
to look out for anyone’s interests but their own. Building classroom communities, as 
involved in the discipline systems proposed in this thesis, requires pupils to understand that 
the obligations they have to others in their communities are justified by more than the will 
of a teacher. Beginning from an assumption of only negative freedoms (i.e. freedom from 
the intervention of others) gives space to consider from first principles why consideration 
for others might be justified, and can support discussions of fairness that develop the 
understanding of justified political authority required for good school discipline. 
A further theoretical concern about social contract theories actually makes them more 
suitable for classroom situations. This is the concern that one is unable to opt out of an 
idealised contract when one knows one’s actual personal circumstances, and that this may 
not be justified. This is a charge that can also be laid against the compulsory education 
                                                        
42 Hobbes, from whom this term is drawn, is further discussed below. 
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system, rendering SCT a highly appropriate model for the exploration and challenge of this 
context. The choice of whether or not to attend a formal educational institution has usually 
not been given to a child, and been made instead by a parent or caregiver. This is also 
reflective of how individuals have not been given choice about being born under the 
authority of a particular nation-state. Whether this involves tacit consent or institutional 
force, the problem applies similarly to the practical situation of schools as to the theoretical 
model of SCT. A pupil may have no ability to opt out of formal schooling against the will of 
his or her parents,43 but this is similar to the practical impossibility of opting out of certain 
aspects of a nation-state’s governance. For example, even if living remotely, one is still 
subject to the enforcement of the state to participate in its justice system and allocation of 
property rights. If such an issue ends up being highlighted in SCT discussions then it is not a 
problem with the theory in this context so much as a good illustration of possible coercion 
in the organisation of our state institutions. It exposes some of the compulsions to which 
citizens are subject from which they cannot easily escape, even if they disagree with their 
justification.44 These problems can then be discussed in restorative conversations. The 
details of how particular social contract theories deal with such problems are expanded 
upon below. 
Social contract theories are rational models, and are concerned with the taking of 
perspectives other than one’s own. They fit with assuming a reasonable pluralism of moral 
positions among pupils, adults, and citizens, and allow for a second-order approach to 
justice that can adjudicate between them in cases of conflict as explained in the previous 
chapter. 45 Understandings of fairness and justice can be evaluated within a social contract 
framework, in a similar manner to deliberative democracy serving as a second-order 
political theory as described above. Contemporary formulations of the social contract are 
also for the most part hypothetical. That is, they are concerned with how individuals might 
ideally reason, rather than discussing the existence of an actual contract to which pupils 
                                                        
43 The interplay between children’s preferences and those of their parents is addressed in detail in chapter six.  
44 The modern (c.17th century) social contract theorists were writing in an environment where such situations 
were much more accepted as the norm. The notions of a government requiring consent of the governed to be 
legitimate at the time were weaker than now, and acceptance of unjust power structures less remarkable. 
45
 A second-order framework is one that allows for the evaluation of first-order theories rather than making a 
claim to being a solution itself. Social contract theory is not claimed to be the ‘correct’ conception of justice 
(which would be a first-order theory), but one that enables the discussion of what fair resolution might be in 
situations of conflict. 
112 
 
have tacitly consented. While there is plenty of scope for the practical agreement of 
concrete classroom contracts, the role of social contract theory in this argument is to help 
pupils (and teachers) develop a rational understanding of why a disciplinary system that 
seeks to make fair judgements can be justified, and why particular grounds for a judgement 
might or might not be fair. 
Some understandings of social contract principles are more involved than others, and the 
explanations below include discussion of how to choose an appropriate model to help 
pupils’ understandings in a given situation. A comparison between them shows that social 
contract models can be used to frame a variety of situations appropriately, present conflicts 
simply when required, and also explore the justification for a judgement in more depth 
when that is helpful. Classroom events can be clearly linked to common questions, 
principles, and objections that arise in disciplinary situations. Students often ask why a 
ruling goes against their preference, claim it is not fair, or behave in such a manner as to 
indicate that their compliance is to do solely with obedience to the threat of force rather 
than the recognition of any authority in either the adjudicator or the decision that ought to 
be obeyed. The models explored in this chapter can provide a succinct way to help pupils’ 
reasoning progress beyond this, as considering social contract issues can stimulate thinking 
about the fair resolution of conflicts, including the consideration of when not getting one’s 
own way is a reasonably justified outcome. It involves the exercise and development of 
rational, impersonal thinking in addition to the empathic work already done in restorative 
discussions, where the feelings of other parties are considered.46 By this approach, the 
rational claims for others’ wills, needs, or rights to take precedence can be explored through 
a model that can be expressed simply yet has a high degree of explanatory power. 
A further benefit of such models is that they allow clear explanation of the separation 
between what justice requires should happen (the impersonal fair judgement incumbent 
upon an institution or its agents to enforce) and what an individual might prefer to do. Thus 
a child arguing for their own benefit can begin to develop an understanding of what is 
                                                        
46 Chapter eight will address the distinction between emotional and rational approaches in more detail. 
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involved in taking another’s perspective, and come to understand the role of a disciplinary 
staff as implementing fair outcomes, rather than pursuing personal agendas.47 
Models of social contract theory 
The best models of social contract theory to choose for classroom purposes are likely to be 
those that can easily be made clear and comprehensible to teenagers. Such theories can be 
explored from the simplest principles of co-operation, requiring little more than an 
understanding of individual desire and the recognition that others have desires of their own. 
They can be used to model disagreements in a broad range of situations, both with 
individuals and institutions. 
As a student gains a deeper understanding of the nature of co-operation and justice, their 
changing conceptualisation may have some parallels with the chronological progress of 
academic thought about social contracts. While formal cognitive development will be 
addressed in chapter seven, tracing a path from the earlier models of social contract to the 
most recent broadly highlights increasing levels of nuance and complexity, and may be 
useful as a guide to understanding how a grasp of social contract can develop as one begins 
to engage more empathy and think more impersonally. Consequently, this section describes 
this progression as it provides a useful illustration of the range of models available to 
teachers under the general approach of SCT, with the earlier featuring a higher degree of 
accessibility, and the later higher levels of explanatory power and values that better fit 
those of restorative communities. 
As a starting point, Hobbes’ view of co-operation requires little in the way of consideration 
for the perspectives of others, and thus is accessible even to those with no inclination to 
think about others’ well-being. He describes ‘the condition of man . . . (as) a condition of 
war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, 
and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his 
life against his enemies’ (Hobbes, 1651, Chapter 14). While he describes the lives of those 
                                                        
47
 The question of whether or not one should accept the orders of institutions legislating according to the 
general will is a fascinating one, but not necessary to explore directly here. ‘Why should I obey the law?’ is less 
relevant than ‘This is why the law is justified, and these are the consequences for obeying or breaking it.’ 
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holding this perspective as ‘nasty, brutish and short’, such a position may prove to be a 
useful model for those least inclined to consider others’ preferences in any way when they 
conflict with their own. It provides for recognition of what happens in the absence of 
agreement when two people’s desires conflict. Even the most self-focused individual can 
start from Hobbes to consider how they might want to achieve certain goals but are 
confronted by others with opposing views, and wonder how resolution can be achieved in 
such situations. With a Hobbesian model one can develop the beginnings of thinking about 
political justification, and recognise the possibility of standing outside oneself in a third-
person position to evaluate one's own claims from another perspective. Some students may 
never have been required to consider anyone else’s benefit but their own. This is also a 
crucial skill for full participation in democratic deliberation as such discussion necessitates 
the consideration of the weight of others’ concerns rather than the mere advocacy of one’s 
own. 
This is also supportive of all five key competencies in the New Zealand Curriculum (‘Key 
competencies / Kia ora - NZ Curriculum Online’). It provides a practical context where 
students are able to practice thinking about co-operation and fairness in matters of direct 
relevance to their own lives. Such deliberation not only is an excellent way to address the 
curricular pillars of ‘Participating and contributing’ and ‘Relating to others’, as practical 
community discussions require active participation rather than passive acceptance of rules, 
but also a way to encourage the taking ownership of one’s own goals and learning that is 
central to ‘Managing self’. That it also involves ‘Thinking’ and ‘Using language’ emphasises 
that disciplinary discussions such as these can be considered core educational activities in 
schools, rather than social adjuncts to an academic curriculum. 
Locke's impartial judge (Locke, 1689/1988) may be a more attractive model than that of 
Hobbes for a different profile of student. This is something of a precursor to Rawls’ original 
position as described in the previous chapter, in that it involves considering the perspective 
of one who is not directly involved in a situation in adjudicating over a fair outcome. Many 
teenagers do care deeply about fairness, and while Locke’s judge was initially conceived to 
rule over disputes concerning property rights — the focus of his approach to social contract 
— it can also be used to adjudicate in wider situations of disagreement. Such a model may 
enable an older student to engage his or her rational capacity alongside deeply held 
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emotional or moral convictions. Locke's ‘freedom under law’ may be a productive model to 
deploy for those who construe good behaviour as comprising of the following of authority; 
Kohlberg’s level four, as will be described in chapter seven. 
This section addresses some models only briefly to illustrate the range of possible 
approaches available for framing discussions in terms of social contract theory, and their 
usefulness for particular situations. They are presented to demonstrate the flexibility of an 
overt social contract framework, with the theorists of particular focus following in the next 
section. Such a broad range of possible approaches can be helpful as restorative 
conversations are intrinsically responsive to the concerns their participants raise. No single 
inflexible framework would be the most appropriate in all situations. Broad guidelines and 
simple frameworks, especially those that can be adapted both to a teacher's preference and 
a pupil's orientation, are much more readily deployable. They fit neatly with the structure 
and philosophy of the current Positive Behaviour for Learning initiative in New Zealand 
which is illustrative of just such an approach: a change in whole-school philosophy, 
supported by strong academic evidence, and deployed via a number of strategies to meet 
certain core goals. Adding an attempt to develop rational thought to the Restorative 
Discipline strand of PB4L is a small adjustment in practice, conceptually substantial, similarly 
flexible, and fits the approach of the overall initiative. 
Pursuing the idea of progressively more-involved approaches to the social contract (but with 
greater explanatory power), Rousseau's (1762) direct self-government under the ‘general 
will’ bears a closer resemblance to the institutional arrangements to which the arguments in 
this thesis lead: the conscious establishment of structures to which the people collectively 
agree and consent to follow, such as democratically-agreed classroom behaviour contracts. 
Rousseau argues that democracy is the best solution for obtaining desirable protections 
from others harming you through the unrestricted exercise of their will, beliefs, or desires. 
His line of argument about being ‘forced to be free’ may not be particularly useful for 
classroom situations48, and is an example of an element to omit when pitching discussions 
of social contract at an appropriate level. Presenting complete philosophical systems in 
short conversations is impractical. A productive discussion that might follow from 
                                                        
48 It builds on specific presumptions about reason and individual value that would be quite complex to explore. 
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Rousseau’s principles is whether a behaviour contract agreed at the start of the academic 
year remains binding when the will of those subject to it has changed; perhaps these are 
also to be considered provisional and subject to deliberative revision in accordance with the 
democratic principles presented in chapter four. The discussion of SCT in restorative 
discipline is not primarily intended to teach social philosophy, but rather to serve as a simple 
and robust basis for the understanding of rational adjudication between persons in pursuit 
of impartiality and justice. 
Rawls (1971/2000) may prove an instructive point of reference because of the centrality of 
principles of impartial fairness to his conception of justice. This thesis has already discussed 
his concept of the original position, as well as how the present argument parts from his 
theories in favour of Sen and Gutmann to allow for provisional, rather than absolute, 
conceptions of justice. Rawls’ concept of fair resolution from an impersonal position does, 
however, provide a clear model of how this thesis handles adjudication over otherwise 
irreconcilable conflicts. Imagining oneself as an impartial judge can be a practical exercise to 
help students decide between two competing positions. Concepts of fairness can be related 
to an abstract model that is more sophisticated than the basic ideas of reciprocity above 
and yet is still accessible in the hurried context of many school environments. As in Rawls’ 
work, public reason is integral to the models of deliberative democracy previously 
discussed, and this enables further parallels from a Rawlsian model to discussions of 
broader social conditions. This project envisions the repeated application of impersonal, 
rational adjudication in matters of behavioural conflict coming to model ideal discussions in 
democratic environments, with a greater weight given to publicly-accountable reason than 
to teachers’ personal authority. 
Rawls’ original position and veil of ignorance face a serious conceptual challenge over 
whether or not it is possible to reason from such a state, before an individual’s adoption of 
values. For example, the disposition towards social agreement and reaching fair 
compromise can itself be considered a value, though Rawls argues this rather to be part of 
the ‘basic structure of society’ (Rawls, 1971). This problem is, however, not relevant for the 
practical consideration of fair resolution in school conflicts. In this context there is no need 
to posit the ability to hold a pre-human ‘neutral’ position to decide between two claims, as 
the system is not being utilized to establish to the initial conditions of a society. This society 
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is already established, and for the practical purposes of immediate conflict resolution the 
model is rather used to establish impartiality on relevant moral or factual disputes and 
consider which outcomes or solutions might be the fairest (or the least unjust, following 
Sen’s position on progressive improvement as explained in chapter four). A third person can 
be imagined to judge between two positions, with moral neutrality demanded only on the 
relevant issues under discussion. This theoretical difficulty can also prove instructive: an 
examination of whether such a position already carries certain presumed values, and 
whether the powers embodied in the holder of that position are fair, is educative about the 
effects of power structures and the sources of authority on pupils’ (and teachers’) lives. 
Involvement with real life, personal examples has greater effect than any abstract discussion 
of such theories in a classroom, as defended above on the benefits of a practical education 
in civics over an education in civil citizenship. There remains scope for more detailed 
exploration of the conditions of impartiality according to the ability and interests of those 
involved in a discussion. One could ask not only how a hypothetical third person might rule 
on a situation, but if the issue is raised of how it depends on that individual's values, one can 
also prompt thinking about what might be decided if someone who did not care about 
relevant values were the judge, or how they might judge in an analogous situation. Fairness 
can be introduced simply, but explored in depth. 
The existence of a liberal democratic context in which these real-world events take place 
also avoids the immediate need to address the major communitarian criticisms of Rawls: 
that he is fundamentally liberal (in the sense of idealising a rational, independent model of a 
human in a state supposedly prior to value), and that that is problematic. While it may be, 
the acceptance of being limited by existing setup of our nation-state renders this an 
academic question beyond the scope of practical classroom reasoning. This is again no 
inhibition to education about the issue in schools, and no obstacle to seeking the least-
unjust resolution possible to conflicts. While application in a live context strips social 
contract theories of some interesting issues in their justification, it does not impede the 
productive application of their concepts to developing understandings of rationality and 
impartial justice. The argument of this thesis remains a practical proposition about how to 




Contractarianism or contractualism? 
Contemporary social contract theories are commonly divided into two broad categories: the 
contractarian and the contractual. These categories are covered here in detail as they 
describe philosophically-developed positions that can appeal to students in quite different 
ways. Both feature the same core principles of attention to hypothetical rational reasoning, 
but contractarian approaches appeal to self-interested motivations while contractual 
approaches prioritise finding mutual agreement. These two perspectives describe practical 
models for evaluating fairness in restorative discussions of conflict resolution, and offer a 
considerable degree of both precision and simplicity. This section argues that both are of 
use for restorative conversations, where a teacher may initially choose the most effective 
model for connecting with a particular audience to teach a new concept and then allow 
discussion to develop and consider opposing views in due course. 
Given that restorative discussions focus on responsive conversations, it is unlikely to be 
greatly significant what one’s individual preference is when choosing which formulation of 
social contract theory to deploy in approaching a given situation. The accessibility of a 
model to specific pupils is of greater practical relevance. Reference can be made to theories 
which seem the most easily relevant to a given situation and then discussion can progress 
from there according to a pupil’s responses.49 A teacher engaging in a restorative 
conversation does not have to propose any model of truth, rather provide tools and 
stimulation to support educational thinking on the way to reaching an acceptable 
consensus. Making even simple methods available here is a great improvement both over 
traditional discipline systems that do not examine the justification of authority, and over 
attempts to explore authority without the knowledge or framework to progress as far as a 
convincing justification, in which situations explanation can appear still to terminate with 
coercion in the shape of a teacher’s assertion that something is right. 
Theorists of social contract differ over whether a neo-Hobbesian (contractarian) model, 
such as that of Gauthier (1986), or contractualist approach, such as that of Scanlon (1998), is 
the more coherent approach to social contracts. A more appropriate question for their 
school implementation is which of these is likely to be more accessible to and educative for 
                                                        
49 The next section of this chapter addresses the practicalities of such questioning. 
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students in a given context. Both approaches bring benefits in different areas, as expansion 
on their claims will make clear. This will then be followed by explanation of how both are of 
complementary benefit to restorative discussions. 
For a contractarian, rational action is maximising the satisfaction of one's own subjective 
preferences: a different usage of the term ‘rational’ from that of previous chapters. Barry 
(cited in Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, p. 21) argues that this is pure assertion, and that one 
can counter-assert that it is ‘equally rational to care about what can be defended impartially 
… The virtually unanimous concurrence of the human race in caring about the defensibility 
of actions in a way that does not simply appeal to power is a highly relevant supporting 
consideration’. This highlights a core difference between contractarian and contractual 
models, namely to what degree self-interest informs rational behaviour. Gauthier's model of 
self-interested individuals, similar to that of Hobbes, might seem appropriate for opening up 
conversations with the self-centred, but may be inappropriate for school environments in 
the following number of ways. 
Gauthier claims that the maximisation of self-interest is morality. This is a significant 
divergence from the separation of justice and morality in this thesis, where justice is that 
which can adjudicate between competing conceptions of the good. This claim of Gauthier’s 
is one that does not need to be made for addressing contractarian thought in restorative 
conversations, and one that might alienate potential audiences. If a system were to claim a 
moral scepticism, and that justice is the virtue of note, then this would be unappealing to a 
large proportion of the potential audience with different moral convictions. Many schools 
and teachers would want to instil that there is more to morality than this: besides the clear 
example of faith schools, numerous institutions promote the cultivation of particular values 
in their students that they believe to be morally good. While in practice this claim will be 
barely distinguishable in many situations, with appeals being made to goodness instead of 
justice or rightness in a restorative conversation, the ability to respect individuals' differing 
moral positions is an important aspect of what makes the discussion of justice a useful 
element of education in a pluralist democracy. Presenting this as a rival moral position of its 
own loses this impact, even if an individual does not need to accept it and sees it merely as 
a competing view. It would be helpful to distance the political from the moral claim, and 
indeed it is not too problematic to do so: Gauthier's claim can be argued not to be a 
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complete account of what we might want to call morality, as it addresses neither 'moral' 
feelings towards others which we might want to attach to such a theory, nor, crucially, why 
his model needs to be considered 'morality' at all. The amoralist’s position can remain 
intact, and questions of justice can be discussed in the realm of political theory rather than 
individual ethics. 
While the grounding of Gauthier's model in formulations of the prisoner's dilemma might 
provide an excellent mathematical teaching point, this is not relevant to its use in 
restorative discussions and his focus on self-interest may be unpalatable to school leaders 
seeking to promote other forms of social change in their school. Teaching children that they 
are fundamentally self-interested may not be something teachers want to encourage: the 
transformative (and often negative) power of giving children labels is well-attested,50 and if 
a lack of regard for others is so legitimised then many would fear accompanying changes in 
attitude that character educators would deem undesirable. 
On the positive side, the lack of historical agreement needed to ground a contract in 
Gauthier's terms fits with the involuntary situation in which many secondary school-aged 
citizens find themselves in having to go to school. One does not need specifically to have 
agreed to one’s present conditions in order for a contract from such a position to be 
negotiated. The model remains an imperfect fit, however, as Gauthier's initial position has 
to be arrived at non-coercively, which is plainly not the case in most situations of school 
attendance. If force can be used against those who do not wish to enter a social contract, he 
considers it illegitimate. Perhaps the greatest strengths of Gauthier's model for the 
purposes of this project are its focus on self-interest (for suiting some students’ attitudes), 
that it is philosophically contemporary, and especially that Gauthier's hypothetical contract 
is a thought experiment to find practical rationality rather than a specific agreement. 
Finding rational solutions in the abstract is a key skill such discussions aim to develop. The 
end goal for Gauthier is the benefit of individuals. In the context of classroom restorative 
discussions, if participants cannot agree on what is of collective benefit or moral goodness, 
then public reason can at least establish a collective means of compromise over best 
outcome; the realisation of individuals' aims, whatever they may be, with prisoners' 
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dilemmas governing the adjudication between competing interests, rather than some 
Kantian formulation of rational obligation as contractualists would prefer. 
One of the problems identified with a contractarian approach that is particularly relevant for 
its application in public schools is that it can lead to undesirable outcomes for those with 
particularly high levels of need or disabilities in certain areas. It is not a considerable stretch 
to see approaches based around self-interest as leading towards situations where those 
who an individual sees as lacking in value can be treated without basic respect, as if 
excluded from all social obligations. This is because in contractarian theory those who 
cannot contribute to a social contract (however that is construed by an individual who might 
be a fellow party to it), or who need an extreme level of care, may be seen as not ever likely 
to provide the reciprocal benefits that one expects from entering into a contract with 
another. If formulating a contract on the basis of pure self-interest, a strict interpretation of 
Gauthier would see the demands of justice and contract as not reaching as far as these 
individuals: no direct value is ascribed to persons per se.51 
This is arguably reflective of the contemporary social order outside of schools. Worldwide, 
many right-wing and neoliberal agendas continue to place emphasis on people’s worth 
being contingent on what they can produce rather than any intrinsic value to their existence 
or well-being. Economic contribution and shareholder return are prioritised over the quality 
of individual lives. The discussion of economically-rational policy may entail reasoning 
similar to that described above, in which there is no economic argument for diverting 
resources to those who cannot contribute to production. While it would be tangential to 
discuss such issues in detail here, a contractarian model can highlight such potential 
shortcomings for discussion, and pupils can consider whether these are issues of morality or 
issues of justice. 
While lack of consideration for individuals with significant needs may appear abhorrent in 
the abstract, in the applied context of schools the contractarian view can yet be defended as 
this problem disappears with the addition of a moral system that prohibits such behaviour; 
a personal morality at an individual level distinct from that of justice and the political 
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structures which this thesis addresses. This would be a problem for Gauthier, for whom 
maximisation of self-interest is morality, but not for those involved in a moral discussion 
under a political system guided by his principles. Consequently, a contractarian model for 
resolving situations of conflict may prove a useful referent in restorative discussions for its 
clarity and focus on individual interests when working with individuals currently inclined to a 
selfish perspective; when teachers and restorative discussion facilitators do not wish to 
begin from positions that demand recognition of the value of others’ preferences and 
desires, a contractarian model can establish at least an instrumental justification for co-
operative behaviour. 
Given the significant ethical considerations this approach involves, the alternative 
formulations of contractualism may seem preferable. Contractual models can require more 
from students to participate productively in discussions — notably, the ability to consider 
the perspective of others — and so are less accessible than those which adopt contractarian 
reasoning. Contractual principles, however, may be better for improving citizenship through 
restorative discussions as they involve consideration of others’ perspectives rather than 
assuming individuals are wholly self-interested. The central difference between the two 
approaches is that where contractarian views feature satisfaction of competing interests, 
contractualists seek to pursue their own interests in a way that can be justified to others 
who have interests of their own. 
This foundation on a principle of mutual acceptability52 might make contractualism initially 
seem more complex to adopt than contractarianism, but the crucial changes in emphasis 
can be modelled in restorative discussions without needing to explore the underlying theory 
behind such models. While it is more demanding to consider the impact and value of the 
self against others than raw self-interest, such thinking is already asked of students in other 
areas of school, such as in the direct consideration of ethics, or classes on either religious 
studies or global wealth distribution in geography or economics. The thought processes 
involved in social contract reasoning are of more value than the individual conclusions 
pupils reach — that is, developing the disposition to consider one’s impact on others is 
typically more important than the outcome of one individual disciplinary situation — and 
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steering pupils’ thinking away from a focus on self-interest is something that many schools 
might deem desirable as an independent moral goal. Such moral goals can be provisional 
and open to overt re-evaluation — and furthermore will necessarily exist, as it is not 
possible to create a value-free environment for teaching. As with democratic deliberation, a 
fixed conception of the outcome of a discussion is not privileged over the process: 
educators may try to take students as far as they can from their respective starting points, 
but do not have a necessary principle or target to reach. There is no specific level of concern 
for others that counts as sufficiently educated for citizenship in a state which sets merely 
legal boundaries, for the most part, for adult participation in society. Therefore one can 
simply seek to educate each individual as well as one can, given a plurality of changing 
conceptions among different schools and teachers of what that entails. 
As with the less attractive principles of unmitigated self-interest underlying 
contractarianism, the harder principles of contractualism can be understood and referred to 
if needed, but do not necessarily have to be presented in most cases. Scanlon is a leading 
contemporary theorist of contractualism, whose work can be contrasted to that of Gauthier. 
His views are predicated on an argument that the distinctive factor of human life is the 
ability to evaluate reasons and justifications (Scanlon, 1998). The capability to apply 
rationality is held central to the evaluation of morality, a principle that meshes well with the 
rational approach to justice adopted in this thesis. Addressing the foundations of his 
argument is not necessary for the discussion of fairness to be based upon them, and may 
potentially cause problems. For example, the idea of valuing others because of their 
capacity for rationality has the potential to lead to a half-understood idea having some 
negative consequences, perhaps where those ‘less rational’ are held as ‘less valuable’ in the 
schoolyard, when in fact the degree of rationality does not scale with (but simply 
establishes) equal consideration as a reasoning person. Contractual models do, however, 
have many contrasting strengths to those of contractarian models for restorative 
discussions. 
Scanlon's contractualism focuses on ‘what we owe to each other’ (Scanlon, 1998) by virtue 
of being rational creatures, and characterises right and wrong as that which we have good 
reason to do. This fits well with Southwood’s position on the reason to be rational as 
presented in the previous chapter, where rationality is that which we owe to ourselves. The 
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equation of rightness with reasonable justifiability (more precisely, the equation of 
wrongness with that to which another could reasonably object) also fits well with 
intersubjectively-justifiable fairness, as defended above, even though this thesis does not 
claim that necessarily to be morality itself.  In contrast to Gauthier’s model, in which 
contractarianism is the whole of morality, a contractual system can preserve space for 
democratic discussion of moral principles at a level subordinate to a contractual political 
structure. There is no need for a solution that works only for practical purposes. The 
benefits of the system can be maintained while its very principles are under discussion; 
perfectly suited for institution and modification under deliberative democracy. 
Unlike Gauthier, Scanlon does not present the social contract as encompassing the whole 
realm of morality, merely the realm of what we owe to each other. For Scanlon there may 
be other elements to morality, whereas Gauthier argues his model to describe the entirety 
of the moral domain. Scanlon’s approach leaves scope for moral debates not to sit in 
immediate tension with the framework under which they are conducted, whereas 
Gauthier’s justice requires its claim to also describe morality to be set aside when 
conducting evaluative discussions of other moral theories. A Scanlonian model fits with the 
principles laid out in the previous chapter, as the truth claims necessary to adopt such a 
model for conflict resolution are minimal beyond a commitment to rationality, and 
compatible with holding personal moral views that are not already in tension with being 
subject to a secular democratic state. Just as Scanlon's contractualism does not seek to 
define the whole of morality, neither does this thesis; rather it seeks an educational 
engagement with fair justification in conflict management. 
There are still further aspects to a contractual model that make it appear suitable for 
restorative discussions. Scanlon invokes no veil of ignorance, in contrast to Rawls, being 
concerned with apparent justification to all rather than hypothetical justification from initial 
conditions. This makes a contractual model more immediately fit for application to existing, 
practical situations than Rawls’ model of justice. For a pluralist approach to conflict 
resolution it is also superior to an implementation of utilitarian principles, and should not be 
confused with such. Utilitarianism would require some external judgement of well-being 
against which potential outcomes to a dispute could be compared, and this requires 
agreement on aspects of goodness and value. Valuing individual reasons, as contractualism 
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does, requires only concordance on rational reasoning itself, which is already necessary for 
the public discussion of justified authority, as explored in chapter four. Contractualism 
allows for a plurality of conceptions of well-being, and arguably also avoids the problem of 
aggregation53 that utilitarianism faces, though this is contestable (Parfit, 2003, 2011; Taurek, 
1977). Again, this fits an overarching political structure that can contain various ethical or 
philosophical orientations, rather than alienating those who hold certain positions. The 
ability of Scanlon's contractualism to bridge major approaches to morality to some degree, 
and embrace both principles and outcomes, is one of its great strengths. 
Comparison with an alternative approach will highlight the usefulness of being able to refer 
to different models of SCT in restorative discussions. Parfit (1984, 2011) attempts to 
combine rule consequentialism, contractualism, and Kantian ethics. His approach makes a 
powerful claim to unify three major approaches to the study of morality, though is less 
accessible than Scanlon’s as a teaching tool in restorative conversations because the focus 
on considering impersonal reasoning is more intellectually demanding than considering 
what one individual could reasonably reject. An individual making a judgement of a 
principle’s unacceptability is one step less removed from considering basic notions of one 
person's desire in competition with another's, and subjective preference maximisation, and 
may be easier to work with than a complex deployment of thinking from an abstract third-
party position. For practical educational application, one could visualise Gauthier, Scanlon, 
and Parfit as on a continuum of complexity, with gains in purported explanatory power 
trading off against simplicity of presentation. Gauthier is the most acceptable to the broadly 
self-interested, but neither requires nor necessarily develops respect for others’ preferences 
as potentially equal in value to one’s own, so serves perhaps best as a starting point for 
those disinclined towards reflecting on the consequences of situations for others. Scanlon 
allows for this, but requires the taking of a less self-centred perspective and may prove 
overly detailed for simple and brief explorations if one has to justify why one should care 
about the outcomes others obtain. A detailed philosophical composite such as Parfit may 
have considerable explanatory force and deal well with specific theoretical problems, but is 
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likely too complex to be translated into simple understandings, on which the following 
section goes on to expand. 
The detail of what approach to take to developing pupil understandings of justified 
authority is something that can be devolved to the judgement of a school or smaller 
community. Understanding the justification of authority is a requisite of good school 
discipline, but there is no need to stipulate a specific model of SCT to be adopted for its 
discussion. As with the under-defined aspects of PB4L policy, the principle of discussing 
social contracts can be suggested as an effective way to approach these issues, and 
decisions on the detail of the implementation can be devolved to those with local expertise 
in accordance both with practical suitability and a community’s other values and 
preferences. A pragmatic choice of a model of SCT that seems to be the best local fit for a 
specific situation, individual(s), and specific learning goals may lead to the most productive 
discussions, as they can all address the necessary questions of fair justification. Just as 
chemistry students are initially taught a simplified model of electron shells, which is then 
scrapped as they progress in understanding, so a simplified model of the interactions that 
make up 'morality' or 'politics' is of great use; once students have begun to consider the 
terrain and manipulate the elements, more complex ideas can be introduced. Compared to 
the minimal attention the overt rational consideration of fairness is currently required to 
receive in school discipline, enabling these questions to be considered under any model that 
is practical is likely to better enable thinking about the justification of authority in school 
discipline. 
In summary, contractarianism may be a simple entry point into considering issues of 
compromise for many students, but the likely undesirability of the self-centred perspectives 
to which it leads may make a swift transition to a contractual model desirable. This might be 
introduced as simply as by a change from asking ‘what do you (both) want?’ to ‘what might 
you agree on?’ The same techniques currently used for developing the consideration of 
community impact in restorative discussions can be used for the consideration of justice, 
and this exploration can develop through deliberative democratic discussion, as the 
following section explains. 
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Application and practicalities 
This section discusses how the models considered above can be used to support the 
development of rational thinking about fair outcomes in restorative discipline discussions. 
While the material above is complex, the core ideas can be deployed much more simply, as 
illustrated in the examples below.  Discussing what might be a fair resolution to a dispute 
can be tailored to the reasoning and theories most relevant to the concerns an individual 
student expresses. As an academic thesis, this document pays more attention to the detail 
of specific theories than is necessary for their classroom deployment. Similarly, works on the 
theory of restorative practice address concepts of restoration more deeply than the policy 
proposals currently being implemented. Questions of how far one can take personal 
responsibility for certain harms and how far one should be expected to make restitution can 
be deeply complex, yet are unnecessary to explore in a practical presentation of the system. 
Conversely, it would be a thesis in itself to construct a wide range of conversational 
templates for restorative discussions of justice. This section addresses their possibility, 
practicality, and similarity to existing structures in defence of the overall argument of the 
thesis — that such questioning is desirable as part of good school discipline. 
Questioning 
Questioning to elicit consideration of fairness in conflict situations requires only subtle 
changes to the phrases and formulations already used in restorative discussions. Essentially, 
questions aimed at asking how another person might feel about something can be recast to 
explore what they consider might be a fair resolution. The exploration of what it means for 
something to be fair can progress through the course of questioning, proposed solutions, 
objection, and discussion. When two people want opposing things, a teacher can ask one 
what the other person might want, and how a third party might rule between them. 
Conversations such as this take place regularly in disciplinary contexts, but without 
conscious effort to communicate an understanding that there are principles a teacher is 
referring to for their decision, rather than his or her own personal authority. Many teachers 
will have played arbitrator in ‘he-said/she-said’ situations, but without attempting to 
present the grounds for the arbitration as impersonal. Explaining how such conflicts are 
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resolved can clarify explicitly that something is a matter of principle as opposed to a 
personal choice, spark consideration of such principles, and yet still use simple language. For 
example, if two pupils come to a teacher with conflicting claims, he or she might reply ‘How 
could someone choose between you?’ as opposed to discussing the concept of an impartial 
observer. ‘I’m not sure which of you is right. Given that I’m not sure, what would be a fair 
decision here?’ Asking questions that stimulate the consideration of another person’s 
perspective provides simple openings for conversations about fairness, especially as some 
may be keen to argue in their self-interest if they see the potential for gain! As in empathic 
restorative discussions, the adult involved can reframe the conflict to switch the perspective 
of the speaker and the other disputant, and then see if they maintain the same position. 
One might expect some to pursue their self-interest, and stick to their perspective (even if it 
might obviously not be the case – e.g. ‘Would you want him to give it back if he had stolen 
your toy?’ ‘No’, replies student 1, aware that this is untrue). This can be worked around in 
community discussion: put to a group of peers in class discussion time, the same resolution 
should not hold the floor when subject to public reason.54 Similarly to how empathic RD 
discussions raise awareness of how others might be thinking and feeling, so can rational RD 
discussions raise awareness of when others might be justified in seeing a situation as unfair. 
Depending on whether a student seems to find particular arguments convincing, either 
generic language can be used or discussions can be tailored to specific formulations of SCT. 
If a student seems unreceptive to recognising the value of others’ perspectives, a teacher 
can discuss a problem in terms of ruling between competing desires for the best possible 
outcome, in line with contractarian thinking. One can discuss the maximisation of subjective 
preferences with simple phrases such as ‘What do you want?’ ‘What does he want?’ ‘How 
can we compromise given that I need to be fair to both of you?’ Conversely, if a student 
recognises that both sides have a reasonable claim in a given situation, a more contractual 
form of discussion can be adopted: ‘What can you both agree on, even though you disagree 
about (x)?’ ‘What would seem fair to (the other party)?’ ‘What sort of solution might you 
both consider fair?’ Regardless of any attempt to address a particular set of justifications for 
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terminate with such conclusions, but do not constitute the best outcomes of public reason. A different 
question is being addressed in those cases: namely, ‘Given that we want to support student 1 getting her way, 
how can we attempt to justify this within the discussion structures available?’ 
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fairness, one can simply refer to ‘fairness’ and let a conversation follow the particular set of 
justifications that are suggested by the progressing argument. Claims about what an 
individual wants, or what might be a fair way to distribute resources, can be addressed with 
reference either to the satisfaction of competing preferences or the establishment of 
mutually-acceptable ground-rules as seems appropriate for the particular situation. 
If a longer pastoral intervention is being conducted, such as a restorative conference as 
opposed to a brief conversation, rational fair outcomes can be explored to greater depth. 
This is similar to how students are already encouraged in such conferences to consider in 
greater depth the emotional impact of their actions on those around them. If a student 
persistently denies the value of considering the perspective and desires of others, one can 
promote rational thought about the situation as well as attempting to engage his or her 
empathy. ‘Imagine if everybody else thought like this. What would happen when two people 
disagreed?’ A student might suggest that it leads to a physical fight. They could then be 
encouraged to consider a similar situation where they believe avoiding a direct fight would 
be preferable, and how systems or compromises might be made to avoid this in situations 
where it is preferable to do so. Would such a system be applicable to the current situation? 
If not, why not? What would the other parties involved think? The principles of eliciting 
thought and reflection from the student can follow the same patterns as the empathic work 
in restorative conferences, and take place alongside them. This proposal is not for a 
completely new structure of intervention to develop the consideration of fairness, rather for 
the use of existing methods to address an additional concern alongside emotional 
restoration; one that is necessarily beneficial for good school discipline and for which 
restorative practices provide excellent opportunity. 
These discussions, it is worth noting, refer to the fair rather than the good, and thus respect 
moral pluralism rather than demanding adherence to certain values which an individual 
might not hold. If neither party can agree on who has right on their side in a given conflict, 
one can explore how an impartial judge might rule in such a situation, and explore how this 
might be the only way to find resolution without picking sides (i.e. adopting a particular 
moral position). In a similar way to how the empathetic appeals of restorative conversations 
seek to kindle a student’s desire to repair their relationships, rational consideration can 
engage a student’s thought about how something might be fairly resolved by someone who 
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cannot reasonably take sides. This supports a more nuanced understanding of democratic 
decision-making by considering the need for impartial fairness as well as simple majority 
voting. If two bullies outvote one victim, their actions are not justified. The scope of the 
thinking encouraged by such discussions is limited neither to a present conflict, nor to the 
confines of school. 
As simple an opening as asking a student ‘What might be fair?’ can present opportunities to 
develop an individual’s understanding of how a third-party position can have justifiable 
authority in conflict resolution, especially where there is a reasonable pluralism of facts or 
values in a particular dispute. 
Training 
Restorative practices are sometimes perceived to be difficult to carry out effectively, 
partially because they sometimes require abandoning patterns of behaviour management 
that individuals may have practised for decades. The Ministry of Education in New Zealand 
has undertaken to carry out some of the hardest parts of initiating change through adopting 
the Restorative Practice programme in PB4L.55 This thesis merely suggests supplementary 
questioning patterns be adopted within such models in order to stimulate thinking in 
additional areas. 
It requires more knowledge than a set of prescribed phrases to develop a conversation 
about fairness — yet, crucially, this is no different from the implementation of restorative 
practices as currently understood. Training is usually required to carry out restorative 
interventions effectively, and ideally they should be embedded in a supportive school 
culture to be successful (as discussed in chapter three). Considering justice would require an 
extension to the knowledge base communicated in such training, but the support for 
implementing restorative practices is something to which the New Zealand government has 
financially committed and to which work on justice could be added. The Ministry’s existing 
commitment to training for restorative discipline covers the lions’ share of this: it would 
take little alteration also to consider fairness in comparison to the much larger commitment 
undertaken to provide training on how to employ restorative structures effectively. 
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Addressing fairness does not require the study and transmission of a great body of theory; 
understanding this at a level sufficient to discuss it is not significantly more complex than 
the concepts already required for understanding the restoration of harm done to a 
community. 
Not all staff members need a high level of expertise in dealing with restorative situations. 
Being able to describe what an impartial observer might decide in a contested situation and 
why may be sufficient in many situations, similarly to how templates provided in RD training 
documents (‘Support material / PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive Behaviour 
for Learning’) enable all school staff to engage restoratively with disciplinary issues in a basic 
manner as the point of first contact. Just as in current training for restorative practices, 
some staff will be more interested in pastoral matters or want to receive more training, and 
will be better-placed to take the lead in escalated situations; be they a community 
behaviour conference for an individual with serious difficulties, or a discussion about fair 
classroom rules in form time. In these situations knowledge of models of SCT may be 
helpful, just as knowledge of more advanced restorative techniques in other areas can be 
helpful for other conferences. Deploying a simple, contractarian model of SCT might be the 
most accessible for one teenage audience, and a more widely-scoped contractual 
understanding may provide a more nuanced picture in another situation, but teaching a 
basic understanding of these is not a significant addition to the substantial training already 
required when a school adopts restorative practices. Learning how to employ restorative 
approaches to harm effectively is a much larger commitment than learning to address 
rational as well as empathic concerns within such practices. 
Opportunities 
Macfarlane, Macfarlane, & Margrain (2011) have written on the implementation and impact 
of restorative discussions in Māori communities, where the involvement of families and 
peers of at-risk individuals has proven beneficial in securing wide support for the methods 
and decisions of restorative conferences. It does not need to be only major disciplinary 
meetings such as restorative conferences that can feature overt, educational discussions of 
just authority and involve the whole community; such discussions can also be embedded 
simply in everyday disciplinary interactions as described above, and explored further as a 
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part of existing social and community time in schools. The logistical requirements of 
enabling such discussions are low. Many schools discuss community matters in form time, 
circle time, or some other pastoral period.56 When the principles behind a specific conflict 
are impersonalised and abstracted, it can be discussed by a wider group for educational 
benefit. Pupils may well realise exactly what event instigated such a discussion and be 
particularly engaged with the concrete example, but this appears to do no harm — and 
perhaps the opposite, as studies of the sensitive situation of anti-bullying discussions 
suggest (Cameron & Thosborne, 2001; Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007, p. 339). 
Such groups as these pastoral units are excellent spaces for deliberative, democratic 
discussion, enabling students to express and explore their perspectives and guide the best-
reasoned thoughts of the group towards a better understanding of the problem at hand, 
and perhaps also a proposed solution. Participation in community meetings in democratic 
schools suggests that students are keen to establish fair procedures and principles when 
they know their voices are being listened to and respected. While their principles are a step 
beyond the proposal of this thesis, the citizenship education facilitated by democratic 
schools such as Summerhill and Sudbury Valley is excellent at developing facility in the 
formulation of effective rules in conflict situations (Vaughan & Brighouse, 2006). A 
facilitated democratic discussion can lead to significant learning about fairness and justice, 
and allows the pupils to direct attention to where the relevant questions are perceived to 
be rather than requiring an expertly-planned philosophical lesson. The demands of running 
such a discussion are different from, rather than greater than, those of facilitating a 
restorative conference. Those with a greater interest and knowledge base can lead more 
involved discussions and disseminate more detailed knowledge, as with staff taking 
leadership roles in other areas of school RD programmes. For the wider body of staff, the 
same principles as with existing RD implementations apply: school-wide training in the 
basics, with practice leading to increasing fluency. 
Such conversations bear some similarities to the Communities of Inquiry implemented 
under Lipman’s Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement.57 As in those discussions, children 
raise the questions, and unreasonable answers are eliminated from the pool of possible 
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outcomes. The aim of restorative conversations, however, is different: rather than 
discussions led by trained philosophers and aimed at developing critical thinking skills more 
generally, restorative discussions of classroom justice are likely to remain concerned with 
the domain of fairness and require only a more specific body of knowledge. The emphasis is 
on understanding fair structures to resolve practical community problems as opposed to 
more general abstract exploration. Some of the critical analysis might be similar (for 
example, identifying ‘special pleading’, when a person or position is presented as an 
exception to a generally accepted rule without justification — such as an attempt to justify 
why you personally might not have to complete your homework, while everyone else still 
does), but restorative discussions also fit into shorter interpersonal interactions, and as part 
of classroom management techniques. They can occur within time that might otherwise be 
considered educationally ‘dead’, such as time that can be lost to maintaining classroom 
order in a less educative fashion, as opposed to requiring a timetabled slot for philosophical 
discussion. It is not unreasonable to project that some of the benefits identified as resulting 
from P4C programmes (such as improvements in reasoning and communication skills: 
Trickey, 2007) might also flow from similarly logical discussions in the context of restorative 
discipline. 
When restorative discipline structures are in place, in the same way that the briefest 
interactions can be used to reinforce and support other restorative community principles 
when staff are invested in the programme, so too can thinking about justice and fairness be 
promoted: From simple interventions in, say, an argument over who has rights over a 
shared football, to potentially very deep questions that might take hours to explore (‘Why 
do we have to do French today when I want to play in the snow?’), thinking can be steered 
into a socially educational domain with questions such as ‘What would be fair?’. There are 
times when a short discussion is practical, and times when it is not, but referring to a 
continuing concern for fairness is not something that is universally done. Even such small 
references to principle are more suggestive of reasoning than abrupt, closed, responses and 
orders, which can divert a questioner away from any reflection on the values and 
compulsion behind a political issue. Resolving conflicts by the force of a teacher’s power, 
rather than by promoting reflection on the justification or fairness of an outcome, can be 
seen as missed opportunities for citizenship education by the argument of this thesis. 
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Regardless of the length of thinking time and discussion available, questions of justice can 
be raised in response to small incidents in a similar way to how RD already raises concerns 
of restitution and the repair of harm. Short conversations about how something can be 
resolved fairly can follow similar patterns to short conversations about how something can 
be made (emotionally) ‘right’ again in RD. While it may run against a political tide of 
focusing on immediate and measurable gains, as the reference to evidence-based policies 
earlier describes, allowing time in form periods, circle time, or citizenship education to fall 
to the discussion of issues that have arisen in the week allows ongoing and developmental 
address of such topics, and may acquire continuing momentum of its own. When pupils 
become engaged in questioning why school rules and decrees are fair or justified, the 
enthusiasm for such active citizenship seldom fades away (Vaughan & Brighouse, 2006). 
In summary, social contract theories provide a useful framework for exploring ideas of co-
operation over disagreement in restorative discipline, and one educative about the 
operation of secular institutions of justice in adult life. Explanations can be given at different 
levels of complexity as suits a given situation, adapted to appropriate theories, and further 
explored in either individual or group discussions to stimulate reflection on what rules and 
resolutions to a conflict might be fair. 
Embedding the consideration of justice into restorative discipline appears both reasonably 
practical and philosophically defensible. Its most challenging requirements already have 
support from the existing commitments of the Ministry of Education to restorative practices 
and the growing body of evidence on the efficacy of restorative discipline. The opportunities 
to address justice in restorative discussions are numerous and found in the smallest of 
interactions with pupils as well as in pastoral time or time allocated for disciplinary issues. 
The introduction of PB4L is an eminently suitable opportunity to improve education for 
democratic citizenship by considering justice and fairness in restorative discipline, and one it 
may be wise to take considering both its potential impact and the lower time and 
opportunity costs of doing so in comparison with a standalone initiative aimed at achieving 
similar goals in the future. 
While it is a hypothetical link, studies of prison populations report exceedingly poor conflict-
resolution skills in terms of finding co-operative solutions to persistent disagreement, rather 
135 
 
than resorting to violence or forcefully pushing for one’s own way (Swanson, 2009, p. 77). 
Any improvement of such skills, especially at such little cost relative to those of the judicial 
and penal systems, carries the possibility of helping students learn how to de-escalate a 
situation or accept compromise, rather than taking forceful selfish action of the kind that 
often involves violation of the law. 
Chapters 1–5 have proposed the extension of restorative practices to further educate about 
fairness and the justification of authority, and why that necessarily contributes to better 
school discipline. Chapters 6–8 defend this argument against three lines of attack: from the 
status or rights of children, their cognitive capabilities, and the privileging of the rational 




Childhood, rights, and parental preference 
This chapter examines the special status ascribed to children in democratic societies such as 
New Zealand and the consequences this has for rational deliberation in restorative 
discipline. It considers whether specific conceptions of childhood, children’s capabilities, or 
their parents’ preferences undermine arguments for education about justified secular 
political authority, and consequently the techniques proposed in this thesis. It makes 
specific reference to the situation of faith schools, and from what aspects of ‘moral’ content 
a pupil can reasonably be exempted. It concludes that individual moral beliefs are not 
interfered with by the development of rationality through restorative discipline any more 
than they are by the existing compulsions of being part of a contemporary secular 
democratic state. 
This chapter also examines the notion of rights, on which some prefer to base claims about 
justice rather than arguments emergent from the social contract. It addresses some issues 
with their formulation, and then clarifies that rights can be considered to emerge from 
hypothetical contractual discussion, thus enabling them to serve as a further element of 
support for the restorative classroom discussions proposed rather than as a competing 
narrative. 
Child, adult, parent, pupil, and teacher: important labels, or a distraction 
from considering capabilities? 
The concept of childhood 
What is significant about the state of childhood — about being, or being considered, a 
child58? Historically it has been assumed that this distinction between child and adult states 
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 This chapter uses the term ‘child’ in binary opposition to ‘adult’ except for where specified otherwise, 
because this usage best highlights the difficulties in assigning rights and duties on which it proceeds to focus. 
Many of the ‘children’ under discussion will be adolescents, as the proposal is aimed at those of secondary 
school age and so will most often consider pre-teens from the age of 11 to young adults at the age of 18. More 
specific categorisation of the under-18s is more significant for the next chapter, and relative differences in 
capability (including of teenagers in contrast to younger children) will be addressed there.  
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is real and important, and this distinction is often deployed in debates around the fair 
treatment of children by those who are deemed to have reached a state of maturity and 
accorded a greater voice in public life. The central position accorded to the state of 
childhood in debates on fair treatment of the young is potentially harmful due to its 
imprecision: the legal definition of childhood is blunt, leaving little space for the flexible 
treatment of individuals, and the connotations of the term in the public sphere may include 
significant deficit conceptions justified primarily by legal status. It may be better to address 
individuals’ qualities, or capabilities in specific areas, rather than descend unnecessarily 
soon to generalities. 
The nature of childhood is philosophically contested and its boundaries are unclear. It is 
worthwhile to note how recent a development mass education is in the course of human 
history, and that most of these developments in the conception of the child have occurred 
within living memory. Ariès’ (1962/1965) depiction of children as ‘little adults’ is a 
conception of childhood that goes all the way back to Aristotle, according to whom children 
are the immature form of a developed, final, adult organism. A competing — and now 
dominant — model is that of development through a number of stages, typically associated 
with Piaget (1977) and Rousseau (1763/1979). The ‘blank slate’ model of childhood, with 
children conceived of as open books for the world to write in, is also consigned to history in 
its absolute form,59 in part through Chomsky's work on Universal Grammar. Human 
language learning provides compelling evidence that the human mind is primed for certain 
linguistic structures, and learns how to generate complex linguistic structures correctly from 
limited input, in forms to which a child has not necessarily been exposed (Chomsky, 1995). 
The fluidity of the conception of childhood in one generation’s lifespan means that a simple 
and consistent legal definition of childhood as below a certain age is the most practical one 
to understand when the term is used in everyday speech. Such a definition should not, 
however, be confused with an ethical one, as the following section will highlight. 
Two particular models highlight the inadequacies of a purely legal approach to childhood: 
firstly, the view developed primarily by Holt, Farson, and Cohen that children are effectively 
no different from adults in key respects (H. Cohen, 1980; Farson, 1974; Holt, 1974), and 
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 A non-absolute claim, that children have some existing ‘programming’ and yet are also significantly 
influenced by their environment, is a small and fairly uncontroversial one. 
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secondly, that of children as potential future full citizens (either on the passage of time, 
development of certain capabilities, or reaching some legal designation of adulthood). 
The former position challenges an essential distinction between the states of child and 
adult. Areas of overlap exist that render a strictly binary division undesirable. Some adults 
will be less deserving of certain ‘adult’ freedoms than some children. This position may 
initially seem attractive as it removes a potentially unjust distinction that is blind to 
individual capabilities. Difficulties arise, however, when looking beyond the compelling basic 
demand to the practicalities of ascribing equal rights to humans across a vast range of levels 
of development. Rights theories, as expanded upon below, tend to hinge on considerations 
of will or of interest. There are periods when a young infant is neither yet able to perceive 
what actions will lead to consequences in its own interest nor able to communicate complex 
notions of will. Special consideration of some sort is required to avoid the less capable being 
prey to the further developed. The equality Holt, Farson, and Cohen demand cannot be for 
all humans, in all respects — that is to say, certain humans require differentiated treatment 
in particular areas to safeguard other aspects of equality deemed more important. For 
example, different provisions for transport (school buses in rural areas) provide for equal 
access to educational facilities. Consequently, attention to specifics is desirable, rather than 
an abstract label of ‘child’ or an under-defined notion of ‘equality’. This requires making 
numerous difficult judgements, though, such as of what quality entitles one to the licence to 
take responsibility for oneself to the same degree allowed to human adults. With uniform 
treatment considered as equality, and without such distinctions, the youngest of infants 
would suffer from a policy of non-interference. 
This argument does not render such a demand for equality as Holt, Farson, and Cohen’s 
untenable under some requirement to be absolute or to fail. The position can allow that the 
key to the appropriateness of giving or not giving rights to children arises from capacity (H. 
Cohen, 1980), and develop this position in accordance with will- or interest theories of rights 
(the discussion of which follows). Such claims still have problems, however. For example, a 
‘thin’ definition of the capacity to choose can be defended in terms of children making 
choices by expressing preferences. Such a minimal definition of choice, without an 
awareness of consequences, can be paralleled to that possessed by animals, and raise 
further questions about the extent of the bearing of liberty rights; that is, why humans of 
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limited capability should deserve distinct status from animals (Singer, 2011). Conversely, a 
‘thick’ definition of capacity to choose (based on a full awareness of consequences) is one 
that either no-one meets, or still requires a problematic distinction, based on the difficulty 
of defining what either a full or sufficient awareness of consequences entails. 
One approach to childhood that mitigates these problems is the second of the two models 
suggested above, in which such distinctions can be drawn based on a person or animal’s 
capacity for potential future development. When an absolute claim of status equality is 
modified by such a qualification based on capacities, the above position becomes 
sufficiently close to a model with rights based on stages of development that they can be 
treated together for the sake of the proceeding argument about what significance the state 
of childhood holds for education about justified authority. 
Adulthood, legal status, and the problems of labelling 
Whether understood as based on either capabilities or the potential to develop certain 
capabilities, establishing a legal boundary between childhood and adulthood is problematic. 
When this is based on the blunt measure of reaching a specific age, it is particularly so. 
As a practical tool, legally ascribing adulthood to all those above a particular age can target 
approximate levels of development of a large proportion of people across a normally-
distributed population. Considered as a judgement of capability, for many people this will be 
unfair, as some younger people have higher capabilities than some older people. It does, 
however, avoid the practical near-impossibility of conducting a test on each citizen, or each 
citizen who requests one, to measure their capability in an area on which their qualification 
for a particular right or freedom depends. Such a system could easily be unfair, corrupt, and 
overly resource-intensive.60 The concern here is with a philosophically well-justified 
boundary, open as with every principle in this thesis to scrutiny by democratic deliberation, 
and it is partially on such a principle that legal judgments ought to be based. The ‘potential 
future adult’ conception of childhood can hit philosophical difficulties if defended on factors 
other than ability: what quality is it that is specific to adulthood that ascribes adults with 
extra privileges if not a higher level of capability? Legal precedent is a practical and historical 
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boundary, not a philosophical one. That a child will come to reach the legal boundary is no 
philosophical argument that might ground the granting of different political statuses to 
those of different ages. Even if such a system may be as fair as is practically possible, it leads 
to unjust outcomes for some individuals, and seemingly arbitrary restrictions are a key 
flashpoint in many rebellions against authority in the secondary school age range. An 
understanding of the practical limitations of certain institutions is not likely to lessen the 
resentment that stems from personally suffering an injustice; understanding why a 
restriction is just or fair is more likely to be persuasive than ‘It’s the best we can do. Sorry.’ 
Finding a fair way to evaluate qualification for adult status is challenging. 
The potential for an individual to develop is something society treats as significant, not just 
one’s current capabilities. This justifies the different treatment of children, who typically 
grow in cognitive capability as they age and reach ‘independence’61 in adulthood, and 
lower-capability adults who are less likely to need preparation for certain responsibilities if 
they will continue to need specialist care in many aspects of their lives. Potential for 
development is, however, not relevant to including and evaluating all voices as part of 
deliberative discussions: ideal public reason should settle on the best arguments, whatever 
the source. While a higher proportion of weak or irrational contributions may be harmful to 
the emergence of high-quality arguments, the educative value of participation is significant 
and at the level under discussion (school environments with small numbers of participants, 
with a specifically educative intention) this is unlikely to be a significant obstacle. 
Potential for development is also significant for highlighting the inadequacy of approaches 
to childhood based solely either on current capabilities or on categorisation by age. If it is 
desirable to account for likely development, then judgements of current capability are not 
the only relevant factor in evaluating a young person’s social duties and entitlements. 
Conversely, if notions of capability were unimportant enough for a legal age of majority to 
suffice as a completely ethical and fair boundary for adulthood, then there would be little 
grounds for affording extra consideration to adults who face challenges from limitations in 
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 Insofar as anyone is independent. This is often an unhelpful term that plays into libertarian worldviews and 
fails to acknowledge the links and dependencies that remain even between individuals who describe 
themselves as fully independent. 
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their abilities. Including elements of both age and ability in the judgement of adulthood 
appears to be important. 
The different rights and duties which adults and children may justifiably have are addressed 
below, but it deserves reiteration that the apparatus of public reason in deliberative 
democracy gives no reason why the less rational or the child should be excluded. A school 
environment can provide democratic practice for young people in ways a state-wide 
representative democracy does not. A blunt age boundary might be a practical necessity for 
some legal situations where there are practical limitations on the effective execution of 
judicial functions,62 but in education for developing our understanding of society and 
citizenship we should consider both the legal status and capabilities of individuals: a label 
like ‘child’ can encourage negative pre-judgements (for example, about an individual’s 
capability to make rational decisions) as easily as class descriptors more widely considered 
to be negative such as ‘simpleton’ or ‘convict’ (the latter being a similarly misleading label 
for some individuals: consider the innocent or the morally-justified political prisoner63). A 
parallel example would be a constant gender flag in every reference to a human who is 
female: often irrelevant, and likely to increase the possibility of prejudice or unwarranted 
power dynamics influencing their treatment.64 
In conclusion, to label children is imprecise, legally blunt, and can encourage weakly justified 
and potentially harmful connotations. The state of childhood is no obstacle to participating 
in deliberative discussions about fair outcomes. 
Teachers’ authority and its limited scope 
Attending to other labels than ‘child’ provides further examples of situations where they can 
prove unhelpful in democratic discussions. The strength of an argument posed in 
deliberative discussion is more important than the ability of the person who suggests it, and 
so the voice of an ‘adult’ or facilitator in a democratic discussion needs specific 
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draw attention to the fact that they used to be less independent, make poorer decisions, and to imply that it is 
still a relevant feature in how they should be considered. 
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consideration. Creating an environment in which the opinions of the adult were 
automatically given extra weight would be detrimental to full and equal participation in 
democratic discussion. If some participants in a discussion are perceived as less capable due 
to a label, such as ‘children’ in contrast to ‘adults’, their voices may be marginalised. 
Separating attention to the strength of an argument from its source is a further task that 
meshes well with the work done in communities of (philosophical) inquiry under the 
Philosophy for Children programme. Both pupils and teachers may benefit from having their 
attention drawn to the manipulation of social status being used to gain more favourable 
consideration for one’s ideas. 
Being the teacher, adult, or facilitator in a group does not mean one will necessarily produce 
the best arguments. It may generally correlate with a higher level of rational capability than 
an average child65— and most probably a better knowledge of structuring democratic 
debate, at least initially due to training and/or prior experience — but this does not 
translate to better understanding in every situation. All arguments should ideally be 
evaluated independently or with bias correction to account for their source. Teachers may 
have expert status in particular fields due to a deep knowledge of their subjects, but in 
discussions outside their specialist areas their most salient ability may be their capability for 
a different perspective to that of the children in their care. Often this may be a wider one 
that rightly considers more variables; but those variables can be exposed to group 
discussion, rather than being used privately to form an individual conclusion put forward 
with authoritative force. Because of the authority vested in the teacher in classroom 
situations, they must take care not to use this authority to privilege their contributions to 
debate unfairly at the cost of respecting the input of others. Part of establishing a 
deliberative community of the type this thesis discusses involves helping pupils to transfer 
their perception of authority from the person in the role of the teacher to the reasoning 
that supports their administration of just authority. When discussing democratic 
justification, it is counter-productive and logically inconsistent to assert personal or 
positional authority in support of its imposition. This would be circular: using an individual’s 
existing authority to justify the system that ascribes authority to the individual. As 
deliberative democrats describe the potential problem, teacher authority violates 'authentic 
                                                        
65 The next chapter explores such differences in capability in detail. 
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deliberation'. There is a challenging balance to find for the same facilitator to play the roles 
of impartial observer and participant as well as the practical arm of law enforcement. This 
challenge, however, is one classroom teachers have long had to face. 
When enforcing democratically-agreed ground rules that are currently being broken, it is 
preferable in democratic classrooms to do so in a way that directs attention to the rules the 
community desires rather than one that suggests ‘the teacher is keeping order’. These prior 
agreements remain provisional, and subject to further democratic change in accordance 
with deliberative theory, but their enforcement is by reference to the law as opposed to the 
authority of an individual. A simple example is to ask ‘What did we agree about running in 
the classroom?’ as opposed to saying ‘Don’t run in the classroom’. This reference to 
principle will be educative for many, as shall be expanded upon in the following chapter on 
cognitive moral development. Discipline through collective agreement also encourages a 
more participatory environment, where pupils can police each other’s behaviour (another 
phrase with undesirable negative connotations!) and consider what good behaviour involves 
with scope for disagreement and development, as opposed to receiving an instruction from 
power that may be perceived from earlier childhood experiences still to brook no argument. 
Much of this aspect of practitioner skill (crediting and developing the community system, as 
opposed to taking personal authority) is addressed by existing commitments to training for 
restorative discussions, regardless of the additions proposed in this thesis. 
In the context of deliberative discussions, an adult should take care not to dominate by 
proposing most of the best suggestions, and should rather seek to draw considered ideas 
from children. This is standard teaching technique in schools, in preference to lecturing to 
an audience one assumes to be convinced of one’s wisdom. In some areas a teacher will 
have specialist knowledge that merits particular consideration; in others they will not. An 
understanding of the principles of fair justification may be one such area, while overriding a 
democratic judgement of what a fair outcome would be is not. The former supports 
effective deliberative discussion, whereas the latter would impede it. For example, an 
effective facilitator can ensure everyone gets a turn to be heard, and that contributions are 
considered on their merits rather than the popularity of the speaker. An ineffective 
facilitator might hurry concluding on an idea he or she thinks is best before pupils have 
come to their own judgement. 
144 
 
Individuals who contribute less helpfully to deliberative discussions can still participate fully 
in classroom democracy as long as the system and its facilitators work to enable their ability 
to do that. Indeed, often it will be beneficial to privilege children's voices when they are 
most directly affected by a decision of which adults do not necessarily perceive the full 
effects. Perhaps a change in room allocation to provide for specific teaching resources 
means that one class has to carry excessively heavy bags over a long distance. The 
perspectives of all community members are valuable, and consequently so is wide 
participation in community discussions. One can recognise that some participants may not 
comprehend certain issues fully, or make logical errors — indeed, a thoughtful class can 
come to consider the fallibility of its own judgements — but the process of democratic 
discussion can promote the logical analysis and comparison of proposed solutions and make 
progress towards whatever the community judges a better answer to be, no matter what 
the starting point. 
In summary, the label of ‘adult’ or ‘teacher’ may be unhelpful in some situations, even if 
vital in other contexts. A teacher’s particular strength in democratic debate might often be 
in upholding the system, and agreed-upon consequences — as a consistent presence of a 
developed adult awareness of justice, and with experience of maintaining consistent 
boundaries in the face of social pressure. 66 The teacher should not be presumed to be the 
provider of optimal solutions to problems under democratic discussion. 
Individual children's ability to suggest successful policies is not universally lower than that of 
adults, even though in many situations they will produce less rational solutions. Avoiding 
lazy reference to labels when it is unnecessary helps lessen the problems of social power 
magnifying some voices inappropriately. 
Pupils, parents, and the inability to opt out of particular compulsions 
Two further regularly-distinguished categories merit individual mention: those of pupil and 
of parent. These will be used to highlight the role of democratic discussion in developing the 
understanding of why particular claims of authority are or are not justified. Mirroring the 
role of teachers, who have certain powers justified by their position, certain areas of 
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 Discussion of the relative levels of development of teachers and children follows in the next chapter, and 
addresses the potential issue of adults who may not be well-placed to facilitate such environments. 
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expertise, and particular duties, pupils similarly have domain-bounded duties and 
entitlements. Being in the pupil's role for a particular learning experience does not mean 
that a student has lesser knowledge or capability in every respect. The pupil’s role should 
not be conflated with the state of being a child: his or her role is to learn, often about a 
specific domain, and being a pupil should not necessarily entail any assumptions of lacking 
knowledge or wisdom more broadly that may lazily be associated with children. Again, the 
deliberative principles that support the models discussed in this thesis provide a means for 
learning about a community member’s rights or duties: agreements on role — like all prior 
agreements or resolutions in deliberative democracy — are provisional, and their 
justification can be subject to discussion. When such roles run against the imposed force of 
a greater authority such as the nation-state (e.g. as in the case of compulsion to attend 
school), such authority can be exposed, challenged, and discussed, but for present 
practicality has to be accepted. 
For learning about the democratic process itself, restorative discussions enable students to 
be involved in decision making and thus learn by participation — practical civics in action, as 
discussed in chapter four. Quiet enforcement of the rules can reflect legal and political 
processes at a state level, enabling the experience of being subject to the rules of school to 
serve as practical education about democratic citizenship. Discussion of the justification of 
these restrictions can provide an excellent platform for developing critical literacy67 as 
students approach adulthood and the increased opportunity to engage with the governance 
of wider democratic society. 
The role of parent is another that carries authority which children may feel they cannot 
challenge. A parent's ability to compel a child to follow certain rules may reach beyond the 
limits of its justification given that the family unit is not beholden to the judgments of public 
reason. Family law and social care are often only of recourse in the most severe cases of 
domestic disharmony and abuse. There is clearly widespread social desire to respect and 
preserve the special relationship and closeness many parents have with their children, and 
for many it forms a primary component of their human happiness, but there are limits to 
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 Critical literacy here is the ability to perceive and address oppression covertly imposed upon citizens by 
institutions such as governments, and consequently to become more empowered. This social justice 
understanding of critical literacy is most associated with Freire (1967/2000). It is an optional direction in which 
discussions of institutional power can be taken, rather than a required element of the argument of this thesis. 
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the extent of a parent’s justifiable authority and out of the public eye this may well be 
exceeded. The details of a parent’s duty of care lie mostly beyond the scope of this chapter, 
but the section below on faith schools examines whose interests should take precedence 
when child, parent, and state come into conflict. The extent of the authority parents should 
have over their children may be different from what they do have in practice, but if so then 
this is an imperfect feature of our current society that is less easy to address with school 
policy than relationships conducted in a more public arena. A child’s freedom to be home-
schooled, and opt out of attending formal education, may not be one that is realistically 
available to them while they are dependent on their parents for care and the meeting of 
their basic needs. These problems do not invalidate any of the solutions proposed in this 
thesis as they are similarly built on a society where there is no practical option for adults to 
opt out of membership of the nation-state that claims the land on which they live. Children 
in New Zealand will be subject to New Zealand family law, and to the New Zealand justice 
system in adult life if they remain in the country, whether they like it or not. Learning to 
cope with, interact with, and thrive under such conditions that at first may seem immutable 
is part of the personal benefit of citizenship education. 
Should children have some say over aspects of their status such as the ability to opt out of 
the protections and limits under discussion? There is merit68 to the position that those who 
request an adult right should broadly be granted it, and this is addressed legally by the cases 
of Gregory K's involvement in his change of legal parenthood (Russ, 1993) and the UK laws 
of Gillick competence (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, 1985). 
These were precedent-setting cases concerning children's ability to have a say in the 
conditions of their own future. Gregory K legally divorced his parents at the age of 12 while 
under the care of his foster family, and the Gillick decision confirmed the legal right of 
children under the age of 16 to have medical treatment without the knowledge or consent 
of their parents ‘if and when the child achieves sufficient understanding and intelligence to 
understand fully what is proposed’ (Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health 
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 This is both on the grounds of a right to self-determination, and on consideration of why a child otherwise 
lacks a certain right. If a child is judged to have considered, and have a meaningful grasp of, the consequences 
of a certain right, then arguments against a child’s capacity to act in accordance with that right are 
undermined. The question of what a ‘meaningful grasp’ entails faces problems similar to those of having a full 
understanding of the outcomes of certain choices, addressed both earlier in this chapter and in the following 
section on different theories of rights.  
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Authority, 1985). There is some philosophical difficulty in clarifying a point at which 
authority can be given to a child's opinion that affects their future self when their rationality 
is yet not fully developed,69 but the structure of much non-restorative classroom 
governance is so far removed from the acknowledgement of children’s preferences and the 
rational merit of their views that any introduction of democratic principles is a step in the 
direction of justice. ‘Traditional’ authoritarian discipline demonstrates very little respect for 
children’s input in disciplinary situations, and may serve the interests of fairness poorly 
through not allowing relevant facts to emerge. A simple example would be punishing a pupil 
for being in an area restricted to staff without giving them the opportunity to explain any 
special dispensation to be there which they might have. The empirical data on restorative 
practices highlight many benefits that can accrue from the inclusion of children's voices in 
resolving situations of conflict, yet some democratically-justified decisions will still go 
against the preferences of certain individuals and groups. High levels of autonomy for the 
mentally underdeveloped are likely to continue to be one of these situations unless the 
merits of a small degree of paternalism are substantially refuted. 
In summary, some of the issues that may arise in democratic discussions of discipline in 
secondary schools will be built upon positions about the status and capabilities of children, 
and are not fully addressed when explanations terminate without exploration at concepts 
such as ‘the pupil’s duty’ or the legal requirements of schooling for children. Labels can be 
problematically imprecise, as is universally the case with generalisations, and those 
discussed in this chapter especially so because of the parcel of unexamined values many will 
have about those who bear them and the relationships they should have with other groups. 
Such distinctions can be legally rather than philosophically grounded, and based on easily-
measurable qualities such as age rather than qualities which might be more significant, such 
as mental capabilities. The democratic debate proposed in this thesis can expose and 
evaluate these problems — educative in itself about the conditions under which 
schoolchildren work — and at least propose and consider suggestions for how the most 
problematic of our current systems might be made more just. 
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After considering the variety of conditions and situations about which democratic 
discussions can educate, the concerns of behaviour management systems not openly 
grounded in such attention to fair justification may seem all the more distant and custodial, 
attending to punitive discipline rather than being socially educative. The issues above 
support the restorative discussion of justice in school discipline as an educative project. 
Democratic discussion can help children understand and engage with the reasoning behind 
social limitations, exploring and questioning the sources of justified authority, as a 
component of good school discipline and in better preparation for engagement with adult 
democratic life. 
Children’s rights 
This thesis has until this chapter made little reference to theories of human rights. This is no 
accident, as the justification for rights theories is often drawn from arguments that can be 
considered subordinate to a deliberative democratic process rather than necessarily prior. 
This section addresses some problems with the formulation of rights theories, and then 
clarifies how a conception of rights as emergent from contractual discussion can enable 
them to serve as further support for the argument of this thesis, rather than as a competing 
narrative. Rights theories have been criticised by communitarians such as Sandel (1998) for 
their close links to liberal positions that consider independent individuals as the constituents 
of societies. These assumptions are unnecessary either to make or to deny in adopting 
Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative democracy as presented in this thesis. Discussions of 
justice and fairness are often built on discussion of rights as basic claims and starting points 
(e.g. Rawls and those working in his tradition make such claims) when their justification can 
actually be found through reasonable democratic consensus. This section addresses some 
problems with taking rights as a starting point for classroom discussions of justice, before 
clarifying how the apparatus of deliberative democracy enables their discussion as 
something emergent from other principles of fairness, rather than needing to be postulated 
as axiomatic. 
Talk of rights can be unhelpful in classroom discussions of fairness and justice. An argument 
in which an individual stands on their ‘right’ to something, aware that this might be an 
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irrefutable claim to the outcome they desire, can be used to close off discussion, rather than 
exploring whether or why this might be the case. It is easy to visualise teenagers in a 
classroom repeatedly insisting on entitlements rather than consider any corresponding 
duties that possessing such rights might entail. Such an approach to rights is very one-
dimensional: it ignores how a framework of rights can support the interests of a community, 
rather than solely concern the self-interested entitlements of a right-holder. Such an 
approach can support a consumerist mentality towards education, where the student is 
considered to be purchasing a service and can insist upon certain circumstances according 
with their preference as opposed to with other principles such as those of distributive 
justice. This thesis proposes educating for democratic citizenship, which (in accordance with 
Gutmann and Thompson’s principles above) involves education to enable equal 
participation in democratic adult life. A student’s choice does not take precedence over such 
principles. This is a situation that will be reflected in the consideration of parental choice 
over faith schools, as discussed below. 
The principles behind some such rights claims will be grounded in legal requirements, but 
others will not be, and all such claims should be within the bounds of reasonable community 
debate. However, a room full of self-interested individuals demanding unexamined rights 
for themselves is a less fertile environment for the discussion of what entitlements might be 
impartially justified than a restorative environment, where community well-being is more of 
a focus. The content of rights can appear to be beyond the scope of debate, when there is 
no reason why they should be accepted without discussion in a system founded on 
deliberative democracy to help prepare children to enter adult democratic discourse. 
Unassailable rights established prior to democratic debate are not helpful when trying to 
establish reasonable and mutually acceptable foundations, as both principles and the 
process of democratic debate itself are provisional under Gutmann and Thompson’s 
formulation. 
Rights talk can confuse the restorative conversations proposed in this thesis. Discussion 
seeks to enable children to explore and understand the sources of values under 
disagreement, rather than to accept some positions unilaterally. Such rights claims may 
both be hard to distinguish from value claims (which can be moral, rather than components 
of justice), and be established in practice by legal precedent and practical compromise 
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rather than by clear philosophical commitment. If citizens are being prepared to enter the 
democratic process, and to be able to modify the apparatus of the state, presenting a legal 
and mutable aspect of the state as conceptually axiomatic undermines the mission of 
exposing the foundations of authority and inviting children to join with the shaping of it. 
Rather than confusing discussions with notions of rights, which may be understood to imply 
further unnecessary philosophical commitments, it is clearer to focus on the political 
authority that comes from public reason. 
An examination of how rights are ascribed to children highlights their practical and legal 
basis rather than primary reference to philosophical issues. The example of the age of 
majority is again illustrative, where being considered to have reached adulthood and to 
have acquired the associated bundle of rights is judged by a uniform measure of age rather 
than a judgement of capabilities, sacrificing accuracy for individuals for ease of 
implementation over a large population. Legal and practical issues follow democratic 
resolution in Gutmann and Thompson’s model, and it would be inconsistent with this model 
to present them as superordinate principles beyond the scope of democratic debate. Such a 
division between adulthood and childhood may be a sensible solution in practice, and even 
a helpful starting point for discussion, but such a division may be mistakenly understood to 
rest on philosophical rather than legal justifications. Similar attention to practicality over 
philosophy does not diminish the value of agreements such as the UN Declaration of- and 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNDRC & UNCRC) as legal guarantees in support of 
practical action. There is great consequential value to the agreements reached to uphold 
them. These documents are, however, political outcomes: they resulted from a process of 
reasoned deliberation, and were agreed to be valuable, rather than being considered as of 
prior value and exempt from the process of deliberation. Care is necessary not to confuse 
grounds for practical and political action with philosophical grounds. In a classroom debate, 
reference to existing conceptions of rights may cloud the issues if raised unnecessarily. 
Rights theories for children are also philosophically problematic, as evaluated by Archard 
(2003). The following section will consider these problems, and further defend why 
assertions of basic rights beyond the consideration of democratic debate are unhelpful for 
the discussions proposed in this thesis. Using the language of rights not only risks potential 
confusion about the source of basic political values, but also requires making unnecessary 
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and contestable philosophical claims, as described below. In a similar manner to the 
pragmatic acceptance of the current government in chapter four, and the avoidance of 
stipulating specific moral truths throughout this thesis, there is no need to adopt a position 
here that might alienate some who would otherwise accept the argument of this project. 
Theories of the function of rights are split primarily into two families: will theories, in which 
a right-holder has a choice to enforce the correlative duty on another to provide that right, 
and interest theories, in which the interest of the right-holder in having the subject of the 
right is sufficiently great that it creates a duty upon others to fulfil it. When applied to 
children, there are serious difficulties with both of these approaches. 
Will theories of rights 
The problems of applying a will theory of rights to children are well-documented.70 While 
there are different moves that can be made to attempt to reconcile apparently incompatible 
central claims, many will theorists assert that only those capable of exercising choices can 
be rights-holders, and that children are incapable of exercising what meets their criteria for 
genuine choice. Unless one of these claims is modified, children cannot be rights-holders. 
While the will approach has potential solutions, such as the decisions of trustees on behalf 
of children who are democratically active, it is deeply problematic for those wanting to 
ascribe rights to children. It is practically challenging to apply will theory rights to beings 
without a clear way of communicating their will accurately, which would include intelligent 
non-human species, and, below a certain age, young children. There are also challenging 
liminal issues here, for example in delineating when an expression of preference become a 
meaningful choice, or how well someone has to understand or be able to predict the 
necessarily indeterminate consequences of an intended action for it to be considered as a 
choice. The inclusion of will theories of rights in grounding classroom conflict resolution 
takes on significant philosophical problems unnecessarily. 
Interest theories of rights 
While more favoured than will theories in addressing issues of children's rights, interest 
theories of rights also face problems. The child's best interests are key to the formulation of 
                                                        
70 Archard (2003) provides a comprehensive summary. 
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the UNCRC (UN General Assembly, 1989), but it is difficult to be precise about what exactly 
‘best interests’ are, and what claims they make on others. Reich states simply that the 
child’s best interest cannot be singularly defined in the value pluralism of a liberal 
democracy (Siegel, 2009, p. 473). In such an environment there is disagreement both over 
what constitutes a good outcome, and whose projection of the likely outcome of a decision 
should take priority. 
An initial problem is whether 'best interest' is constituted prior to moral value, and subject 
only to a political justice framework. That is, whether best interest is determined by some 
conception of the good, or in accordance with conceptions of fairness and the right that 
attempt to account for competing notions of the good. If interest is judged from a moral 
basis chosen by another, this may be a significant denial of children's freedom to choose 
their own values due to some quality judged essential to their status as a child. If one factors 
in the child’s preferences, however, then there is significant overlap between interest- and 
will conceptions of rights, and a question of how much weight to place upon these 
preferences and whether or not they constitute considered choices. A judgement of the 
best compromise between reasonable perspectives may privilege rationality in a similar way 
to public reason, but in doing so attends less to the child's perspective, and is somewhat 
paternal. This thesis does not consider personal morality to be subject to public reason in 
the same manner as interpersonal justice, and establishing rights from a moral perspective 
is not necessarily compatible with a commitment to moral pluralism. When best interests 
are morally determined, there remains the question of not only how they might be 
evaluated, but also how they should be constrained by justice and the interests of others. 
This again touches on how such legal rights are primarily a practical solution rather than a 
philosophical claim concerning ethics that we might attempt to explain to our students. This 
approach does not necessarily address pertinent questions of justice, as prioritising one 
conception of the good does not allow for the evaluation of that conception in comparison 
to other competing conceptions of the good. 
Making a hypothetical choice in service of a child’s best interests is similarly problematic. 
Three different approaches to this choice all face conceptual problems: 
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 Attempting to choose as the adult a child would become would choose neglects the 
impact of this choice in the person they would become: Archard's illustration is of 
the child who practises the violin and becomes a happy concert violinist, and of the 
same child who practises football and becomes a happy professional footballer. Each 
end-state adult would reasonably recommend a different course of action. 
 Attempting to choose as any adult would choose is not straightforward, as while in 
some situations the course of action is easily agreed, such as in classic considerations 
of paternalism involving keeping a child's hand out of a fire, in others there will be 
significant difference of opinion. This thesis recognises a reasonable plurality of 
moral positions, on which adults would disagree.71 
 Finally, attempting to choose as an adult analogue of a specific child would choose is 
conceptually challenging. It is hard to isolate what aspects of a child can be altered 
without neglecting to respect some important part of their personality, and also 
arguable as to whether or not this produces something coherent: for example, 
seeking an adult decision on whether or not to visit a non-existent Santa Claus in 
Lapland in whom your child counterpart believes. This appears to be another case in 
which reference to imprecise labels such as ‘adult’ and ‘child’ is unhelpful. 
Reference to the best solution found in deliberative discussion (by public reason) might  
seem helpful in addressing doubt over a child’s best interests, but this faces a problem of its 
own in considering to what degree one ought to respect the voice of the person primarily 
concerned, even if making an irrational contribution and reaching the ‘wrong’ conclusion. 
The interest approach also faces complications from Parfit’s (1984) argument against the 
identity of our present and future selves, as a child may often prefer a course of action that 
benefits them now but will cost their future self. It would require a refined justice 
framework to reach agreement on legislating in such conflicts of interest between a person 
and their future selves! 
                                                        
71
 This can be mitigated to some extent by the use of justice reasoning to find the best possible compromises 
between different positions, as proposed for conflict resolution in this thesis, but this still does not meet the 
criteria of a choice following a moral conception of best interest on which any adult would agree. 
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Ascribing weight to a child’s conception of their best interests involves consideration of their 
preferences, even when they are highly irrational. This again suggests the specific 
consideration of individuals’ capabilities rather than generalisation about the preferences of 
all those labelled as ‘children’. The potential for development remains important here, as 
the reaching of ‘adulthood’ is used to distinguish a point at which an individual’s conception 
of their best interests is given greater priority over competing concerns and other people’s 
values. This is all compatible with a distinction between children and adults being made on 
relevant qualities for a particular decision, such as their ability to foresee consequences and 
potential future development, rather than a lexically- or legally-bounded definition. The 
problems inherent in categorising children are magnified when attempting to consider their 
rights. 
The above problems all illustrate the difficulty in adopting a framework of rights prior to 
democratic discussion, both conceptually in relation to children and practically in their 
impact on classroom discussions of fairness. Furthermore, if rights are grounded outside of 
the scope of democratic deliberation and justice reasoning, then they are based on some 
additional unspecified axiomatic values. The establishment of rights from justice is an 
alternative, as this thesis argues that justice can be grounded in democratic deliberation, 
and rights can be emergent from justice principles, which are derived from contract theory. 
Rights so grounded are then accessible and modifiable in ongoing democratic discussion. 
Contractual grounds for understanding rights fit the proposal of this thesis and eliminate 
many of these areas of difficulty. 
If the justification of rights is itself understood to be contractual — that is, if rights are 
concepts on which reasonable agreement can hypothetically be found —72 then they are 
subject to public reason and can be considered in deliberative debate. What rights children, 
pupils, and teachers have can therefore be considered in the classroom in terms of co-
operation and social contract, rather than being the object of absolute demands. They can 
emerge alongside, or as the result of, understandings of justice. This is a type of discussion 
that can be productively addressed with restorative conversations, and is less conducive to 
                                                        
72
 By any of the theoretical formulations discussed: for example, a Scanlonian approach would involve 
considering agreements to which no-one could reasonably object, while a contractarian approach would seek 
agreements that all parties agreed were in their own interests. 
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the consideration of rights encouraging absolute claims of entitlements as discussed above. 
Contractual discussion of rights enables a clearer focus on fairness and co-operation when 
individuals’ interests or preferences collide. Such a justification permits the exploration of 
alternative conceptions of rights while still drawing on the same consistent principles of 
democracy and the social contract as used throughout this thesis. Adopting an 
understanding of rights as principles established in Rawls' original position, or as principles 
to which no-one could reasonably object (Scanlon, 1998), eliminates the need to assert 
rights as being external to the structures adopted in this thesis, and also avoids the 
difficulties of adopting an absolute approach to one will- or interest theory of rights. Rights 
can instead be considered to emerge from the exercise of deliberative democracy and 
public reason, and attention to individual local problems can consider capabilities and 
potential with more nuance than the stipulations of a separately-grounded universal theory. 
This allows for more practical and engaging debate as it can be directly relevant to real 
disciplinary problems that occur in schools. Avoiding the use of additional principles to 
ground theories of rights in addition to deliberative structures enables their establishment 
through debate, without the requirement of asserting contentious moral statements or 
other philosophical positions as if they were simply true. Such problems can be faced within 
the system of deliberative discussion, rather than being used to ground it. A contractual 
basis for justice can serve as an acceptable foundation for the discussion of rights in a 
morally plural school. 
Special interest and faith schools 
Discussion of rights suggests returning to a topic briefly addressed in chapter four: the right 
of parents to have a say in the moral content of their child’s education. This is of key 
relevance to the justification of faith schools, as this section shall proceed to explain. It 
might at first appear to be guaranteed by the third element of Article 26 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948), that ‘Parents have a prior right 
to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children’. However, Gutmann 
and Thompson (1996) argue that this right interferes with citizenship education on the 
grounds of the previous element of Article 26; that 
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Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality 
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among 
all nations, racial or religious groups. 
(UN General Assembly, 1948) 
The argument in chapter four of this thesis defended a child’s right to development that 
enables full participation in democratic society as an adult. Choosing a ‘kind of education’ 
that denies this right in accordance with the third element of Article 26 would be in 
contradiction with the above quotation from the same Article. To quote Gutmann, 
‘democracies do compromise an important principle of educating all children within their 
borders to the status of equal citizens when they decide to exempt some insular groups 
from this democratically justifiable requirement’ (Siegel, 2009, p. 424). Reference to a ‘kind’ 
of education is vague, but is clearly not intended to allow for contradiction with that which 
comes but a paragraph before. A parent does not have the freedom to stipulate that the 
kind of education they desire for their child is one that deliberately limits their personal 
development.73 
The domain in which such conflicts commonly occur is that of communities which desire a 
specific moral approach to their children’s education. These are often schools that adhere to 
the tenets of a particular religious faith. Such schools differ significantly in the extent of 
their stipulations, so in evaluating their acceptability it is important to look at both what 
individual schools claim to do and what it may be improper for them to do. 
Many parents want to instil their children with ‘good moral values’, as they understand 
them. The structure of our democratic state allows for plural conceptions of the good. It 
does not, however, allow these conceptions to take precedence over the structures of 
justice, which function partially to rule in situations of moral disagreement. Throughout this 
thesis issues of justice and of morality have been specifically distinguished. Good education 
about the structures of justice, as the practices proposed in this thesis aim to promote, 
would make it less common to confuse issues of justice for issues of morality, over which 
parents and schools might justifiably claim to have some authority. Such confusion may well 
lie underneath the most strident objections to the enforcement of education about justified 
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 Reich tackles this problem clearly by distinguishing parents’ rights to direct children’s upbringing from their 
education. (Siegel, 2009, p. 471) 
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authority; confusion which dissenting groups would likely describe as rejecting the state’s 
authority to enforce its values over their religious beliefs. The response to this claim is to 
reiterate that this is a proposal for a state, not for groups who may wish to secede from it. 
Children in New Zealand will be subject perforce to the justice framework of the New 
Zealand government. This is not something from which a sub-community can choose to opt 
out. Challenging the morality of this is a worthwhile discussion, but beyond the scope of an 
argument about education policy for those currently living in the state. To live in Aotearoa 
and use its infrastructure necessitates some method of dealing with competing claims 
between parties who would use it differently. Thus, principles of law and justice are 
important for children growing up in this country, and their full development is stymied if 
they are not educated about such. Because of our plural conceptions of the good, there is 
no legislation to enforce education about certain aspects of the good. However, education 
about justice as construed in this thesis, and defended by Gutmann and Thompson as 
something necessary for development into a capable adult citizen, provides a framework for 
deciding between competing moral claims. Parents may raise their children to believe a 
certain set of moral tenets, but education for democratic citizenship can provide each child 
with the apparatus to evaluate them independently by rational criteria. Denying young 
people the tools to evaluate a moral position cannot be defended as part of a moral 
position, given the superordinate position of justice over morality defended in this thesis. 
Does this, therefore, suggest the existence of faith schools is likely to be harmful? Some 
fundamentalist faith schools no doubt fail to meet these requirements for citizenship 
education, and should be required to attend to education about secular principles in 
addition to those of their faith, but many do not. A community can profess a specific set of 
values while still educating its members about the means to evaluate them. 
A further issue concerning faith schools is that membership of and departure from such 
communities is not free. Children do not always get the choice about whether or not to 
share in the practices of their parents’ beliefs, regardless of their own personal opinions. In 
environments where certain values are promoted strongly it may in practice prove 
unpopular to dwell extensively on secular principles, which may be seen (correctly) as 
promoting doubt about the values for which the community stands. People are not 
universally comfortable with the possibility of their religious convictions being mistaken. It 
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requires a certain level of confidence in the justification of one’s views and the potential 
counterarguments to be happy to stand up and claim that one might be wrong. Negating 
the practical impact of these problems, however, is the lack of an alternative: no child can 
be given a value-free environment from which to take an impartial overview of matters of 
morality. Teaching the ability to adopt the hypothetical position of an impartial spectator 
may be the best one can practically do. Enforced membership of the nation-state is no less 
coercive than enforced inhabitancy of certain moral environments, even if the claims for its 
justification may be less contentious. 
These problems therefore do not undermine the grounds for school communities with 
particular moral commitments to operate. Cairns (2009) defends their existence in a plural 
society as furthering the exploration of aspects of particular conceptions of the good, while 
acknowledging Rawls’ argument that the rules by which political decisions are taken should 
be established in isolation from the world views of citizens. A faith school which performs 
good citizenship education is no more restrictive of children’s moral freedoms than other 
compulsions which may be put upon them with less justification by their parents. Optimal 
preparation for participation in democratic deliberation should require such moral systems 
to be rationally plausible, as teaching a child a decision-making framework containing 
contradictions disempowers them from contributing as helpfully as they might to public 
reason. It follows that schools teaching demonstrably contradictory moral positions as if 
they were not so, just as schools teaching 2+2=5, are not preparing children as well as 
possible for equal participation in adult society. In practical terms, this provides grounds for 
mainstream faith schools but prohibits extreme cult situations in which ‘alternative facts’ 
are asserted to be true. 
Legal defences of the justification of faith schools are not necessarily founded on the 
grounds presented above, and may not safeguard the rights to equal development for 
democratic participation defended here. The landmark legal case of Wisconsin vs. Yoder 
(1972) is seen to establish the right for home schooling in the USA, on the grounds of 
religious freedom. The Supreme Court judgment featured a partial dissenting opinion in line 
with the specific argument followed here: that a child’s full development is not being 
respected if they are not exposed to certain opportunities or forms of education outside 
their family’s belief system or way of life. Part of the justification in support of the ruling 
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was that the Amish community under consideration was considered generally to be ‘pro-
social’ — that the values the community espoused were ones which the court found 
praiseworthy. This implies that the judgment was not based on principles independent of 
the type of moral education the community was seen to provide. Such a legal justification 
for faith schools does not guarantee an education which respects secular principles of 
justice and allows for a child’s full development for democratic citizenship. The case to 
promote certain types of education as in a child’s interest is strong and supported by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the practical reach of this argument into specific 
communities may be less than is ideal. One can only hope that the number of directly 
harmful communities that are justified under this law is small; there is no scope to insist 
that education must be rational and non-contradictory under the provisions of the First 
Amendment to the US Constitution. Freedom of religion receives stronger legal protection 
than the development of the ability to consider principles that are not acceptable to those 
within a specific belief community. 
Furthermore, simple reference to the outcome of cases such as Wisconsin vs. Yoder (1972) 
obscures the educative potential of considering the justification of such rulings. The US 
Constitution provides a foundation for the country’s legal system, and is often quoted there 
in defence of one’s right to take certain actions. This is similar to the discussion above of 
how ‘rights talk’ which involves only the assertion of entitlements can be used to close 
down the exploration of an issue of justice.  These are legal conceptions of rights, rather 
than philosophical ones. Restorative discussions are well-placed to unpack this difference, 
and also the difference between moral values and principles of justice in situations where 
the two may collide. They can leave young citizens better equipped by their education both 
to reflect on their own moral convictions and to understand fair restrictions upon their 
interaction with others of different views and the state. 
Developing a simple understanding that others have different points of view, and that they 
may be worth consideration even when in violation of one’s own moral framework, is 
something at which moral education does not always succeed. If faith schools educate 
about both their community’s values and the requirements of justice then they can serve 
both their parents’ values and the children’s rights to full development. If a school does not 
allow all moral values to be open to debate, it is not particularly different from many other 
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contemporary schools — but frameworks of restorative discussion and public reason tend to 
lead to critical discussions of values, making it harder for unjustified principles to pass 
unnoticed. If a school’s values include the rejection of justice, then that is in contradiction of 
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By the understanding of justified 
authority adopted in this thesis, faith schools should not be permitted to teach that 
concerns of justice are morally wrong: it would be a category error to claim that justice can 
be evaluated by morality, when that relationship is necessarily the other way around. 
In conclusion, the issues raised in this chapter do not appear to constitute significant 
problems for the proposed extension to restorative discipline practices. While children’s 
capabilities are limited in some areas, often including their logical reasoning in comparison 
with adults, the exercise of public reason enables the best arguments to be privileged rather 
than the speakers perceived to be the most rational. A careful facilitator should use their 
abilities to support well-structured discussion, rather than asserting their belief to have 
better opinions or greater authority in any content under discussion.  
Such capabilities ought to be more of a focus of our attention to individuals than the 
potentially unhelpful labels of adult and child, which may not scale with relevant abilities — 
or even pupil and teacher, which may only apply in certain domains of exploration with all 
participants being co-learners in others. The label and role of parent is more significant, as 
there is a collective desire to privilege the special relationship between parents and their 
children. The domains in which parents have justified influence over their children are 
however specific and limited, both philosophically and by the law. A duty of care is not 
relevant to the outcomes obtained by public reason in the democratic discussion space, and 
might be unhelpful to focus on due to commonly-held notions that older people often know 
better, or even that they should be deferred to on principle. Such a duty of care also does 
not allow one’s own moral concerns to justify impeding a child’s development for full and 
equal participation in adult democratic society. 
This has specific relevance for the consideration of faith schools, to which Gutmann and 
Thompson’s argument applies that it is a violation of principles of equality for a parent (or 
school) to restrict a child’s learning about democratic citizenship in order to suit their own 
moral beliefs. The opportunity to be educated about the justification of authority is 
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something that should be available to everyone to enable them to function more fully as an 
adult in secular democratic society in accordance with Gutmann and Thompson’s principles. 
Faith schools are acceptable in principle if the reasoning behind their commitments is 
sound; not least because it is impossible to offer a value-free environment as an alternative. 
Care should however be taken to ensure that such environments enable learning about 
secular democracy (for the aforementioned development of equal democratic capability) 
and do not conflate issues of justice and morality to fit a narrative that they are necessarily 
subordinate to morality. 
On the discussion of rights, the usage of such language might at first appear unhelpful when 
appealing to co-operation in conflict resolution, but as rights can be justified from 
contractual principles they can be used to support restorative discussions of justice rather 
than encouraging an unhelpful focus on entitlements. A contractual approach to rights also 
largely avoids the problems of ascribing either will- or interest theories of rights to children, 
and can be explored without the confusion of some principles needing to be stipulated as 
outside the scope of deliberative democratic debate. 
In conclusion, none of the issues in this chapter constitute a substantial obstacle to 
encouraging the rational consideration of just outcomes in restorative discussions in schools 
given the existing compulsion of membership of a secular democratic state — and a 
contractual formulation of rights, including the right to full development as an equal 




Kohlberg and cognitive moral development 
This chapter addresses the potential criticism of the methods proposed in this thesis that 
children (of secondary school age) lack the cognitive capability to understand the rational 
discussions proposed. It does so by reference to the work of Lawrence Kohlberg on cognitive 
moral development. Since the 1960s, Kohlberg’s model has been highly influential in 
describing moral development as progressive competence at a range of cognitive 
approaches to evaluating moral problems, each reached successively as part of an 
individual’s psychological development. While his theories are no longer a widespread way 
of defining moral development, the thinking he describes, categorises, and measures closely 
reflects the thinking about the justification of authority for which this thesis argues. 
Kohlberg’s theories, and the data he collected in support of them, concern a sufficiently 
analogous domain as to defend that adolescents are capable of the type of thinking 
proposed for restorative conversations. 
Kohlberg’s work will be helpful for this thesis in four particular areas, each covered in a 
section of this chapter. The first section will describe Kohlberg’s system, and describe why 
his moral cognition is similar to the rational thought about fairness for which this thesis 
argues. While this thesis does not claim that this type of thinking is necessarily moral, his 
theories and data on the types of thinking which children can do support the ability of 
secondary-aged children to engage with rational reflection on fairness in restorative 
discussions. 
The second section describes how a basic understanding of Kohlberg’s levels can help 
educators decide how to present the reasoning about fairness they engage in with children. 
Kohlberg and his colleagues found that certain types of approaches to moral reasoning were 
not likely to be persuasive to children before certain ages, or before certain other types of 
approach were apparent in their reasoning. Assessing a child’s level of progress through 
Kohlberg’s stages can help teachers know how to present disciplinary interventions, and 
how to initiate discussions which may be developmentally useful dependent on what kind of 
language and reasoning particular children demonstrate. These considerations can fit into 
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the restorative models described throughout this thesis, without their grounding in social 
contract theory restricting their deployment to those who have reached Kohlberg’s stage 5 
or above. 
The third section describes how Kohlberg’s efforts to promote moral development in ‘Just 
Communities’ provide a number of lessons for the successful implementation of practices 
designed to foster consideration of fairness in the secondary school. Just Communities are 
compared to restorative communities and the data on their outcomes are examined. The 
section also explores why the significant criticisms and obstacles he faced are far lesser 
concerns for developing students’ reasoning about justice through restorative discussions 
than they were for the communities he created. 
The concluding section examines Kohlberg’s data to see if they support the practicality of 
the restorative discussions of fairness proposed in this thesis. It addresses the capabilities of 
both teenagers and teachers of the type of reasoning required, and whether such 
conversations are likely to be accessible and meaningful. It suggests that the supportive 
environment of restorative practice lessens the difficulties Kohlberg encountered with his 
training, and may enable similar methods to have more lasting effects in the context of 
PB4L. 
The stage theory of moral development 
Kohlberg’s standard model describes the development of individuals’ thinking about 
morality. It consists of six stages, grouped into three levels comprising of two stages each. 
Each stage, by his theory, is necessarily reached before an individual is capable of the type 
of thinking demonstrated in the following stage. As a subject progresses through the stages, 
they can be seen as growing beyond a self-centred outlook towards viewing themselves as 
part of a society along with others also deserving of consideration, and finally stepping 
outside of the individual's perspective to make moral74 judgements in terms of abstract 
impersonal principles. 
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 These would be judgements of justice or fairness in the terminology adopted elsewhere in this thesis, as is 
expanded upon shortly. 
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The developmental aspects of Kohlberg's work have their roots in Piagetian notions of 
developmental stages. Kohlberg casts ways of approaching moral dilemmas as typical of 
different stages, arranged in a hierarchy through which individuals progress over the course 
of their lives (presented below). Each stage is a precursor to the next, with only a minority of 
individuals reaching the stages at the upper end of Kohlberg's scale. 
The first two stages are described as the Pre-conventional level. They are typified by a focus 
on direct consequences for the self and obedience to the power of those proclaiming rules. 
Judgement is focused on needs and consequences as opposed to persons or standards. 
Stage 1 is a focus on punishment and obedience typical to young children, when goodness 
and badness are judged in terms of the (often physical) consequences to oneself. 
Stage 2 is typified by self-centred reciprocity, well-characterised by the phrase ‘You scratch 
my back, and I'll scratch yours’. Moral thinking remains broadly egoistic, with deals made for 
instrumental value and characterised by a pragmatic reciprocity. It features only occasional 
attention to the needs of others. 
The Conventional level, stages 3 and 4, is characterised by valuing the maintenance of group 
expectations beyond obvious immediate personal consequences. Conformity and 
supporting the social order are key to thought at this level. 
Stage 3 is often described as the ‘good-boy/nice-girl’ orientation, where good interpersonal 
relations are valued. It is typified by approval-seeking behaviour, and beginning to judge the 
morality of acts by one's intention. The interpersonal relationships here are viewed from a 
longer-term perspective, with more value ascribed to the ongoing maintenance of a deeper 
relationship than in Pre-conventional thinking. Judgements of reciprocity are no longer 
based on immediate pragmatic value, but on the ideal moral value of what one should do in 
return. This move towards third-person thinking and metacognition is rarely seen before the 
ages of 11 or 12. 
Stage 4 is the ‘law and order’ orientation. Concepts of duty, and respect for law, authority, 
and fixed rules feature strongly here. Maintenance of the existing social order is valued, as 
well as the maintenance of one's conscience. This is the highest level Kohlberg found the 
majority of adults to reach. 
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Post-conventional reasoning under this model is based on principles and values. Grounds for 
authority are judged separately both from the power of people or social structures that 
possess it and from one's own personal position. 
Stage 5 is a social contract orientation, directly congruent to the conversations around social 
contract theory explored in this thesis. A skeletal presentation of a reciprocal social contract 
would sit here, yet the usage of contractual reasoning can also be a part of reasoning in 
concordance with universal ethical principles, as in stage 6. Still more importantly, simpler 
presentations of fairness can reach down through stages 2–4 and will be more appropriate 
far more of the time in school classroom discussions, but can still ultimately be founded on 
contractual understandings of fairness and justice, as expanded upon below. Stage 5 is 
legalistic in approach, as procedural rules for finding consensus on mutual benefit are 
valued, and impersonal fairness can often be framed in a utilitarian light. Unlike in stage 4, 
laws are judged to be imperfect if they fail to meet principled moral standards. Outside of 
legal requirements, free agreement forms the basis of contracts which beget duties and 
rights. 
Stage 6 is the stage of the logical, abstract, consistent, universal ethical principle. This is not 
a specific moral decree, such as a Biblical commandment, but a principle such as the Golden 
Rule, or Kant's Categorical Imperative. For Kohlberg, these principles should respect an 
individual's exercise of conscience in moral dilemmas that are unclear. 
It would not be accurate to read such a summary and then conclude that students can 
simply be instructed to apply reasoning typical of a stage above that at which they are 
currently operating, as if such forms of reasoning are methods from which one can select 
upon becoming aware of them. These modes of evaluation are the external indicators of 
internal changes in cognition. Students cannot simply be made to value something 
differently by directly being told to do so, or to describe it in a certain manner. Turiel, a 
close colleague of Kohlberg’s, wrote both theoretically and experimentally about progress 
between Kohlberg’s stages. He theorised (following Piaget) that the transition from one 
stage to the next is marked by a period of conflict between two mental schema, in which old 
modes of thinking are re-evaluated and new ones are constructed (Turiel, 1974). A person 
remains capable of reasoning according to stages beyond which they have progressed, but is 
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less likely to continue to find such reasoning convincing. While this chapter addresses social 
influences and apparent regression elsewhere, in general children need exposure to an 
environment which stimulates a change in their mental processes, along with time for 
conflict and reflection. Children (and adults) must make such progress to more advanced 
principles themselves, though appropriate prompts may speed the process, as this chapter 
goes on to explore. An instruction to reason in a manner of which a pupil is not yet capable 
is unlikely to be found convincing, or even understood. If told to divide some sweets equally, 
a stage 1 child will hear an instruction from authority that must be obeyed, rather than 
consider a principle of fairness. The instruction cannot encourage reference to principles 
which a child has not yet come to understand. Consequently, it is important to address 
fairness in the right way when discussing outcomes to conflict with children in restorative 
discussions. This chapter goes on to propose how Kohlberg’s stages provide a useful model 
for a teacher to quickly estimate for a particular child what that way might currently be. 
Developments and refinements of Kohlberg’s model 
Kohlberg's model has been modified and developed variously by Kohlberg himself, his 
collaborators, and scholars working separately over the years since its initial conception 
(Goslin, 1969). Some proposals have been for quite extensive modifications, concerning the 
existence, nature, and content of stages, methods of assessment, and the domain of the 
model’s accuracy. Specific modifications have little impact on the utility of this model for the 
reasoning proposed in this thesis, on which this section shall elaborate. Kohlberg’s own 
modifications to his theories, and areas about which he had doubts, provide a sharper focus 
on the utility of this model for understanding the promotion of reasoning about fairness in 
restorative discipline. As described above, Kohlberg’s stages 5 & 6 were found to be reached 
by few people, and a contributor to this was perhaps the complexity of expression required 
to demonstrate that one's thought was operating at such a level. An impersonal orientation 
towards a problem may not have been matched by a subject’s philosophical vocabulary to 
express the shape of their thinking in a manner recognised by Kohlberg’s scale. Kohlberg 
found stage 6 to almost entirely populated by those with formal philosophical training, and 
withdrew this from his model as a later refinement not only due to the paucity of 
experimental results to support it, but also from concerns about how this stage seemed tied 
to the values of the academic establishment, when the indicators of reaching stage 6 are 
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arguably an issue of how moral reasoning is presented rather than the processing taking 
place. For this thesis, the presentation of one’s reasoning is a core goal, and in accordance 
with the privileging of overt rationality as discussed in chapter four there is some benefit 
and no harm to retaining consideration of this stage. In the context of this thesis, Kohlberg’s 
work provides a means of understanding children’s capabilities and development in 
understanding issues of fairness. Whether desirable outcomes are part of the development 
of moral cognition itself or aspects of presentation is not a concern for the utility of 
Kohlberg’s model in helping teaching professionals understand the reasoning of which 
particular children are currently capable. 
Until his death, Kohlberg continued to make modifications to the model to better fit both 
further theoretical work and empirical results. For example, experimental data suggested a 
return to what resembled stage 2 reasoning in beginning college students, which would 
have challenged the hierarchical nature of the stage system. Kohlberg’s initial claim was that 
individuals would remain capable of reasoning in the manner of levels they had surpassed, 
but find such reasoning increasingly unconvincing, and prefer reasoning of the highest level 
of which they were capable. Further refinements to the theory developed what was 
effectively a stage 4.5: often, Kohlberg claimed, college students were seen to wrestle with 
a developing sense of the need for third-person considerations and a model resembling a 
stage 5 social contract. Yet a transitional stage was observed in which the demands and the 
complexity of their thinking gave way to what was superficially a resigned egoism, which 
belied the advancement of the thinking going on underneath. For a complete account of 
moral cognition and development, as Kohlberg was aiming to provide, this is a substantial 
concern. Again, however, this is not problematic for using this model as a swift point of 
reference for understanding a child’s likely realms of comprehension, as this thesis proposes 
for the support of conversations about fairness in restorative discipline. In a real-time, 
practical context, different approaches can be made that appear likely to be correctly 
pitched and the way forward can be judged from a child’s response. It is not for measuring 
the development of an individual in detail that this model is proposed, but rather for the 
ability to make a swift attempt to pitch a conversation at an appropriate level of complexity, 
on which the following section elaborates. 
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Kohlberg also considered the existence of a stage 7, succinctly describable as concerned 
with ἀγαπη (agape), the Greek term for familial love for all; a transcendental concern for 
the whole of society that borders on spiritual domains. Whether spiritual concepts with 
emotional components are to be included in a theory of rational cognition or not, many 
would desire to include concepts such as this in an account of morality. Kohlberg was 
committed to rational cognitive development comprising the whole of moral development, 
a position it is not necessary for this thesis to adopt to find his model beneficial.75 This thesis 
claims that awareness of this model would be beneficial for those seeking to have rational 
restorative discussions in schools, rather than that it comprises a full account of the 
psychology of morality. Kohlberg’s model fits with the reasoning about justice and fairness 
proposed in this thesis, with complete descriptive accuracy less relevant to its utility here. 
Again, the example of a simplified model of electron shells is relevant. For teaching 
purposes, certain inaccuracies and imprecisions may be tolerable if they promote a 
particular desirable goal effectively. If I want to save a child from walking into traffic, while I 
would prefer not to grab her physically I am happy to do so if the nature of the intervention 
is less important than the result obtained. Kohlberg’s idea of cognitive moral development is 
not the utility of this model here — rather, how his model translates to supporting the 
understandings of rational fairness proposed in this thesis. 
Kohlberg’s morality translates more onto the concerns of justice (in the terminology 
adopted here) than onto concerns of morality. Reasoning about fairness in this thesis is 
second-order reasoning — superordinate to individual claims about moral good, and able to 
allow for a plurality of moral positions while evaluating possible fair resolutions to conflict. 
These arguments, and their reflection of democratic structures, remain unchanged from 
their presentation in chapter four. What Kohlberg describes as moral judgements are not 
moral judgements in the sense that this thesis uses the term. When Kohlberg describes the 
shift to metacognition in his stage three, asking what one should do, this does not 
distinguish the demands of justice (what we ought to do for/owe to each other) from an 
individual moral code. That Kohlberg describes it as morality is not a problem for this thesis, 
and it is rather analogous to the models used here in that the type of thinking he suggests 
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 A composite position that allows for both rational and non-rational/spiritual concerns has recently been 
presented by Gibbs (2014)— a position that continues to avoid the pitfalls of a strong relativism, as Kohlberg 
would have wanted. 
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people develop is not understood in terms of moral codes or character, but rather thinking 
that becomes progressively closer to this thesis’ rational consideration of justice as one 
moves up through his later stages. 
Stage 3 sees the development of concern for maintaining relationships. This is addressed by 
the existing work on repairing harm in restorative conversations. Stage 4 concerns authority, 
duties, and rules. The authoritarian classroom might present authority as present in the 
teacher’s rod, while the democratic collective may vest it in the resolutions of a community 
meeting. Education can be conducted about what authority may be considered just once 
the value of authority begins to be recognised. Stage 5 overtly references social contract, 
which this thesis has already presented as likely to be a desirable means of reasoning, and 
this chapter goes on to explain how contract-based reasoning can be deployed for those at 
lower levels of Kohlberg’s scale than at the stage which is typified by ‘classic’ contractual 
understanding. Stage 6 contains further reference to impersonal principles of the sort that 
may be moral beliefs, but may also justify principles at the second order which allow for a 
plurality of moral positions. These would be principles such as those of deliberative 
democratic discussion being necessarily prior to those of the moral principles discussed 
within them. Whether or not these stages perfectly describe human cognitive development 
concerning either morality or principles of fairness, they do provide a clear and empirically-
supported measure of types of reasoning of which individuals tend to be capable before 
they can understand other, more advanced types. If a child struggles with understanding 
why it is beneficial to remain on good terms with others (stage 3), then Kohlberg’s 
progressive model provides a clear and succinct point of reference for concluding that 
referring to principles of justice might be beyond a young child at this level of development. 
Kohlberg’s writings suggest a clear interest in promoting thinking about justice, and that its 
distinction from morality is not critical to finding common ground over the use of his model 
in promoting developmental thinking, and a distinction that was not always clear 
throughout his writings. Kohlberg writes on Rawls that ‘the central achievement of Rawls' 
theory is that it represents the first clear systematic justification of the principles and 
methods of decision we call “Stage 6”, principles and methods of decision only partially 
articulated by Kant’ (Boyd, cited in Munsey et al., 1980). Like Rawls, Kohlberg accepted that 
that no one view of the good can be taken as overriding. In school environments, teachers 
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work with conflicting claims of interest based on different moral positions, analogous to 
plural conceptions of the good in a democratic society. Boyd highlights that Kohlberg 
sometimes identifies his concept of ‘morality’ with justice. This thesis strongly distinguishes 
the two, but Boyd minimises this gap by condensing a number of Kohlberg's different 
formulations of justice to a claim that ‘Justice is the general moral perspective through 
which competing claims of persons should be resolved’ (p.192). This is an excellent fit for 
the conflict management techniques deployed in restorative discipline environments to 
reach across a range of individual moral positions. The influence on the higher levels of 
Kohlberg’s model of Kant and Rawlsian justice fits with an understanding of justice as able 
to adjudicate over differences between personal moralities, as in the aim of this thesis to 
better fit students for plural democratic societies. 
Aside from arguments about the complexity of the mental operations involved, it is on the 
grounds of a Rawlsian conception of justice and impartial, third-person, rational thought 
that Kohlberg’s model finds support for claiming that a given stage is more advanced, and 
more desirable, than a previous one. This in turn builds on Kantian ideals, with fairness 
considered above one person's individual perspective on what is right, and in line with the 
arguments for justice within a democratic structure throughout this thesis. Kohlberg was 
rigorous in his address of philosophical foundations to his psychological work, and built on 
Plato as a foundation for his exploration of the development of a person both in terms of 
their education as an individual and as a member of a state. It is, however, the similarity in 
formulation between the highest stages of his notion of moral development and Rawls' 
justice that provides the clearest example of his model fitting the philosophical principles 
under discussion here as well as describing psychological phenomena. 
As development of students' rational capabilities is a primary goal of this thesis, Kohlberg's 
model can provide a useful understanding of how certain types of reasoning are persuasive 
and accessible to those at different stages of development. At the higher stages, Kohlberg’s 
moral cognition involves similar reflection on justice to that which is required in considering 
what is fair in a restorative conversation. If a student communicates in a manner suggesting 
their understanding of justice is at one of Kohlberg’s levels, then his data suggest that it 
would probably be unconvincing to use reasoning from more than one stage above the 
student’s level in conversation with them, and consequently that they would gain little 
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benefit from such discussions.76 Such situations might lead to a student feeling forced to 
agree with a teacher’s reasoning — perhaps because the teacher is still considered the 
source of authority through power — and undermine the transition from discipline as 
something done to students to something done with them. Possessing an idea of how young 
people’s reasoning about morality and justice develops helps an adult present ideas about 
the social contract at a level better able to develop understanding of the principles of 
Rawlsian justice that undergird our social institutions. A social contract of enlightened self-
interest (as discussed under Hobbes in chapter five) might be a practical way of engaging 
with those at Kohlberg’s stage 2, whereas less self-centred presentations can be made to 
those who appear to have progressed to a further level of development. As the above 
summary of Kohlberg’s six stages demonstrates, the core elements of his theory can be 
presented quickly and simply to one wishing to understand which types of reasoning are 
acquired before others. 
The superiority or otherwise of specific refinements to Kohlberg's system is not a primary 
concern for adding practical value to developmental discussions in schools. Rest's ‘Defining 
Issues Test’ (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999) is an example of a detailed alternative 
measure of moral development that was inspired by Kohlberg's work, and its assessment 
takes on an entirely different form to reflect his different conception of developmental 
stages: a subject grades a series of arguments about a moral dilemma in order of 
preference, and (according to Rest) their response to each statement shows whether a 
particular schema — a way of looking at moral issues — is currently active in their thinking. 
‘Currently active’ is specified rather than ‘previously activated’, as early stage moral 
arguments look less convincing when one moves on to more sophisticated concerns in 
evaluating a moral dilemma. Rest's method seeks evidence of Post-conventional reasoning. 
The core principles are similar enough to Kohlberg’s in practical application that it seems 
sensible to adopt a system that can most easily identity a point to target, and a particular 
manner of approach. Both Rest and Kohlberg's models would assist with the central 
practical concern of correctly pitching discussions of the social contract with students, as 
described in detail below. 
                                                        
76 Data from Kohlberg’s Just Community schools are examined in more detail below. 
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Judgement of an individual’s level 
In a formal experimental environment, Kohlberg judged an individual's level of moral 
development from their response to dilemmas which presented hypothetical moral 
problems for their evaluation. One example is the famous Heinz dilemma, which runs as 
follows: 
In Europe, a woman was near death from cancer. One drug might save her, a 
form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. 
The druggist was charging $2,000, ten times what the drug cost him to make. 
The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the 
money, but he could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the 
druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him 
pay later. But the druggist said, “No.” The husband got desperate and broke 
into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have 
done that? Why? 
(Kohlberg, in Goslin, 1969, p. 379) 
Test subjects were asked to explain whether or not Heinz should steal the drug, and why it 
would be right or wrong to do so. The type of reasoning they deployed was illustrative of 
which of Kohlberg's levels they had reached, rather than on which side of the argument 
their decision fell. For example, a stage 3 subject might reason their way to justifying the 
theft on the grounds of Heinz loving his wife, and wanting to be a good husband; or to 
condemning the theft on the grounds that he should not steal and would be blameless if his 
wife died, as he has done all he legally could and the druggist was being the heartless one 
for standing in his way. A stage 5 response, by contrast, might be to defend the theft on the 
grounds of the law being inadequate for such situations, or to condemn it on the grounds of 
the ends not justifying the means — both references to impersonal principles.77 
These responses suggest the language one could effectively deploy when discussing fairness 
in a restorative conversation. If a student is reasoning at stage 2, presenting a win-win 
proposal may be effective rather than referring to principles of fairness. If a student shows 
signs of stage 3 thought, then a teacher can refer to good character and making the others 
involved happy, and thus inclined to help them in the future. Stage 4 can reference laws or 
rules that a pupil considers to be justified, while stages 5 and 6 can refer to appropriate 
                                                        
77 A fuller expansion of sample responses can be found in the above source. 
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abstract principles. If attempting to engage in a developmental manner, rather than simply 
secure the swiftest desirable outcome, one can engage in stage 4 reasoning with a pupil that 
exhibits signs of stage 3 reasoning, and similarly mix referring to the next level up with 
reference to models which an individual currently finds persuasive for students in other 
positions. All these levels and approaches can be tied to reasoning about fairness in some 
way, even for those with a limited understanding of what that entails, and grounded in 
theories of the social contract. Stage 2 reasoning focuses on pragmatic reciprocity, and 
Hobbes’ model of social contract can encompass this. The focus on what one should do in 
stages 3 and 4 can be understood in terms of Scanlonian universal obligation, but presented 
in terms appropriate to being a good boy or girl, or following the rules (of justice). 
Reasoning to a contract of what one ought to rationally agree to can be done in terms of 
maintaining community harmony, rather than necessarily in the abstract terms of 
Kohlberg’s Post-conventional levels. A framework of considering fairness in situations of 
conflict can be promoted consistently throughout a school, and it can be the language and 
conceptual emphasis that changes as students’ understandings of what exactly fairness 
entails develop. 
Responses to the Heinz dilemma can provide an illustration of how individuals at different 
levels may reason, yet the level of precision it provides is not vital for application to the 
discussion of immediate issues of justice in a restorative conversation or conference. Asking 
an adolescent what the fair response to a conflict under discussion is might provide a 
similarly helpful response through the reasons they present in even a short answer, such as 
references to fairness, intention, law, or principle, and may provide enough to suggest how 
to pitch a discussion at an appropriate level in a situation where further exploration is either 
not possible or inappropriate. For example, a student who demonstrates stage 2 reasoning 
in response to the Heinz dilemma might well respond to the question ‘What would be fair 
here?’ by trying to cast a solution in terms of both or all parties getting what they want. 
While it is an assumption, it would be reasonable to respond to them by presenting 
concerns of fairness in stage 2 or 3 terms, and referring to either pragmatic reciprocity or 
the expectations of others.  A stage 4 thinker might reply to the same question with 
reference to obeying the rules, whether the rules are fair, and perhaps the demands of their 
conscience; the same concerns as would be more specifically elicited by the Heinz dilemma, 
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but which may emerge anyway in response to an open question. Such a thinker could be 
responded to in terms of what rules or outcomes here would be fair for everyone, a 
discussion that can begin in the terms of stage 4 and progress into the language of stage 5. 
Furthermore, such estimates can easily be provisional in practice; one may start an attempt 
to reason with a student in a certain way, but there is no obligation to continue using the 
same methods of persuasion if they seem unproductive. Whether using the Heinz dilemma 
or some abbreviated method of estimation, matching a student response to Kohlberg’s 
scale gives a good idea of an individual’s currently preferred level of moral reasoning. This 
consequently aids with pitching a restorative conversation appropriately, whether aiming 
for their preferred present level of reasoning or the next level above with the intention of 
stimulating development. 
Domain theory 
Before engaging in a restorative conversation about fairness, it is important to consider 
whether the issue under discussion is likely to be considered by a pupil to be a concern of 
morality, or one merely of social convention. Nucci, Turiel, and Smetana’s work on domain 
theory suggests that if a transgression is not viewed to be a moral violation, then it may be 
worth considering a different type of address to the conflict, or beginning with an argument 
that the matter in question is one of moral rather than merely personal import. Judging the 
correct level at which to phrase an appeal to fairness is likely to be ineffective if a pupil 
considers a matter to be their personal concern, rather than one for which the interests of 
others need to be taken into account. This also affects what styles of responses are 
perceived by children to be fair, as explained below. 
This theory, developed from Kohlberg’s work by Nucci, Turiel, and Smetana and presented 
for classroom application in Nucci (2009), addresses ‘social conventional’ reasoning not as a 
stage of moral reasoning, but as a distinct category outside of the model’s scope. Their 
empirical work on moral development shows not only that an awareness of fairness comes 
at a very early developmental stage in young children (Nucci, 2009), and is cross-culturally 
universal as far as has been tested, but that primary school-aged children are quick to 
recognise the difference between those transgressions of rules that Nucci has dubbed 
'social conventional', those that are 'personal', and those that are in the 'moral' domain 
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(because of their impact on the well-being of others). A school rule not to eat hot food in a 
classroom might be viewed as a social convention; one of the rules for the smooth running 
of the school and not to hold particular moral content (though this view could change in the 
course of argument). A rule to keep one's hair short might be understood as a convention by 
a young child, but cause conflict in teenage years as it is viewed to be part of the 'personal' 
domain, and not within the school's moral remit to control. Whether one is allowed to 
respond physically to someone who interferes with one’s possessions is an example of an 
issue that might be seen as 'personal' if one does not yet consider impersonal rules which 
may be universal, and firmly within the 'moral' domain if one does. The nature of one's 
understanding of a transgression can change according to one's moral development, and 
this has consequences for how it might best be addressed in restorative discussion. One 
would hope that an appropriately attentive response to a disciplinary issue would bring this 
to the fore in most circumstances as those involved are able to express their perspectives, 
and the two-way nature of restorative discussions facilitates such discovery further. 
Uncovering such differences in perspective is important because of Nucci's research on 
what responses are considered fair in response to transgressions against standards of each 
type by pupils of different ages: an authoritative response to a social violation is more likely 
to be seen as appropriate by a primary-aged child, while a reasoned response and request 
for perspective-taking would be more effective for a perceived moral violation with a 
secondary student. 
Thus a two-way discussion of a problem with, for example, a school rule opens up the space 
to evaluate a student's response in terms of their progress through Kohlberg's stages, and 
also to be aware of whether the intended style of response is appropriate for what the pupil 
considers the type of problem to be. In most practical circumstances of secondary school 
conflicts, an understanding of Kohlbergian stages and a response at the developmentally 
appropriate level is unlikely to be a gross violation of Nucci's domains of response. However, 
it is worth considering whether something that a teacher considers a matter of social 
convention might be something that a pupil considers personal if it is impeding reaching 
agreement over a fair solution to a disciplinary problem. 
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‘Just Community’ schools in comparison with restorative communities 
Kohlberg and his fellow researchers conducted significant empirical research on attempts to 
raise the moral reasoning level of students to higher stages of his moral development scale. 
‘Just Communities’ were the school environments Kohlberg and his colleagues established 
with the specific aim of raising pupils’ levels of moral cognition in accordance with his 
theories. This section describes the nature of his Just Community schools, compares them 
with restorative communities, considers the data on their outcomes, and highlights why 
concerns with Kohlberg’s methods would be significantly ameliorated if such methods were 
applied in the context of restorative discussions as part of the PB4L initiative. 
Kohlberg's Just Community schools were school-wide experiments (or at least micro-schools 
— self-contained environments within larger institutions) designed to be environments 
conducive to the development of moral cognition as well as their conventional educational 
functions; environments intended to harmonise the hidden curriculum, school 
governmental structures, and the formal curriculum. The initial implementations were in 
two alternative schools: the Cluster School, an alternative school within the Cambridge High 
and Latin School, where students and staff were given equal say over the operation of the 
school, and the School-within-a-School at Brookline High School, where a separate 
community was established in order to provide a ‘whole-school’ environment supportive of 
Kohlberg’s moral education programme.78 The curricula of both schools featured timetabled 
slots for the group discussion of moral issues, which took place in community meetings 
similar to those in democratic schools such as Summerhill and Sudbury Valley, where the 
rules of these communities were open to democratic debate and change.79 This practical 
implementation of Kohlberg's theories addressed real life dilemmas, not hypotheticals, as 
would also be the case in the context of restorative discipline discussions. The focus in Just 
Community schools was on establishing collective norms, rather than facilitating individual 
moral reasoning: restorative conferences are able to focus more directly on individual 
reasoning if desired due to their one-to-one or many-to-one nature, rather than being 
analogous to community meetings. 
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 See Wasserman (1976) for a detailed account. 
79
 With some limits in the case of Kohlberg’s communities: the pursuit of moral development was not itself 
open to challenge, as discussed below. 
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While these environments were more democratic in structure than contemporary New 
Zealand schools, the core features of an environment suitable both for productive 
discussions of Kohlberg’s moral situations and for restorative discussions about justice are 
encouraged under aspects of the Ministry of Education's PB4L initiative. The Just 
Community approach is a ‘process of democratic schooling that involves collective 
establishment of rules and responsibility taking in concrete situations instead of 
hypothetical dilemma discussion’ (Oser, 1990). While restorative practices do not demand 
democratic school environments, the core features identified of democratic Just 
Communities are very similar to those central to the restorative environments being 
instituted under PB4L, as explained below. 
Oser isolates the following five principles as central to Kohlberg’s Just Communities: 
 There must be reasons for decisions. 
 Students must feel that the results of the discussions will be carried 
out. 
 Decisions are based on democracy and fairness. 
 There is a climate of trust. 
 There is a basis in social contract. 
(Oser, 1990) 
Each of these has a parallel in PB4L:RP. The first point can be understood to suggest that 
reasoning for decisions should be overt, transparent, or given to pupils on request (as it is 
fairly trivial for there simply to exist reasons for decisions). In Just Communities, all pupils 
were party to decision-making processes in community meetings. Restorative conversations 
are undertaken co-operatively with students, rather than imposed upon then, and courses 
of action are only adopted when the pupil also has participated in and accepted the 
reasoning for a given course of action. Both models value the public exercise of reason, and 
are more democratically accessible than traditional authoritarian approaches to conflict 
resolution — and this is all the more so for restorative practices which pay greater attention 
to the rational as proposed in this thesis. 
The second point demands that students feel that their reasoned decisions will be 
translated into according practical actions. Restorative environments place weight on 
consistent and honest adherence to the outcome of discussions, as described in chapter 
three. Both environments require that the discussions are taken seriously as the means of 
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solving a problem, rather than being a cosmetic nod to co-operation with little impact on 
real decision-making in the school. 
A base in democracy and fairness, as demanded of Kohlberg’s communities in point three, 
has been central to the proposals of this thesis throughout. The extension proposed to 
restorative discipline gives even greater prominence to these concepts than their current 
implementations, where restoration of prior relationships may not necessarily consider 
whether or not those relationships are fair. 
A climate of trust requires that commitments to action are followed through, and that 
communication is honest. While restorative practices cannot guarantee this, neither could 
Just Communities, though it is a feature typically reported of successful restorative 
environments (Sellman et al., 2013). Conscientious implementation of policies — as 
opposed to a lip-service that is sometimes undercut by authoritarian methods — supports 
this, as reflected by the emphasis placed on the importance of a supportive environment for 
restorative practices by Drewery and Thorsborne & Vinegrad in chapter three. 
Finally, that a basis in social contract was considered important for Kohlberg’s communities 
supports the idea that social contract reasoning can underpin restorative discussions even 
though ‘contractual’ type moral reasoning is only ascribed to those at Kohlberg’s stage 5 
and above. A contractual model can also be presented to pupils as reflecting other, more 
accessible conceptions of fairness, as described above. 
Kohlberg's Just Community schools appear to feature environmental conditions similar to 
those that would be present in a New Zealand school adopting restorative discipline 
practices, at least in the areas important for Kohlberg’s moral education and for restorative 
discussions about fairness. While Kohlberg’s school communities were specifically set up to 
nurture and support pupils’ cognitive moral development, and used regular formal 
community meetings to support that primary goal, extended restorative practices are a 
structure that aims to weave learning about fair restoration into the practice of conflict 
resolution in a school whenever such mediation is needed. In Just Communities, time was 
specifically set aside for the Socratic discussion of moral issues, with the aim of developing 
the students' moral reasoning over an extended course of such discussions. This is more 
analogous to discussions that occur under the aegis of Philosophy for Children than 
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restorative discipline discussions, although the content of both can be similar — especially 
concerning questions of justice. Some pastoral time may end up dedicated to the discussion 
of issues of fairness in PB4L schools in a similar manner, but (as discussed in chapter five) a 
positive of addressing the rational in restorative discussions is how much of it can take place 
in time devoted to ‘behaviour management’. The principles of such moral discussions can be 
addressed via concrete situations of personal relevance that need to be dealt with in any 
case through the process of school discipline. Using this educationally ‘dead’ time80 to 
develop rational thinking about fair resolution to conflicts as well as to carry out some 
unavoidable management functions of a school avoids a primary criticism of any such 
proposal that Kohlberg would have faced: that classroom time is taken from other, ‘more 
deserving’ areas. An institutional commitment to the practice of restorative discipline 
provides key elements of the democratic, accountable environment that Kohlberg identified 
as important for effective moral development. Furthermore, even if a school environment 
lacks some of these elements, a restorative conference itself by its very nature is 
democratic, holds members to account, and gives all those involved a voice. It features 
collective agreement on its rules, and shares responsibility between all those present for its 
outcome. The micro-environment is appropriate, even if the reality of the macro-
environment sometimes fails to live up to its own ideals. 
Just Community meetings were an attempt to create a living, concrete, community 
implementation of the morally developmental discussions followed in Kohlberg’s 
hypothetical, classroom-based Socratic ‘dilemma discussions’. The methods of his 
discussions, whether in the Just Community or the moral education classroom, have 
considerable similarities to the methods proposed for developing the consideration of 
fairness in restorative conversations. Methods for leading Kohlbergian discussions have 
been proposed by a number of theorists who built on his work, and although some of the 
pedagogical techniques in these books are no longer contemporary they illustrate practical 
approaches to attempting to promote moral development according to Kohlberg’s scale. 
Leming (in Modgil, Modgil, & Kohlberg, 1986) lists Arbuthnot & Faust (1981), Reimer, 
                                                        
80
 Not literally the case, but this is how time spent on discipline issues is often perceived. One could describe 
one of the aims of this proposal as to make elements of the hidden curriculum overt, and improve upon them. 
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Hersch, & Paolitto (1983), and Galbraith & Jones (1976) as practical guidance books on how 
teachers can implement Kohlbergian methods in schools. 
They describe a typical classroom procedure for a Kohlbergian discussion as follows: 
1) Clarify the dilemma. 
2) Students adopt a position. 
3) Group work to discuss their reasoning. 
4) Test and evaluate arguments in full class discussion. 
5) Encourage students to re-evaluate their position and reasoning individually. 
These map fairly well onto identifying a conflict under discussion, considering the outcome 
one personally desires, and subjecting one’s idea of a fair outcome to trial by public reason. 
In a restorative discussion, one could ask a student what would be fair in a given situation, 
and then discuss how a third-party might rule here if they could not decide who was in the 
right, as described in chapter five. The techniques of Kohlbergian educators look to be 
translatable to contexts other than those of the whole-community meeting. 
It is harder to find consensus on the data concerning the progress in moral cognition 
attributable to Just Community environments. The extent of their successes is disputed, and 
conclusions based upon them have consequently faced challenges. Leming's 1985 review of 
Kohlberg’s practical experiments (Modgil et al., 1986) is informative on this, as Kohlbergian 
moral education was a policy under consideration at the time of its writing, and empirical 
evidence for its efficacy would have been important to its evaluation. Blatt claimed an initial 
success in the practical implementation of cognitive moral education after engaging 
intermediate and high school students in a semester of Socratic classroom dilemma 
discussions (Blatt, 1969, as cited in Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). He found that a third of the 
students involved moved up in their reasoning by a Kohlbergian stage, whereas the control 
students remained unchanged. Fenton & Kohlberg, however, attempted to recreate the 
Blatt study results and trained high-school social studies teachers to lead developmental 
discussions of hypothetical moral dilemmas in their classes. They recorded mixed results: 
control groups showed no measurable moral stage change after nine months, as expected, 
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but only half of the experimental classes replicated Blatt's findings; the other half 
demonstrated little change (Colby et al., 1977, cited by Rosenzweig in Munsey et al., 1980, 
p. 377). Leming claims, however, that overall the effect on student reasoning is not 
particularly controversial: that ‘reviews of studies of the moral discussion programme of 
Kohlberg show a convincing stage change in student moral reasoning, between .033 to 0.5 
of a stage over an academic year’ (Modgil et al., 1986). Other variables may sometimes 
affect the success of implementing Kohlbergian moral discussions, but positive results show 
significant levels of improvement in moral reasoning over the corresponding experimental 
control groups. 
Criticisms, and their lesser relevance for restorative discipline 
There are both practical and theoretical concerns that arise when considering the creation 
of an environment suitable for cognitive moral development — or for the consideration of 
fairness in conflict resolution — in a mainstream school. Significant issues that direct 
implementations of Kohlbergian methods have faced are eliminated or minimised when 
translated to the context of this proposal for restorative discipline. 
Firstly, two practical questions that are less of an issue for this proposal than for schools 
that have instituted Just Community practices in the past. The need for staff members to 
want to participate in such an environment, and such discussions, can clearly be a factor. 
The magnitude of this is greatly minimised by the fact that all schools involved in the 
Restorative Discipline strand of Positive Behaviour for Learning have chosen to opt in to a 
whole-school cultural change. Asking teachers to consider addressing behavioural 
infractions in terms of rational fairness as well as addressing harm through empathic 
responses is a small change in the context of a whole-school cultural transformation. Senior 
Management teams have already undertaken to instigate a fundamental shift in 
relationships across their whole school communities, and support mechanisms and training 
programmes are ready to be put into place when a school opts in to the programme. While 
Kohlberg himself claimed some difficulty in changing teachers' conceptions of themselves 
from classroom managers alone to moral educators (Modgil et al., 1986, p. 543), the other 
commitments of the PB4L:RP initiative have already undertaken to meet this challenge. The 
demands made of teaching staff are considered in further detail below. 
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The cost is a similar concern: as described in chapter five, the expense of the institutional 
changes and training programmes is an undertaking to which the Ministry has already 
committed, and this proposal requires only a change to the way restorative discipline is 
sometimes enacted. This economic viability and ripe opportunity are bonuses when 
considering that such changes to ‘moral’ education have on prior occasions seemed 
sufficiently desirable to introduce even without specifically opportune circumstances. 
One theoretical concern raised by Just Community participants was that while the rules of 
their micro-community were open to discussion, the rules of the broader school were not. 
This is somewhat analogous to living under the law of a nation's government, as considered 
in chapter four: one does not have easy access to the highest level of legislative machinery 
to which one is subject. Some discussions of a just course of action may be beyond the 
power of a community to institute directly through democratic mandate, though this is in 
itself educative about the nature of the compulsions under which we live, and an 
opportunity for those invested in critical pedagogy to explore these issues. Education in this 
tradition involves a teacher encouraging students to question concealed ideologies and 
oppressive exercises of power in their environments, including those of schools (hooks, 
1994). Primarily associated with Freire, and his influential Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
(Freire, 1968/2000), this approach developed out of Marxist critical theory and aims to help 
students develop a critical consciousness of oppression. While discussions of fairness can be 
used to pursue such issues if a teacher or school desires, it is not necessary to follow such an 
approach or even take a strong position on social justice in order to enable the restorative 
conversations proposed in this thesis. Conversations about justice can be allowed to 
develop organically, or in accordance with the particular values of a school and its 
leadership. In either case, discussions of fairness are well-placed to consider the justice or 
otherwise of the power dynamics that dictate the limits of pupils’ authority over their own 
educational environments.  
The criticism of Kohlberg's Post-conventional stages may be argued to undermine a model 
which does not exclude them. However, in the context of developing students for 
participation in democratic life, the ability to articulate one's reasoning about justice 
acquires extra value. Kohlberg (1984) found only 13% of his adult subjects to have fully or 
partially reached stage 5, and all of them had some graduate level education. As discussed 
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above, his stage 6 consisted of an élite with formal philosophical training, with little 
empirical data in evidence of its broader representation throughout his sample populations. 
Gibbs (2014), Rest, and Pinker (2011) separately raise that the higher stages seem to require 
articulating a principled reason (emphases mine) for why, for example, human life trumps 
the value of law — and that the intuitive route to this conclusion is not given credit. Gibbs 
argues that Kohlberg's model confuses basic understanding with reasoning that reflects 
philosophical training, and construes stages 5 and 6 as hypothetical reflection on normative 
ethics. 
A major aim of adding work on cognitive moral development to restorative discipline 
discussions is to educate citizens to be better able to participate in deliberative democracy. 
To contribute better arguments for consideration by public reason, one needs to be able to 
communicate reasons in a manner acceptable to others. As argued in chapter four, logical 
theories of causation have a mutual acceptability between individuals that emotions, affect, 
and hunches do not. It seems therefore beneficial to employ a model that ascribes value to 
the ability to reason one’s way to a position, and to be able to explain it to others, as this 
proposal aims to develop overt rational reasoning about fairness. Restorative discipline does 
not need to claim that discussions about fairness are morality, in contrast with Kohlberg’s 
preference, and consequently giving less attention to moral intuition is not a problem when 
considering fairness and justice as opposed to morality. A good argument for the public 
space requires well-reasoned articulation. The better schools can educate our citizens to 
participate in such discussions, the stronger our deliberative democracies — regardless of 
whether such an ability is part of the development of moral cognition or not. This suggests 
that, for the purposes of this project at least, there remains benefit to considering 
Kohlberg’s Post-conventional stages. 
The importance of developing such communication also outweighs concerns about whether 
improving moral reasoning improves moral behaviour. The improvement in reasoning itself 
is a desirable outcome, and a focus solely on behaviour is not a complete conception of 
school discipline, as argued in chapter one. Developing an understanding of justified 
authority and a disposition to act in accordance with it are two separate goals of good 
school discipline. A shared goal of Kohlberg’s cognitive development and this thesis’ 
proposal for restorative discipline is to develop the ability to take a third-person perspective 
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and consider notions of justice and fairness. Developing the will to act in accordance with 
such reasoning is a problem faced by both, and usually associated with Kant in terms of 
translating a rational acceptance of how one should act into personal motivation to do so. 
That is to say, justifying reasons are not necessarily motivating reasons. Even Kohlberg's 
stage 6 does not answer moral motivation — why to act morally — (Straughan, 1986) and 
Kohlberg himself would have been well aware of the inconclusive evidence for the link 
between moral reasoning and behaviour, citing Blasi (1980), a contemporary literature 
review that finds evidence of the link between moral reasoning and behaviour to be 
ambiguous and conflicting. The model developed in this thesis parts company with Kohlberg 
in not asserting the rationally cognitive necessarily to encompass the entire domain of 
morality, but for the development of this to be a significant element of school discipline, 
and thus the impact of this concern is lessened. It is not necessary to stipulate a complete 
separation between moral cognition and moral motivation, and one is not left relying solely 
on knowledge of a failure to perform due reciprocity as a primary motivator for moral 
action. There can be other motivations to act both morally and justly, and these are 
explored in chapter eight. Developing justice reasoning can be desirable even if it does more 
for one aspect of good school discipline than another, and this thesis does not claim to solve 
the whole problem of moral motivation. The non-cognitive considerations addressed in the 
final chapter have a great deal to say about moral motivation, and how, while reasoning 
about fairness can address the understanding of justified authority, the empathic work in 
restorative conversations can do much for moral motivation — a feature on which 
Kohlberg’s methods alone could not draw in meeting the challenge of all three aspects of 
good school discipline as defined in chapter one. 
One final set of concerns to address are those of Zalaznick (1980), an ex-student of 
Scarsdale Alternative School, concerning the compulsion to participate in developmental 
discussions. He refers to ‘moral intimidation’: that students were aware there was a 
purpose to their school — to make them ‘more moral’ — beyond their influence, despite 
their greater participation in community governance. The school's purpose itself did not 
belong to its students, as discussed above. Awareness that there were ‘right sides’ and 
‘wrong sides’ to moral issues, and that some of Kohlberg's stages were considered more 
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advanced than others, led students to ‘close up cognitively and no longer be open to 
cognitive reorganisation’. 
It may be the execution that was the primary source of the issue here, rather than the 
objective of cognitive moral development itself. If students participate in discussions with a 
focus on developing analytical abilities, rather than being aware that certain types of answer 
demonstrate greater development, then the pressure to perform by giving a 'right' answer 
which one personally does not accept is reduced. An environment without an obvious goal 
of moral development is much less likely to undermine a student's trust in their own 
reasoning and engagement with the process than one where a position to which they 
reason might be graded as sub-optimal. The literature on Kohlbergian classroom technique 
could benefit from the practical insights of contemporary Philosophy for Children 
programmes in such respects. 
It is possible that Zalaznick felt as he did because moral arguments progressed beyond a 
level at which he could personally reason at the time. A student in such a situation might 
feel pushed to accept conclusions that they do not find justified, and which are at odds with 
their moral reasoning. In a restorative discussion, as opposed to a formal classroom group 
discussion, such a situation is easier to avoid. In a many-to-one or one-to-one context, the 
issue can be presented to a student at a proximate level for them to engage with based on 
the nature of their responses. The focus is on developing their thinking, rather than the end-
point of a lesson plan. 
On the issue of compulsion, the development of students' reasoning capabilities is an 
undertaking from which they cannot usually opt out in formal education. As argued above, 
following Gutmann and Thompson, rational development is important for the equal 
development of democratic citizens. This is not 'moral education' in the colloquial 
understanding of promoting certain character traits or articles of faith, and should not be 
presented as such.81 Matters of individual belief may remain untouched by reasoning about 
fair ways to deal with disagreement. The ability to reason from outside of one's own belief 
system is desirable in education for participation in a secular state, and developing such 
reasoning is not restricted to any one programme aimed at developing thinking skills. The 
                                                        
81 More on different understandings of moral education follows in chapter eight. 
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value of rationality as defended in chapter four is important for the equal development of 
individuals, and using restorative methods to develop it is in accordance with the New 
Zealand Curriculum: the values of awareness of one's community and the role of reason in 
understanding the world clearly fit two of the five key competencies of the New Zealand 
Curriculum, ‘Relating to others’, and ‘Thinking’ (‘Key competencies / Kia ora - NZ Curriculum 
Online’, n.d.). The nature of how morality should be construed can be open to democratic 
discussion in schools, while certain other values, such as the value of each individual as a 
human worthy of respect, are legally enforced and provisionally established as starting 
points for democratic debate. The purposes of schooling in our state are not currently open 
to significant redirection by those within them. If one wishes to address that the system is 
not open to democratic self-transformation into, for example, a feudal society governed by 
the oldest students where discrimination by race or religion is acceptable, then one may do 
so within the realm of state-level democratic debate. 
The purpose of addressing reasoning about fairness in a restorative context is not to ‘make 
students more moral’, as Zalaznick described the aim of Just Communities, but to develop 
the skills that help an individual reason more effectively from a justice perspective: a crucial 
difference in emphasis. This distinction was not made in the prototypical Kohlbergian 
classroom, and is important not to misunderstand. It may be beneficial to speak of 
restorative discussions as being socially educative, rather than morally educative, to avoid 
accidentally implicating the realms of individual morality and faith, which may raise 
concerns of moral indoctrination. Students who perceive themselves to be pushed towards 
a different moral position may understandably feel a degree of coercion. Students however 
do not need to like or ‘believe in’ justice personally to benefit from understanding how it 
works and ought to be applied in a community for fair resolution between individuals of 
differing beliefs. People whose ability to adopt the perspective of others is still developing 
might see the enforcement of justice as coercive, and it may be easier to accept its merit 
when it is presented as what is fair, rather than what is morally good. Overall, a central goal 
of this proposal for restorative discipline is to develop students' reasoning so that they can 
reflect upon their own conceptions of goodness and fairness, rather than forcibly to 
overrule their moral judgements. This is much less vulnerable to objections of the kind 
Zalaznick raised above. 
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The practicality of a Kohlbergian framework for social contract reasoning 
in restorative discipline 
This section addresses the practicality of rational discussions of justice given the capabilities 
of both teenagers and schoolteachers. It examines the data on which of Kohlberg’s levels 
are typically understood by both groups, and whether this is sufficient for meaningful 
citizenship education. It describes how the existing commitments of PB4L provide a strongly 
supportive environment for the rational consideration of fairness, that introducing such 
consideration requires little addition to existing training commitments, and the increased 
likelihood of lasting cultural change in the context of restorative practice. 
The capability of children to understand different modes of reasoning is central to 
Kohlberg's work. For teenagers (and thus for the secondary school environments at which 
this proposal and the Ministry's initiatives are aimed) the experimental data suggest that 
models of justice which can be understood by those at stages 2–5 may be most appropriate. 
Gibbs, Basinger, Grime & Snarey's (2007) cross-cultural study has adolescents moving from 
the stage 2–3 range, with stage 4 at adulthood. A focus on stage 3 reasoning in the earlier 
secondary years will often be appropriate, as the attention to relationships in restorative 
discipline provides, but a contractual model also provides the scope to reach ahead to the 
higher levels of reasoning in later years, considering the nature of law, fairness, and justice 
when they are relevant and comprehensible. The simple social contract models discussed 
are a comprehensible structure that makes an engagement with stages up to stage 5 as 
accessible as possible. This is not an unreasonable stretch: the data suggest that stage 3 is 
reached in late childhood/early adolescence, and some people progress to stage 4 in late 
adolescence. More importantly, contracts themselves do not have to be discussed in stage 5 
terms, as explained above. A model should allow for developmental reasoning above a 
student’s current stage as well as at their current level, and there is data to support work 
two levels above a student’s understanding leading to noticeable benefits (Walker, 1982). 
For small communities, such as those around students at which restorative discussions are 
aimed, stage 3 reasoning may be sufficient for worthwhile developmental conversation. The 
broader society-level concepts that are a part of the higher stages are not prerequisites for 
useful discussion to take place. Moral debate can focus on the micro-society and then 
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analogies can be made to wider society, in a manner reflective of how schools can be seen 
as a training ground for the adult world. At a lower level of development, one can still 
understand the system without the need for abstraction. Gibbs (2014) describes stage 3 as 
‘not moral cognitive adequacy for living in a society more complex than that of a small 
community’. Yet it is from such a small community that the discussions and opportunities 
for growth can arise. Kohlberg’s model supports how rational development as well as 
empathic development is an important part of school discipline for citizenship education. By 
his theory, primarily addressing relationships in a restorative discussion would largely be 
attention to a ‘stage 3’ orientation. Sometimes this might be the ideal level for an 
individual’s stage of development, though knowledge of Kohlberg’s levels offers a simple 
way to judge when another approach might be more developmental, and what form that 
approach might take. An empathic approach to maintaining or restoring good relationships 
is not always the best motivator towards moral action. Establishing such grounds as primary 
for evaluating moral behaviour may have negative consequences in later life if an individual 
comes under pressure from an immoral environment. For example, a pressure to maintain 
good relationships with those close to you in an organised-crime family is unlikely to lead to 
optimal moral outcomes. A Kohlbergian framework can provide a quick mental reference for 
how to frame the reasoning of a discussion, especially when considering fairness seems 
more desirable than appealing to empathy. 
The capabilities of adults involved in such conversations also merit consideration. Is an 
impractical level of sophistication being requested of teachers to reason about fairness in 
these ways? Leming addresses this issue, describing an understanding of the stages of moral 
reasoning as ‘an invaluable tool for teachers wishing to engage in meaningful moral 
dialogue with students’ (Modgil et al., 1986). 
He raises the issue of the stage reasoning of teachers, and that teachers cannot be expected 
to expose students to reasoning one stage beyond their current level if they have not 
reached such a stage themselves. He quotes a study by Giffore and Lewis (Modgil et al., 
1986) that found Michigan teachers' predominant stage orientations to be 4 and 5A, with 
43% of the samples' reasoning at the principled level. This is consistent with Rest's (Rest et 
al., 1999) finding that 42% of college graduates reason at the principled level. On an 
individual basis, many teachers will be sufficiently advanced to conduct effective 
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developmental discussions with school-aged youth; but on the other hand, some will reason 
no more effectively than their high-school students, and will be unable to lead such 
discussions effectively until they have achieved a level of moral reasoning (in Kohlberg’s 
terms) sufficient to understand the appropriate stages. Leming also posits that many 
teachers who lack the development to become effective teachers about principles of justice 
will likely reject the ideals and goals of a programme such as the Just Community. Education 
about fairness may not seem central enough to some teachers to adopt voluntarily into 
their teaching repertoire, yet the challenge of this problem is one that the current PB4L 
initiatives have already undertaken to meet — as when a school opts in to a system 
requiring whole-school cultural change, not all teachers will be comfortable with the 
adaptation to restorative systems that is required. An additional small element to the 
proposed changes does not significantly add to the difficulty of the commitment already 
made to face such challenges. Under the current PB4L:RP initiative, whole-school change is 
being instituted and supported, environments are being structured around pupil 
development rather than behaviour management, and a commitment to training has been 
made which supports key principles of both restorative practice and Kohlberg’s Just 
Communities. The system-specific changes that are necessary to address justice reasoning 
as part of restorative discipline are comparatively slight. Rational discussions of fairness can 
be brief or extended. They do not need the apparatus of fixed community meetings typical 
of Just Community schools. As discussed in chapter five, one can refer to a simple principle 
of fairness in a short disciplinary interaction rather than needing a full, Socratic discussion, 
yet such a discussion can also form part of a longer restorative conference. At the other 
extreme, if a school does have time assigned for political and social education, the principles 
themselves can be subject to community-level discussion. To whatever depth the notion of 
fairness is explored, clear reference to this contestable principle works to undermine 
disciplinary decisions being seen as merely the will of the powerful; the rule of 'them' over 
'us'. 
As teachers have many demands upon their time and energy, it is helpful to keep the 
amount of knowledge required for such discussions light. A simple understanding of taking a 
third-person perspective to discuss fairness, and of a contract made from an initial position 
of impartiality, is enough to encourage the rational consideration of fairness as well as the 
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emotional consideration of harm in basic disciplinary discussions with children. This is far 
from the requirements of a full Kohlbergian training for teachers to be able to benefit 
students' ‘moral development’. As in all aspects of the social and pastoral education that 
takes place in schools, some teachers will be better equipped to respond beneficially to the 
daily unforeseen events that take place than others. Ideally, educational professionals 
would be as proficient as possible across a wide range of areas not universally considered 
central to their role; most would acknowledge that a certain level of pastoral skill, for 
example, as well as ability to transmit a curriculum is desirable. In school justice at least 
there is scope for a highly reductive approach to a complex topic to be markedly beneficial, 
and at the very least to provide some guidance for impartial reasoning about moral issues 
for which teachers are not always prepared. 
In Kohlberg’s original contexts, there was some concern over whether the usage of such 
methods would gain traction in schools. A 1977 study by Silver (Leming, in Modgil et al., 
1986, p. 251) followed up teachers instructed in the theory and practice of Kohlbergian 
moral education. From a sample of 25 of the 60 teachers in one cohort, two years after their 
training, 80% reported a change in their thinking regarding moral education but showed no 
concomitant shift in their teaching practices. A year after Kohlberg's Danforth project 
(training 20 teachers in the Boston area to use Blatt-type moral dilemma discussions in the 
classroom), only 1 out of 20 teachers involved was conducting moral discussions in the 
classroom. Long-term changes in approach proved problematic to achieve (Modgil et al., 
1986). 
There is great opportunity for such a problem to be lessened in the current environment in 
New Zealand, where schools and teachers are committing to new, whole-school approaches 
to relationship management which involve restorative discipline discussions. Supportive 
changes to school environments are being made institution-wide as well as by willing 
individuals. Restorative techniques that are introduced are to be supported by structures 
that reinforce a culture of their usage, as described by the policy documents in chapter 
three. This should ideally make relapse less natural as substantially new environments are 
associated with new methods. Revised administrative structures and behaviour policies may 
necessitate new ways of managing conflicts, such as restorative conferences, rather than 
enabling the continuation of previous strategies. Teachers are to be trained to manage such 
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conferences using methods congruent with restorative and democratic theories, and these 
environments simply do not sit as easily with authoritarian or traditional techniques as a 
familiar classroom situation may have done to Kohlberg's subjects. Under these new 
arrangements, where restorative justice and community are to be at the heart of school 
discipline, the environment is receptive for work on developing the rational consideration of 
fairness to be added to the methods already used in restorative discipline conferences. 
In summary, knowledge of Kohlberg’s stage theory can help teachers in quickly evaluating 
the type of moral reasoning a child seems to be employing at a given time. This can help 
them discuss fair resolution to a dispute with a student at a level that they can engage with 
and that will stimulate thinking about justice, rather than accidentally making an argument a 
student does not understand and sees as something they simply have to accept due to the 
teacher’s power. 
Social contract-based reasoning can be deployed in restorative discussions in a manner 
accessible to students at a range of Kohlbergian levels. That it is a contract-based 
understanding does not restrict its usefulness to those of a stage 5 orientation. For example, 
a fair compromise can be presented as mutual reciprocity (stage 2), as doing the ‘right thing’ 
(3), following the rules (4), or in contract-theoretical terms (stage 5). A contractual model 
can serve as a template against which ‘fair’ outcomes can be evaluated at the level most 
comprehensible to those involved in the discussion. An understanding of how notions of 
fairness develop, through social contract theory and Kohlbergian stages, equips an educator 
with an easily-tailorable model to deploy in response to the challenging question, ‘Why?’ 
Kohlberg’s work on moral development provides empirical data as well as useful terms of 
reference for understanding pupils’ developing conceptions of justice. His ‘Just Community’ 
schools serve as a historical parallel that shows the potential for success in using restorative 
discipline to attend to the rational as well as the empathic. Criticisms of these experiments 
are far less applicable to the use of similar methods in restorative conversations than to 
their original contexts. A Kohlbergian model can help to present contractual reasoning more 
effectively within restorative discussions, and the supportive environment of PB4L may help 
avoid or mitigate some of the issues his related conversations faced forty years ago. 
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Discussions Kohlberg instituted to support his goals of moral development can inform the 
conduct of restorative conversations to promote the understanding of fairness and justice. 
Kohlberg was working from the insight that moral development was not complete by the 
end of childhood, but was something that continued to develop throughout adult life. 
Developing students' moral capabilities is only infrequently remarked upon as an aim for 
school education, perhaps in part because of the difficulty in separating personal 
convictions of 'morality' from that which is required by justice in a secular state. This 
distinction is exceedingly complex, and not one that everybody is willing to hear because of 
their personal moral convictions (and thus there is all the more reason to encourage the 
ability of children to think from a third-person perspective). The final chapter of this thesis 
explores a particular challenge to Kohlberg’s position that highlights how different 
conceptions of morality can coexist alongside the development of thinking about justice, 




Care, empathy, and their relationship to justice in school discipline 
Prior chapters of this thesis have focused on the benefits of addressing questions of fairness 
in restorative conversations. The rational consideration of justice has been argued to 
support the development of pupils’ understanding of justified political authority, one of the 
three components of good school discipline identified in the first chapter. While chapter 
four addressed particular advantages to developing pupils’ rational capabilities (such as the 
wider acceptability to other persons of rational reasons than other types of reasons), this 
chapter addresses a separate challenge to assuming the superiority of a rational approach in 
situations of conflict. Care theory argues that justice and rational ways of thinking have 
traditionally been over-valued or over-privileged in the consideration of moral questions. 
This chapter will consider this challenge, further distinguish concerns of morality from those 
of justice, and ascribe complementary value to both fairness and caring-based approaches 
in the resolution of school conflicts and the meeting of the goals of good school discipline. In 
much of the literature, care is set directly against rational approaches to morality and 
justice, and this chapter argues that this does not need to be the case: a clearer distinction 
between morality and justice — the good and the right — shows that the two approaches 
can coexist productively, and without the considerable theoretical tension that might 
initially seem to exist between them. 
This chapter begins with an examination of the core claims of care theory, introduced by its 
presentation as a direct challenge to rational theories of morality such as those developed 
by Lawrence Kohlberg. It proceeds to consider whether its tension with rational concepts of 
justice jeopardises this thesis’ argument. It addresses this by further clarifying distinctions 
between morality and justice and their relation to different aspects of the goals of good 
school discipline. 
The following section considers how care theory is also beneficial for the meeting of the 
third goal of good school discipline, developing pupils’ dispositions to act in accordance with 
just authority. It presents care theory as an example of a sentimentalist approach to 
morality, and addresses the benefits that such approaches provide for the development of 
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moral motivation. A careful distinction between the concepts of empathy and sympathy 
helps illustrate how both justice and care can contribute not only to moral motivation, but 
also to the development of the disposition described above through different approaches to 
restorative conversations. 
The fourth section addresses the claim that developing pupils’ abilities in both justice and 
care comprises moral education, and consequently compares these approaches with 
character (or virtue) education, the third major secular claimant to this space. It proposes 
that it is necessary to address more than one of these approaches for a broad education 
about the content of morality, and that it is possible to address them all in restorative 
communities without theoretical inconsistency. 
The final section addresses how theorists of justice and care have approached either the 
combination of or the conflict between the two approaches, and explores how both 
problems and solutions this raises can be accommodated by an overarching apparatus of 
deliberative democracy as adopted throughout this thesis. The chapter concludes with how 
both justice and care can contribute to the meeting of the goals of good school discipline 
through different approaches to restorative discussions. 
Care theory and its challenge to cognitive moral development 
Care theory — and its significance for the argument of this thesis — is perhaps best 
introduced in terms of its conflict with the work of Kohlberg covered in the previous 
chapter. This is illustrative not only of its significance for this thesis, but also of its initial 
formulation in opposition to a particular set of claims about morality. Kohlberg framed his 
work on cognitive development described above as the development of moral cognition. 
Developing the ability to think in more sophisticated ways about the rational requirements 
of moral behaviour was presented as gaining moral sophistication, and reaching higher and 
more desirable understandings of morality. 
Care theory takes issue with this claim. Is it the case, so it argues, that this is an accurate 
description of morality? Or is it rather a description that favours only one type of moral 
thinking; a type preferred by certain privileged groups, at the expense of the recognition of 
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others? This was initially a feminist challenge to the claims of Kohlberg, and indeed to a 
great deal of ethics in the western philosophical canon.82 Such a model of moral thinking, 
care theorists argued, privileged the type of moral engagement that came more easily to 
the male and the formally-educated mind. It marginalised the intuitive approach to 
morality, and the impulse to care — an impulse, so the claim went, that was associated with 
feminine (and thus trivialised — on which more follows) domains and concerns. 
Kohlberg's work was strongly influential in the 1960s and 1970s, before the explosion of 
work challenging the claim of the white, male, western, educated academic voice to be 
impartial and objective. Carol Gilligan's In a different voice (1982) can be considered as 
where this criticism of Kohlberg primarily originates. She isolates what she considers serious 
shortcomings in Kohlberg's work: that all the participants in his studies were men, the 
essentialism of some of his judgements of gendered capabilities, and the presumption of 
certain contextual values. Kohlberg's scale of moral development leaves most adult women 
attaining level three on his developmental scale, whereas many men attain level four. Was it 
correct, so this criticism went, that capability as an impersonal, universal quality was being 
measured; or was it that this quality of rational judgement being at the heart of moral 
judgement was central from the perspective of a specific subgroup of humanity, and other 
voices were being marginalised? The educated, white, male voice which ‘naturally’ turned 
more easily to impersonal concepts such as justice was valued as a more developed and 
sophisticated form of moral judgement than the ‘feminine’ focus on relationships and 
caring. A critical assessment of these claims would require a much deeper exploration than 
this chapter alone will afford, but it shall be clarified below how the compatibility of these 
apparently opposed models can be evaluated without taking a position on whether one 
approach has been unfairly privileged over others, and likewise whether or not these 
different approaches correlate with either biological sex or gender. Both approaches claim 
to describe major components of morality, and are thus worthy of consideration in an 
environment that respects moral pluralism such as the restorative school. 
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against a foundational claim for morality to be a rational field of inquiry was far-reaching. This chapter 
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For Gilligan, as mentioned, her work was primarily a feminist critique at the outset. 
Noddings’ work is central to understanding the development of care theories (1992, 2002a, 
2002b, 2013), and she also identifies her approach to be feminist in nature. Consideration of 
care theory as primarily a feminist argument has, however, reduced over time, including in 
Noddings’ own consideration: her early works feature more gender-essentialist language 
than later works and editions, and it is illustrative of this change in emphasis that the third 
edition of her core text on the subject, Caring, features an alteration to the subtitle, from A 
feminine approach to ethics and moral education to A relational approach… Her work 
addresses ‘culturally feminine’ virtues — that is, those which a culture finds it praiseworthy 
for one gender to have, but which are less respected in another — and how they are valued 
differently in certain domains, such as in the family in contrast with in the public sphere.83 
While the language used can soften the emphasis on sex and gender of such an argument, it 
is still reasonable to claim that some virtues (e.g. chastity) are more readily associated with 
women than men, and consequently that it remains an issue for gender egalitarians, 
whether they identify as feminists or not. 
Care theory considers concerns other than rational justice to be at the heart of good human 
relationships. Care theories concentrate on the qualities of human relationships, rather than 
the qualities of atomic individuals. This focus on connections is at odds with the basic liberal 
conception of individuals seeking to maximise outcomes from their personal perspectives; 
an assumption made by many who work with concepts of justice in the tradition of Kant and 
Rawls. Care theory emphasises the direct contact between people, and the emotional links 
between them, as a basis for making moral decisions rather than reference to reason.84 It 
shares ideas with moral sentimentalism (on which more below) in wanting to ascribe value 
to common human emotions that many people would consider to have moral content. Care 
theorists recognise the involuntary nature of many of our connections, such as many familial 
connections, as opposed to those voluntarily agreed to in hypothetical contractual 
situations. For Gilligan (1982), men turned more easily to the objective, the idealised, and 
principles such as freedom, rights, and autonomy; the ‘different voice’ often demonstrated 
by women, she argued, was not inferior but focused more on a connected self: on the 
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 Although neither approach is necessarily exclusive of consideration of the other, and this chapter shall 
proceed to elaborate on this. 
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relationships in which one operates, and emotional engagement. Care theory does not 
prioritise reason as a basis for the ethical treatment of others, but rather seeks to give 
prominence to genuine caring relationships. It recognises the fundamental 
interconnectedness of people, rather than positing autonomous rational actors in the 
original position. Caring is driven by emotional moral motivations rather than some rational 
conception of moral obligation. Through a deep emotional engagement, the carer seeks to 
work out what is good for another person. If one assumption of many concepts of liberalism 
is that of individual separateness, care features an assumption of connectedness. 
For Noddings, ‘Moral people rarely consult abstract principles when they act morally’ 
(Noddings, 2002a, p. 1). She describes the purpose of moral reasoning as ‘to establish and 
maintain caring relations at both individual and societal levels’. Under her model, caring can 
be divided into four stages: caring about, care taking, care giving, and care receiving. This 
should not be taken as an attempt to make care procedural — a process that one could 
replicate by robotically adhering to an ordered set of prescriptions — when it is intended to 
be emotionally driven. Rather, it is to clarify the particular rational construction of effective 
caring as she construes it. 'Caring about' can be described as the initial recognition that 
there is a problem to be addressed: for example, being distressed that children are going 
blind from preventable diseases. This stage does not require a direct human relationship to 
be effective. 'Care taking' is the recognition that there is some responsibility for you to do 
something about an issue, and that you have the agency possibly to do so. This describes a 
similar element of morality to Kantian notions of duty. 'Care giving' is the direct moral 
action, motivated by care, in a context where one is genuinely relating to another and 
concerned by their needs and feelings as closely as possible to as if they were one's own. 
'Care receiving' helps us prioritise functions as a check on our assessment of needs; that this 
was a problem that it was right to care about. It asks whether the care has been 
appreciated, and if the relationship is now stronger (Noddings, 2013). 
The affective basis of caring and the identification with the other involved in genuine care 
are differently characterised by different writers. For Noddings, ‘engrossment’ pertains to 
the idea of identification with, and fellow feeling for, another individual: the feeling of their 
concerns as if they were one's own. Many understandings of empathy are close to this, 
notably that of Slote (2007), for whom it is the basis of his theory of morality. Section three 
198 
 
of this chapter addresses this in detail, and contrasts empathy and sympathy in order to 
clarify their different roles in care theories. 
Such a model as caring sits congenially with Buber’s (1923/2004) work emphasising the 
encounter between one's self and that which is other. One can situate caring in the 
encounter between the self and an other that ceases to be an object, but is approached 
with a mutual humanity and granted recognition thereof. This is mentioned to highlight the 
stark contrast in philosophical traditions between care theory and some contractarian 
approaches to morality such as that of Gauthier described in chapter five. Care theory 
considers affective openness and connection to be important features of the human 
condition, experienced in connection with others whether one desires such connections or 
not. Contractarianism attempts to legislate for a Hobbesian situation of mutual indifference, 
where such connection may not be apparent to parties seeking a beneficial outcome to a 
conflict. Both these starkly different approaches can nevertheless coexist in an environment 
that uses restorative methods to address conflicts, as the next section goes on to describe. 
This is not to say that care is entirely an affective and non-rational process. Behind 
Noddings' engrossment there is a substitute procedure for when this emotional connection 
is lacking. For Noddings, 'ethical caring' is a rational substitute of lesser desirability for when 
the genuine caring emotion is lacking. One should summon the image of oneself as an ideal 
carer, and act as that carer would act on becoming aware of lacking the appropriate 
emotional impulse in a given situation. For example, there are times when both medical 
professionals and school staff might feel their reserves of compassion have run dry after 
dealing with draining situations for extended periods of time. In these situations, an 
emotionally ‘honest’ response to a patient or pupil when short-tempered or exhausted 
would provide them with an inferior level of care that they may have done nothing to 
deserve.  The lesser desirability of Noddings’ ‘ethical caring’ is persuasively defensible: 
would a wife wish her husband was by her side in the hospital out of a desire to be there 
and support her, or out of a sense of ethical obligation? On these grounds, Noddings’ work 
can be read as more compatible with Kantian duty than her own emphases might suggest it 
to be, especially if one considers these situations to arise with great frequency in some 
professional lives. Care ethics requires no moral effort, according to Noddings, rather 
requiring being genuinely moved (this is her ‘natural caring’). ‘Ethical caring’ comes from the 
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caring ideal, when natural caring runs short. Noddings contends that this ethical caring can 
be a threat to natural caring: we are uneasy when receiving good care from duty, rather 
than from feelings.85 Such a form of caring may be admirable in certain situations, but is a 
risk to caring relations. This notion of the caring ideal as a guide for caring action may seem 
strongly suggestive of virtue ethics, but a care ethic is distinguished by its proponents from a 
virtue characterisation of caring by consisting of the action and the relationship, rather than 
a disposition towards such action (though virtue ethicists can challenge whether or not this 
is a substantive difference). 
An ethic of caring appears to have fundamental differences with rational approaches to 
morality. It focuses on relationships, rather than principles; on the concrete, contextual, and 
particular rather than the formal and abstract; and on activity, not judgements. Because it is 
particular, it is necessarily responsive (or vulnerable, as a critic might put it) to changes in 
the cultural environment. Because of the political condition of women, care has perhaps 
received inadequate attention: to quote Tronto, ‘Care is marginalised, devalued as work and 
associated with the needy, the trivial, and the personal rather than the political’ (1993). 
Measuring moral ability in Kohlberg's terms produces conclusions that value the abilities 
and approaches of the groups with the highest social power as the most morally developed. 
Care ethics prioritises the caring relationship and other concerns traditionally associated 
with the feminine role. 
Care theory is not an anti-rational position, but makes claims against the rational having 
primacy in considerations of morality. Given that moral intuitions can vary significantly 
between persons in similar situations, and that affective reasons are not as mutually 
accessible as rational reasons (chapter four), this may not seem to provide clear grounds for 
solving conflicts in schools through restorative discussions. The next section describes how 
the adoption of both approaches in restorative discussions allows for the benefits of each 
model without making theoretically contradictory claims. 
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The coexistence of care and the rational, given a distinction between 
morality and justice 
Kohlberg claimed his cognitive development to concern morality. In the terminology of this 
thesis it is not moral in itself, and its proposed use in restorative discipline is primarily 
concerned with reasoning about justice. Throughout this thesis morality has been 
considered a matter of personal decision, on which a reasonable pluralism of positions are 
possible and for which reasons do not have to be intersubjectively acceptable. Chapter four 
considered how moral difference is discussed under deliberative democracy, and chapter six 
the defensibility of communities espousing particular moral positions, such as faith schools. 
To recap the relevant distinctions, when moral positions are found to be in irreconcilable 
conflict then the apparatus of justice can be used to evaluate fair outcomes to these 
conflicts, in accordance with the structures of deliberative democracy. This is a second-
order apparatus, to deal with irreconcilable differences between first-order beliefs. Fair 
outcomes are construed rationally, and reasons to support them need to be rational in 
order to be widely acceptable to parties holding different moral beliefs. 
In this thesis, Kohlberg’s work is used to support rational discussions of fairness through 
restorative discipline: that is, concerns of evaluating just outcomes. While Kohlberg would 
claim his model to represent morality, by dropping this claim it becomes compatible — for 
the sake of informing developmental discussions in a restorative environment — with the 
claims of care theory. 
Care theory can be understood to make claims about the moral domain. The call to include 
moral intuition in an account of morality is not at odds with preserving a rational approach 
to justice for impartial adjudication in cases of moral conflict. This thesis does not give 
rational justice elevated status above the moral, as the language of ‘first-order’ and ‘second-
order’ may seem to suggest, but rather employs it as the mutually acceptable point of 
retreat when moral debate reaches irreconcilable difference. Its adjudicative power is not 
from a superior position within the moral domain, but from an external position from which 
to evaluate competing claims in a manner that an impartial observer could accept. Some 
reasoning about fairness may be adopted by individuals in their personal moralities, but this 
is not something either stipulated or excluded by the structures that this thesis proposes. 
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The claims of care theory, consequently, can be assimilated as one of many moral positions 
in the reasonable pluralism of a deliberative democracy, in accordance with the analysis of 
these concepts in chapter four. Some people may hold Kohlberg’s position to describe 
morality. This would be a rival, and incompatible, claim to the nature of morality if held 
alongside those of care theory. Using some of Kohlberg’s apparatus to inform a necessarily 
rational means of comparing different moralities is not. It is not given pre-eminence over 
any moral concerns, but rather the licence to evaluate compromise when there are conflicts 
between them. When particular moral positions conflict with or deny a society’s 
requirements for justice is a situation that was explored in detail in chapter six, and 
addressed with reference to principles of deliberative democracy. When parents’ beliefs 
conflict with their children’s rights to an education about justice, this thesis follows 
Gutmann and Thompson in prioritizing the children’s claim; that education ought as far as 
possible to enable students’ development for full and equal participation in democratic 
adult life. The domain of justice is not considered pre-eminent over morality — holding 
adjudicative power does not imply a hierarchy of domains, but rather than a difference in 
the category of the objects that they can assess: questions of morality in the moral domain, 
and fair resolution between incommensurable or incompatible moral positions for justice. 
The following groupings of concepts illustrate the above distinction: 
The domain of justice:  The rational, Kohlberg, fairness, and ‘the right’ 
The domain of morality: The emotional86, care theory, ‘the good’ 
While these groups are not exclusive of each other, such a division may help clarify the 
typifying concerns of morality and fairness. As an example, the moral may include elements 
of the rational, and of justice (attending to justice can be considered morally good), but the 
role of justice in conflict resolution is a distinctly separate, extra-moral concern. 
Both these types of thinking are therefore important, and restorative conversations in 
schools can productively attend to developing both of these. The existing focus on 
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restoration and empathic connection primarily addresses morality87, whereas prompting 
consideration of fairness can help develop thinking about justice. This also is not a stark 
division: students may feel an emotional and empathetic draw to doing what is fair, and, 
conversely, people may be swayed by reason to act in accordance with what they think the 
good course of action to be. However, thinking about what is fair, and examining one’s 
feelings about what would restore a relationship, may be more comfortable default 
positions absent of context than feeling what is fair, and thinking about what would restore 
the relationship. Both may prove productive, and this further strengthens the argument for 
restorative conversations to develop the facility to consider rational fairness as well as the 
emotional restoration of relationships. 
Moral motivation and the third goal of good school discipline 
Having the ability to attend to both rational and emotional development in restorative 
conversations aids meeting the three goals of good school discipline. The core focus of this 
thesis has been to show how exploring fairness in restorative conversations can help to 
develop understandings of justified political authority (goal two). The existing literature on 
classroom management systems primarily addresses their maintenance of order to enable 
effective learning (goal one). The third goal, developing the disposition to act in accordance 
with justified authority, has been less of a focus, but the material in this chapter makes a 
contribution to the meeting of this goal. As discussed in chapter seven, part of the reason 
the primary focus has been elsewhere is that solving the question of moral motivation is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Even given the distinction between justice and morality 
drawn above, which renders this a problem of being motivated to act in accordance with 
justice rather than one of moral motivation, the issues with addressing it are similar. The 
rational approaches so far described in this thesis can be argued to account for moral 
motivation, but such an approach is not without its problems. Moral intuition and moral 
sentimentalism provide an emotional means of accounting for moral motivation, and this 
section describes how the possible coexistence of justice and care described above enables 
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both to be built upon by restorative discussions to aid in developing the disposition to act in 
accordance with justified authority. 
Understanding moral motivation as wholly drawn from either rational or emotional 
concerns presents a number of philosophical problems. This is well-illustrated by a thought 
experiment of Bernard Williams’ (1981), which runs as follows: 
A man sees two people drowning, and has the opportunity to save one. One is his wife, the 
other a stranger. The man checks with the abstract moral principle to which he adheres, 
confirms that he is allowed to show partiality to those with whom he has a close familial 
bond, and dives in to save his wife. His wife might criticise him for ‘having one thought too 
many’ before diving in to save her, a criticism which seems worthy of inclusion in an account 
of morality. The grounds for this are clearly a desire for the rescue to be motivated by some 
form of emotional impulse rather than one’s faculties of reason alone, and this is not 
allowed for by a wholly rational account of moral motivation. In Noddings’ terms, this 
illustrates how we prefer to receive genuine, relational care rather than her ‘ethical care’ as 
a rational substitute. Conversely, valuing emotional motivations without reference to the 
rational is incompatible both with utilitarian calculation of outcomes and with Kantian 
principles, as emotions might lead us away from that which it might fairly be ruled anyone 
should do in such a situation. Perhaps one is temporarily enraged with one’s spouse, and 
more inclined to save a stranger, yet one’s specific duty of care has not lessened. Bloom 
claims that empathy in such situations is ‘biased; it's innumerate; it can be weaponised. It 
makes us worse people … we should make our moral decisions without empathy, through 
rational deliberation’ (Bloom, 2017). Emotions are subject to a variety of influences, 
including environmental factors that one may consider ought not to affect a particular 
decision, and may lead to different moral conclusions in analogous circumstances, unlike 
approaches based on reasoning. Noddings’ care theory defends holding care and 
relationships as superordinate to the judgements of reason, with her employment of 
‘ethical caring’ as a rational substitute in situations where care runs short. This emotional 
approach to morality addresses Williams’ initial problem, but not without raising difficulties 
in other situations: what if, to return to an earlier example, one has close ties to an 
organised-crime family and caring for those close to you might harm many further afield? 
Neither emotional nor rational approaches to morality and moral motivation are without 
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their problems, and consequently both deserve consideration in the realm of democratic 
debate, in accordance with the environments of reasonable pluralism stipulated throughout 
this thesis. 
Given that finding a complete solution to moral theory and moral motivation is far beyond 
the scope of this project, it is sensible instead to consider the impact of different 
approaches upon a restorative school environment. The following section argues how 
reference to both sorts of model may be productive for developing different children’s 
thinking when resolving conflicts in schools. 
While it is possible to draw on rational motivation to act in accordance with moral 
requirements (i.e. for justifying reasons to also have some force as motivating reasons), 
emotional concerns may seem easier to draw on in many practical situations such as 
disciplinary discussions in schools. Wholly neglecting emotional inducements to act rightly 
would be imposing unnecessary difficulties on restorative discussions that broadly focus on 
rational concerns of justice. The possible coexistence of care theory with cognitive moral 
development in restorative environments enables a clean way of addressing this. Care 
theory, with its basis in moral intuitions, is one of a broader set of approaches to morality 
which are led by emotional concerns, described as moral sentimentalist theories. The 
following section analyses the concepts of sympathy and empathy that are typically central 
to such theories to illustrate more clearly how both sentimentalist and rationalist 
approaches can help encourage the development of motivation towards good school 
discipline through different kinds of restorative discussion. 
Moral sentimentalism, empathy, and sympathy 
Slote (2010), whose contemporary moral sentimentalism based on empathy is described 
below, provides a concise summary of a key argument in favour of some sentimentalist 
approaches to moral motivation. Our motivations to moral action, so the argument 
concludes, are less well accounted for by a theory which posits that we are fundamentally 
autonomous (such as liberal theories of justice in the tradition of Kant and Rawls) than one 
which acknowledges the connections between individuals; connections which we do not 
choose, and which permit a theory that gives prime attention to the relationships in which 
people live, as opposed to considering isolated rational actors.  
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Even the earliest writers on moral sentimentalism, however, recognised its insufficient 
allowance for considerations that this thesis describes as those of justice. Smith’s 
(1759/2000) and Hume’s (1738/2009) conceptions of sympathy illustrate some of the 
confusion over how these concerns of justice might be included in a sentimentalist 
conception of morality. 
For Hume  (1738/2009), the communication of passions rests on inference, and out of these 
inferences, sympathy arises. The term ‘sympathy’ is understood to carry at least four 
separate meanings in different parts of his works (Agosta, n.d.). He considered the 
interaction between reason and passion to be ‘too fine and minute’ for philosophy to 
separate. For Hume, there is a black box here. He saw extensive sympathy in man, but 
limited generosity. He argued that benevolence was the root of justice, but would not 
always extend far enough alone to create justice; an approach that Noddings' ethical caring 
echoes in acknowledging that our emotional responses will not always be sufficient. For 
Smith (1759/2000), there was a more cognitive element to sympathy. It involved imagining 
oneself in the same situation as another, and then imagining how one would feel in that 
situation. Smith desired reason to be a moderating influence over the concerns of 
sympathy, in a manner more analogous to the adjudicative role of justice over moral 
conflicts as described in this thesis. 
The model adopted here allows for attention to concerns of justice and concerns of care (or 
morality) to be considered separately, rather than necessarily including justice in an account 
of morality. However, further distinction between empathy and sympathy will clarify how 
both emotional concerns (of morality and of care) and rational concerns of justice can 
separately contribute both to moral motivation and to the disposition to act in accordance 
with justified political authority. 
The word empathy itself is a fairly recent coinage, arising from psychological literature at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. 
In the English language “empathy” simply did not exist prior to Cornell 
University psychologist Edward Bradford Titchner's (1909) neologism in 
translating the German word “Einfühlung” as “empathy” in his lectures based 




In non-academic contexts, the terms empathy and sympathy generate a fair amount of 
confusion, though the division proposed here is in line with many attempts to disambiguate 
the two for writers, students, and teachers of English as a foreign language (‘Empathy vs 
Sympathy - Difference and Comparison | Diffen’, n.d.; ‘Empathy vs. sympathy - Grammarist’, 
n.d.; ‘empathy vs. sympathy : Choose Your Words : Vocabulary.com’, n.d.) as well as with 
specialist philosophical and psychological analysis. 
That is not to say there is either academic or general consensus on the matter. Some of the 
conflict may be because of the historical changes in the uses of the terms, and the multiple 
fields in which they are employed. The etymologies of the terms are of limited use, given 
the nebulousness of the Greek prepositions ἐν and συν and that one term is a neologism 
constructed in parallel to the former. The distinction adopted here is as follows: 
Empathy is the ability to feel as another feels: to actively imagine oneself in a similar 
situation to another, and feel as best as one can imagine what they are feeling. It is an 
emotional response, and the one on which care theorists draw. While it is not isolated from 
cognitive considerations (on which more below), it is related to the ‘natural’ response to 
which Noddings refers; more desirable in her theory than a rational attempt to recreate 
similar in a situation of ‘ethical caring’ when one's emotional reserves of care have run dry. 
The analogue in the psychological literature is ‘affective empathy’: to respond with the 
appropriate emotion to a stimulus involving another person. 
Sympathy, on the other hand, is more intellectualised, and less emotionally connected. The 
specific usage adopted here is very close to the term's colloquial usage as an adjective: if I 
am sympathetic to your plight, I believe that I have an understanding of the salient features 
of your situation, that I understand why it is a problem, and that I intellectually understand 
why you might feel bad to be in this particular situation. It does not entail any emotional 
feeling of this, yet such feeling is not excluded. The two concepts are tangled: sympathy is 
primarily intellectualised, yet emotional responses may follow. In the psychological 
literature, this is more analogous to ‘cognitive empathy’, which is the process of thinking to 
understand how another perceives a situation. This is much more related to theory of mind, 
understanding another’s mental state, and perspective-taking than to an affective response. 
Empathy and sympathy involve both perspective-taking and fellow-feeling in slightly 
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different forms. In fellow-feeling, any feelings that may be elicited in a sympathiser are from 
their own perspective, whereas empathic feelings are close to the sufferer’s feelings. In 
perspective-taking, empathy involves an approximation of inhabiting another’s perspective, 
whereas sympathy involves having an approximate cognitive conception of it but 
maintaining an external standpoint. 
Some definitions lack specificity:  
sympathy is feeling compassion, sorrow, or pity for the hardships that 
another person encounters, while empathy is putting yourself in the shoes of 
another. 
(‘Empathy vs. Sympathy | Dictionary.com Blog’, n.d.) 
This definition may seem to imply a reversal of which of empathy and sympathy is primarily 
emotionally-based, but leaves room for doubt, as ‘feeling’ in this context — and in that of 
the rest of the article — could be read as ‘awareness of’. The emphasis here is on the 
distinction between the external awareness of another’s hardships and the taking of their 
perspective, rather than on whether either empathy or sympathy has an emotional or 
cognitive basis. 
Sympathy is a compassion and sorrow one feels for another, but empathy is 
more focused around personally identifying with or projecting oneself into 
another’s situation. 
(‘Empathy vs. Sympathy: What’s the Difference? - Writing Explained’, n.d.) 
This definition captures the projection in empathy, and recognises that sympathy entails a 
recognition of another’s difficulties, but also appears to move the primarily emotional 
response from empathy into sympathy with the ambiguous nature of ‘feel’ in the first 
clause. To ‘feel for’ someone can be an intellectual sympathy with their plight, and the 
absence of any mention of feeling in the second clause may suggest a contrast that is 
unintentional. 
A pair of definitions from an academic philosopher and psychologist, in contrast, captures 
the important distinctions well and shall be followed from this point: 
(Empathy) involves, first, seeing someone else’s situation from his 




Sympathy (‘fellow feeling’, ‘community of feeling’) is a feeling of care and 
concern for someone, often someone close, accompanied by a wish to see 
him better off or happier … sympathy, unlike empathy, does not involve a 
shared perspective or shared emotions, and while the facial expressions of 
sympathy do convey caring and concern, they do not convey shared distress. 
Sympathy and empathy often lead to each other, but not always. For 
instance, it is possible to sympathize with such things as hedgehogs and 
ladybirds, but not, strictly speaking, to empathize with them. Conversely, 
psychopaths with absolutely no sympathy for their victims can nonetheless 
make use of empathy to snare or torture them. 
(Burton, 2015) 
This clearer division of empathy and sympathy can help distinguish the separate role of 
‘ethical caring’ — the intellectualised substitute for an emotional impulse to care — in 
Noddings’ model of care theory. Sympathy with a person’s suffering can correspond with 
her 'caring about', and can be used to generate the motivation for ethical caring from an 
intellectual construction of how they are likely to be feeling. For Noddings, this is cognitive 
and does not require a direct human relationship to be effective. In contrast, her actual 
‘care-giving’ is direct, and is aided by a relationship; this requires empathy. It is empathy 
which is directly conducive to caring relations, and sympathy which has the intellectualised 
distance of Noddings' ethical caring. 
This helps illustrate how an argument can be mounted against a strict division between 
emotional grounds for moral motivation and rational arguments for justice. It is easier to 
develop dispositions to act in accordance with just political authority (the third goal of good 
school discipline) if both emotional and rational considerations can contribute to this. The 
typical pairings have already been addressed: moral sentimentalism accounts well for moral 
motivation, while knowledge of one’s duty following Kant and Rawls can encourage 
adherence to justice. The former may seem easier to draw upon than the latter, and it 
would be desirable to be able to employ this also in the development of motivation to act in 
accordance with justice. Both considerations can, in fact, also apply to the other domain: 
sympathy, as Noddings’ ethical care, appears to be a rational motivation to moral action, as 
understood by sentimentalist theories. Conversely, some individuals may consider rational 
concerns to be part of their moral theory, as Smith (and a great number of other ethicists) 
would allow. They may consequently be emotionally motivated to do what is right (in terms 
of justice) by considering it itself to be morally good. Kohlberg’s model suggests that this is 
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likely to be a considerable demographic in schools: students at stages 3 and 4 are likely to 
consider being a co-operative member of a community and supporting rules as part of what 
being good entails, and may draw upon the corresponding motivations. There are also 
possible emotional inducements to respecting just authority that are non-moral: a student 
may emotionally value being in an environment where profound moral conflicts are typically 
resolved, and a democratic or community environment, in which pupils participate in school 
governance and have some say in the construction of school rules, can encourage emotional 
investment in the operation of the system and the desire to see it succeed. 
Developing the disposition to act in accordance with justified political authority does not 
necessarily require a Kantian approach to duty, but can also draw on emotional motivating 
factors. An environment which allows care and justice to coexist, rather than framing them 
as alternative moral perspectives, allows for both emotional and rational grounds to support 
the development of this disposition. Given the permissibility of a reasonable pluralism of 
moral theories in deliberative democracy, a teacher aiming to engage a student’s motivation 
to comply with a particular resolution to a conflict is not compelled to restrict him- or 
herself to taking one particular approach in the name of theoretical consistency: both 
emotional and rational inducements to respect an impartial resolution to a conflict can be 
employed. 
These are addressed by two different emphases possible for restorative discussions. 
Restorative discussions as they typically occur emphasise empathic connection and the 
restoration of relationships. This model builds primarily (but not exclusively) on emotional 
motivation and connection. Relationships of care can support these. Restorative discussions 
that address fair outcome primarily (but not exclusively) engage rational thought about just 
resolution. Following the argument here, they need not rely solely on the motivation of duty 
to encourage compliance with what reason suggests is the fair outcome to a conflict. 
Both the emotional and rational can support motivation to both moral and just action, and 
they can be supported by two different approaches to restorative discipline discussions. 
An addendum to the above separation of the domains of justice and morality clarifies that 
while their roles in situations of conflict are distinct, concerns typical to one may inform the 
other. An approach focused on empathy may contribute to motivation to meet the 
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requirements of justice, and discussion of fairness may lead to motivation towards the 
requirements of morality. Standard restorative discussions, and the engagement of 
empathy, are typically associated with morality yet may inform justice; while restorative 
discussions of fairness, and the engagement of sympathy, are typically associated with 
justice yet may inform morality. 
In conclusion, given an acceptance of moral pluralism, restorative communities in 
democracies may adopt, model and draw on the benefits of both the sentimental and the 
rational to develop students’ motivations to act in accordance with justice as well as with 
morality. The combination of both approaches in this context avoids some of the 
philosophical problems that would be involved in claiming a combination of the two to form 
a theory of morality, and the coexistence of care- and justice-based approaches in 
restorative discussions can help support the meeting of the third goal of good school 
discipline. 
The benefit of multiple approaches to moral education 
This thesis concerns education for democratic citizenship, rather than moral education. The 
proposed additions to restorative discussions are to encourage the development of pupils’ 
understandings of just outcomes, rather than to promote some singular conception of the 
good. Given that this chapter allows specifically for the value of care and the moral in 
contributing to pupils’ motivations, however, some comparison between the models used 
here and similar concepts in moral education is worthwhile. 
Kohlberg claimed his work to concern moral education, as do care theorists their models. 
The elements of both used here are not presented as theories of morality, despite their 
authors’ original intentions. Such theories comprise a large proportion of common secular 
approaches to moral education, which can broadly be divided into those models which 
follow a cognitive approach such as Kohlberg’s, sentimentalist approaches such as those of 
care, and ‘character education’ models which draw on virtue ethics. This section will address 
some of the claims of character education; compare different methods of developing care, 
justice, and character, and their shortcomings in isolation; and reinforce how an 
environment of moral pluralism can allow for the address of all of these approaches. 
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The idea of developing the good man — a man with a list of qualities such as honesty, 
charity, and whatever else a particular theorist may wish to defend — is as old as the history 
of philosophy of education. Part of the appeal of character education is that it espouses the 
development of qualities widely agreed to be desirable, though without necessarily 
specifying exactly what those qualities entail. People of different moral convictions may 
agree that educating wise and kind children, for example, is desirable, but without 
discovering their profound differences about what that involves. A corresponding strength 
of this nebulousness, however, is that it allows for local cultural interpretation of the nature 
of a virtue. While Noddings (in Siegel, 2009) is quick to differentiate virtue ethics from a 
caring approach, she shares with virtue ethicists the conviction that a morally better world 
would require ‘better people, not better principles’. Care for Noddings is an activity, and 
relational, rather than a disposition to act in a caring manner. She contrasts care and virtue 
as follows in Caring, Empathy, and Moral Education (Slote, 2009): ‘Care and virtue both put 
little weight on rules and principles as guides to moral action. Virtue looks to character of 
moral agents, care on an ethical ideal developed over much time being one who cares.’ The 
relationship, rather than the virtue, comes first in care ethics. 
In practical educational contexts, the virtue-driven ‘character education’ approach was pre-
eminent until Hartshorne & May’s (1928) influential studies of its effects. These cast serious 
doubts on the efficacy of character education approaches at instilling the virtues for which 
they aimed. Nonetheless, character education still remains a popular conception of moral 
education due not least to its intuitive appeal, and that the evidence ranged against it is not 
categorical. 
The rational development approach to moral education, in contrast, is that on which the 
previous chapter focused in detail. Kohlberg's idea of a developmental scale in the 
conceptualisation of moral issues follows a similar model to Piaget's stages of child 
development and has a fair body of experimental data in support of it, such as the work on 
Just Community schools covered in the previous chapter. Kohlberg's model sits congenially 
with liberal assumptions of rational autonomy, but the foundations of a caring approach 
would be in a certain degree of meta-ethical tension with a cognitive, rational approach to 
moral development, as addressed earlier in this chapter. Kohlberg’s model fits well with 
many principles followed for justice in earlier chapters of this thesis: a focus on the rational 
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consideration of justice or fairness, an idea of contracts as a foundation for negotiations 
(though without an implicit assumption that the starting points for such negotiations are fair 
and equal in practice for each individual), and a commitment to democratic deliberation to 
produce the best answer a collective of people can propose that is mutually rationally 
acceptable. Abandoning the claim of such a model to describe the entirety of the moral 
domain goes some way to allow for its compatibility with other theoretical approaches. 
A sentimentalist criticism of evaluating morality primarily on principles of justice does not 
undermine the value of rationality in the public sphere for fair, impersonal consideration of 
individual moral perspectives, nor exclude it from any role in discussions of the nature of 
morality. Okin (1989/1998) argues that the relationships we find ourselves in are not 
voluntarily chosen, and do not leave us in an impartial position to begin any hypothetical 
contract negotiations. One can accept this is the case without denying the value of 
contractual negotiations from an unfair basis. Adopting such a model pragmatically as a 
teaching tool can demonstrate the values of rational agreement even from a non-idealised 
starting position, and that practical improvements can be brought about from an imperfect 
starting point. The lack of attention to moral motivation would, however, be a genuine issue 
with a purely rationalist approach, and this suggests at least some exposure to the 
consideration of care or virtues in a school environment which is aiming to provide a broad 
moral education. 
Care theory approaches, in contrast, can be criticised on the grounds that socially desirable 
emotions are prone to vast cultural difference, to such a degree that there can be 
disagreement on whether the content of how we choose to care is moral. For example, 
there is a value difference between how different people might respond to a Jewish 
circumcision: is it to be taken as a sign of welcoming into a community, or a painful act of 
mutilation? Which feeling will be primary for a genuine carer? It is not an unreasonable 
stretch to visualise Noddings attempting to make a ‘trolley decision’88 and pulling back, as 
she describes, from feelings of care. Caring relationships may impede making a swift but 
uncomfortable decision in situations like this, and encourage inaction when under particular 
                                                        
88
 A hypothetical example used in various permutations to explore a utilitarian calculus of moral outcomes. If 
you can pull a lever, ensuring one person dies, to stop a trolley full of people from racing to certain death, 
should you do so? (Foot, 1967) 
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pressure. A utilitarian calculus, (which Noddings would not prioritise), would not necessarily 
produce a better result, but there is a question over whether a snap selection of the most 
immediately accessible caring response is the one that best honours caring relationships. 
Emotional responses remain prone to interference from other influences which affect 
emotions but are perhaps not morally relevant. ‘Ethical caring’ may be of some assistance in 
such a situation for the rational consideration of one’s caring obligations when extreme and 
possibly conflicting emotions make natural caring responses hard to access. This is further 
support for addressing multiple approaches to moral education in the restorative school, 
especially when considered alongside the argument that developing moral reasoning in 
isolation does not value human emotions in as central a manner as a moral theory perhaps 
ought to do, as illustrated by Williams’ vignette at the start of section three of this chapter. 
Educating for a caring approach requires a different set of considerations to the models 
above. Kohlberg’s rational approach builds on cognitive development as described in 
chapter seven, and the methods used by character educators depend on from where one 
considers a particular virtue to arise. Habituation, if such can be considered education at all, 
is not the foremost way to educate an individual to display more than the outward signs of a 
virtue. Given that care is borne out of empathy, engrossment, or a caring orientation to 
another, education for caring involves developing an individual’s relationships, and the 
feelings which drive such impulses to care. 
Hoffman's system of ‘inductive discipline’ (2000) aims to nurture and develop emotional 
responses in a way that encourages caring responses. It is designed to get children to think 
about the effects of their actions on others, both good and bad, and become more 
consistent actors as a result. This has clear parallels with restorative practices. Noddings 
(2002a) has created models of moral education based on care ethics, involving modelling, 
dialogue, practice and confirmation. These aim to develop the capacity for engrossment, 
similar to Hoffman's induction of empathy. Work on perspective-taking can be both 
cognitive and affective in whether sympathy or empathy is encouraged; one can imagine 




Without a basis in rational moral principles, criticisms can be levelled at the encouragement 
of certain emotional responses such as guilt. It is hard to evaluate the level of guilt a 
wrongdoer ought to feel for a crime— and, indeed, it seems odd to stipulate a 
proportionate level of hurt to feel as a victim of wrongdoing. If guilt should correspond 
solely to the emotional impact of a crime on those affected, then this would imply that 
crimes against those of dulled emotional response are less reprehensible than against those 
who feel their effects keenly. Despite emotional responses lacking objective measurements 
of degree (and consequently an easy way to assess what extent of response comprises fair 
restitution), they fit well with promoting social restoration after a misdeed rather than 
punishment; a core value of restorative justice and restorative school discipline. Valuing 
relationships is an element many would want to include in a model of moral education, and 
consequently approaches which pay some attention to developing both emotional and 
rational capabilities seem appropriate for adoption in moral education in schools. The 
proposed extension to restorative discipline achieves this with the possibility of increased 
emphasis on rational fairness in restorative conversations as well as on the restoration of 
good relationships. 
Each of the moral education systems addressed here features elements that some citizens 
value which other systems lack. It is furthermore worth considering a practical variable in 
the application of such systems — that different audiences may be receptive to different 
approaches at different times. Some days, a student might want to argue why something 
that has been done to them is wrong, but in other situations they may prefer to receive a 
hug. The path of least resistance is not necessarily the most desirable, however: it would be 
remiss never to stimulate the empathy of a student who seems perpetually disinclined 
towards it, if it is desirable to develop both emotional and rational capabilities for future 
adult life. 
Nucci’s (2009) psychology of moral development in young children merits further mention 
here to illustrate that while following these different approaches might involve different 
mental operations, this is likely not to affect children’s non-rational moral processing of 
what the domain of morality actually is. Key distinctions are established well before the 
secondary age range at which this thesis is directed. Nucci presents data (2009) to illustrate 
how children learn the moral and the socially conventional to be different, and that 
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children's psychological sense of morality centres around issues that could be addressed by 
any of the approaches examined here (caring, helping others, avoiding harm, and being fair). 
He presents that the basic moral concepts of both religiously- and secularly- brought-up 
children emerge very early in development, and are the same. Consequently, for the early 
development of children’s psychological conceptualisation of morality, schools can adopt a 
particular philosophical model of moral education without affecting a child's pre-rational 
moral intuitions, or undermining faith at that pre-rational level. 
Restorative discipline discussions can address moral dilemmas in accordance with any of the 
models discussed in this chapter. While this thesis does not propose justice thinking to be 
moral education as Kohlberg would describe it, it acknowledges the importance of 
considering individuals’ moral positions when attempting to make just judgements. 
Questions can be posed that direct a student to different points of reference, such as 
whether a given outcome is fair (justice thinking), how someone might feel about it 
(empathy), or what a kind response might be in this situation (appeal to virtue). A school 
may prefer to promote one approach alone to morality. While that is permissible in 
accordance with the argument on faith schools in chapter six, attending only to one 
approach is an incomplete address of the possible concerns of morality, and consequently 
less educative about positions held by others in a morally plural democratic society than 
also addressing other perspectives. 
No single approach needs to be considered pre-eminent in the moral domain for the 
proposals of this thesis. Individuals may adopt a relational model of caring encounters whilst 
seeking still to defend rational fairness as a virtue of social institutions. In education 
specifically it is important to equip people for fluency in both justice and care, as institutions 
without rational thinkers to steer them may become vulnerable to inconsistent or unjust 




Different approaches to the reconciliation of justice and care in the context 
of deliberative democracy 
While this chapter has presented care theories and justice as initially seeming to be in direct 
opposition, there are a number of theorists who allow for a certain degree of combination 
of these approaches, even within the moral domain. This section investigates how well 
these different approaches to the theoretical coexistence of justice and care correspond 
with the combination adopted here, how this fits well with an overarching framework of 
deliberative democracy, and concludes the chapter as a whole. 
Smith would likely have been amenable to a composite approach to justice and care which 
recognises the value of both the sentimental and the rational. He presented reason as 
moderating the concerns of (his) sympathy: for Smith, morality should move away from 
being a purely sentimentalist concern (Smith, 1976). There are compelling arguments that 
make a purely moral sentimentalist position look unattractive without the addition of 
rational elements, as both Smith and Hume realised. One major problem is ‘social distance’: 
we sympathise less easily not only with the physically distant but also with the socially 
distant, such as those in extreme poverty or of a different race. This is likely to perpetuate 
class divisions, and mask the seriousness of distant problems. A contemporary illustration is 
the parody newspaper headline ‘Experts: Ebola Vaccine At Least 50 White People Away’ 
(2014). Smith’s concept of the impartial spectator, which gained increasing prominence in 
the later editions of The theory of moral sentiments, can be seen as a clear precursor to 
Rawls' work on the veil of ignorance, and a further suggestion of the porousness of the 
divide between the emotional and the rational, the good and the just. 
Tronto (1993) searches for areas of overlap from the perspective of care theory. She 
describes moral motivation as being less of a problem for rational approaches if care is 
separately held in higher regard, yet sees as more of an issue the ability to make sure one is 
sufficiently detached to recognise the moral difficulties inherent to caring situations. She 
wishes to see care embedded in a theory of justice, as she sees a vulnerability to 
paternalism (or maternalism) and parochialism in care alone. Okin (1989/1998) also seeks a 
position that allows for both justice and care by arguing that Rawls does not have to assume 
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that people are mutually disinterested, rather than mutually engaged, and sees the view of 
human nature inherent to care theory as a remedy for some of the flaws of justice theories. 
While these positions differ over which elements of justice and care are considered moral, 
and which should primarily be an influence or moderating concern upon the other, they fit 
the type of compromises that emerge from deliberative discussions in a pluralist 
environment. This is because they look for rational resolution to areas of conflict between 
different models and compromise in accordance with that value (rather than, for example, 
stipulating the supremacy of a sentimentalist approach and that rational compromise 
should be subordinate to the strength of certain feelings). 
In opposition to the above theorists, it is equally possible to find arguments in favour of a 
strict separation between justice and care. Slote (2007) uses his formulation of caring as a 
foundation for an ethical system grounded in moral sentimentalism, without the need to 
draw on reasoning-based criteria. His empathy-based ethics accepts the above criticism 
about social distance, and argues directly against a utilitarian position commonly associated 
with Singer (2011): for Slote, it is morally acceptable to feel a closer tie to the person 
suffering in front of you than a person suffering on the other side of the world because of 
the empathy involved; because of the direct, personal caring relationship. He claims an ethic 
of care based on empathy answers a different set of philosophical problems to those 
answered by rationalist approaches. This can still be compatible with the structures of this 
thesis by considering the role of an educational environment in preparing citizens for future 
democratic citizenship. Even if the responsibilities of justice are placed on institutions rather 
than individuals, education still needs to prepare citizens for engagement with them. 
Rational and impartial adjudication is still necessary when beliefs clash irreconcilably, but for 
Slote this is external to the concerns that he considers to be moral. 
Slote argues that care and a Kantian liberalism are incompatible, and tries to construct how 
justice arises from care instead. He construes empathy as foundational to morality because 
our empathic feelings lead us to the judgements we want morality to make. Slote considers 
caring and justice approaches fundamentally incompatible due their difference in 
conclusions on individual moral problems. In The ethics of care and empathy (2007) he gives 
the example of a man who wishes to lead a neo-Nazi rally, but would be too embarrassed to 
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appear in public without his dentures and wig. Without his presence, the rally would not 
take place. He asks the reader to consider the position of his daughter, who has the 
opportunity to hide them. While she has deep caring ties with her father, and can permit 
herself partiality towards those to whom she is emotionally close under an ethic of care, 
under Slote's construal of a care ethic she can feel a deep empathy with the many people in 
her community that this rally would offend, and act to hide her father's property. If one 
were following a justice framework, Slote argues that the principle of free speech — even if 
hate speech — might be prioritised in this situation. He argues that one of either justice or 
care has to be given priority because of such situations of incompatibility in their 
judgements. This conflict is less troubling for an environment of moral pluralism that does 
not necessarily seek to resolve such conflicting claims: both positions have reasonable 
justification, and thus this argument can be conducted within the space of democratic 
debate and public reason. In the terminology of this thesis, Slote’s justice here is more a 
moral position based on the rational concerns of justice; the justice that this thesis defends 
to be compatible with care is that for adjudicating the conflicts between competing moral 
positions, as opposed to one that passes judgement on moral questions itself. As argued in 
the second section of this chapter, a second-order justice is compatible with care theory, 
whereas a justice in the moral space (as is Slote’s target) is not. 
For Noddings (2013), ‘care...is essentially non-rational’. Her concept of ‘engrossment' — 
similar to Slote's empathy — is central to such an approach: rationality can focus on the 
problem, but not on the 'cared-for'.  While there may be benefit to ethical caring as a 
substitute for genuine care, it does not substitute satisfactorily for a caring relationship. This 
may appear initially to be a claim for strict sentimentalism, but ethical care still allows for 
rational support of such an approach, and consequently raises the question of how 
complete this separation is: if rationality is used to summon an intellectually-constructed 
image of oneself as an ideal carer, to some degree it is helping to support this sentimentalist 
approach to morality. Rational concerns of how one ought to behave are employed to 
support aspects of moral action. When caring emotions are in conflict, as in some potential 
trolley scenarios as described above, the employment of the rational to assist in their 
resolution is not excluded. 
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Neither Slote nor Noddings dismiss the value of justice. Noddings acknowledges that care 
without justice is likely to be lacking, yet she sees them as incompatible as they come from 
different meta-ethical starting points. The particular and compassionate is set against the 
universal and rational.  She writes (in Siegel, 2009) that reasonable questions remain about 
their combination: which of justice and care is primary? Must they be in different domains? 
Are they reasonably applied in phases? These questions do not necessarily need resolution 
in the structures supporting restorative discussions of justice and fairness: they can be left 
to debate in the deliberative democratic space, and addressed through public reason 
alongside other concerns of the good and the right in particular communities as desired. 
In Starting at home: Caring and social policy (Noddings, 2002b), Noddings suggests caring 
provides the foundation of a sense of justice, as does Okin in commenting on Rawls (1989). 
This ‘sense of justice’ may not refer to the same concept as ‘justice’ does in this thesis.  In a 
strongly sentimentalist approach it may be appropriate to reach for a feeling to support a 
concept, but that would be a very different construal from justice as the first social virtue, as 
Rawls described it. Such a sense may practically aid in encouraging adherence to justice’s 
demands, but not in understanding its rational nature. It also may sometimes mislead, in 
cases of unwitting bias. For the purposes of school community disciplinary structures it is 
not the motivation for justice that is most important, rather its transparent operation in 
conflict resolution, and the discussions of what fairness entails that take place as a result. 
These discussions can address the motivation for employing structures of justice if and 
when it is helpful to do so. 
Noddings further writes that caring can pick up where justice leaves off, in many cases. This 
need not be seen as a claim that justice as a concept should be privileged over caring: 
rather, that the enforcement of justice takes one so far, and then can present a significant 
omission if a social consequence is applied to an individual without the provision of caring 
support. Without caring human contact, a sanction can feel oppositional and unfair. A 
greater awareness of the affected relationships makes such sanctions easier to understand, 
as is encouraged in restorative conversations and restorative conferences in criminal justice. 
There is scope for both justice and care in the support of such situations. A rational 
understanding of why one's classroom transgression led to specific redress is helpful in quite 
a different way to how emotional support and inclusion are helpful. One may be 
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significantly more valuable than the other in a specific situation, but they are both of value, 
and both a rational and an emotional engagement with the system can be productive and 
educational. 
This thesis recognises rational grounds for justice and sentimental grounds for care, defends 
that the boundaries between them are not absolute, and maintains that both are 
compatible and helpful for restorative discussions of good and right action. Held (1993) and 
Tronto (1993) both argue that caring can be good in the public sphere as well as the private 
sphere, and vice-versa for justice. Attention to both would go some way to address the 
political marginalisation of care as less valuable; a concern of the familial rather than the 
public domain. The two approaches can inform each other even within the application of 
their own methods: emotional impact can be a consideration in evaluating the fair response 
to a transgression, and while ‘caring for’ needs direct contact, ‘caring about’ can be guided 
by principles of justice. 
Concepts used in rational justice can be accounted for in care by different means: for 
example, certain obligations can be understood to arise either from rational justice or from 
emotional closeness. Where there are such overlaps, the question of theoretical priority 
does not need to be specified in the construction of practical systems for the classroom. For 
the school structures proposed, any such reasonable dispute is not a problem, as it is 
subject to the remit of democratic discussion. This is the type of moral question that is open 
to debate within a system, as opposed to required universally to ground a system of conflict 
management in schools. In Gutmann and Thompson’s deliberative democracy, after the 
initial establishment of a context in which discussion can take place, all principles and 
procedures are provisional. Relationships of caring can be encouraged, and supported 
through restorative discussions; teachers can be supported in engaging with students with 
care, and schools can also be transformed into caring communities — all whilst still applying 
agreed-upon principles of conflict resolution in situations of moral disagreement where 
there are a number of reasonable positions, and the teacher has no grounds to insist upon 
his or her own interpretation. 
Furthermore, in situations where there is no reasonable alternative to one position in a 
conflict, it still may not be the best course of action simply to present the only coherent 
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position for consideration. A major purpose of adopting a deliberative framework for school 
discipline is that the discussions that take place under its remit are educational; enabling 
students to come to understand the positions and social compromises adopted, rather than 
have them stipulated without explanation. In many fields of education students follow 
simplified models of a system before moving on to more complex, yet more accurate ones. 
To return to one example, the model of electron shells taught to teenage chemists is often 
simplified to the point of gross inaccuracy. This approach is defensible due to the important 
understandings it does impart, and the amount of additional knowledge necessary to 
understand a more accurate model. Sometimes it can be helpful to explore specious 
positions. It is not possible to engage young children in terms of Kohlberg’s Post-
conventional stages rather than first engaging in the terms of his lower levels. 
This understanding (and principles subordinate to those of deliberative democracy) further 
supports that a structure of school discipline which encourages both justice and care is not 
professing contradictory principles, even if both are claimed to be in the moral domain in 
opposition to this chapter’s previous arguments. Justice can be a virtue of institutions and 
impartial conflict resolutions, and care can underlie relationships between humans in a 
community. Justice need not be asserted to be of specifically moral value, rather a system to 
resolve conflicts in cases of reasonable pluralism. Neither justice nor morality need be 
asserted to be theoretically prior to the other in order for justice to be effective at this 
function. Any areas of tension in making such distinctions can be discussed educationally 
and subject to the judgements of public reason. Only a school system that educates about 
both justice and care prepares students for two reasonable perspectives that one is likely to 
encounter in adult life. A school discipline system which lacks either justice or care may be 
considered wanting by the moral values of many of its participants. A structure for a plural 
population may benefit from something akin to Rawls’ agreement on principles of justice 
even from incompatible positions: exposure to both justice and care is something on which 
one would likely find reasonable consensus even if unable to reconcile theoretical 
differences on the basis therefor. 
Restorative discussions can highlight the differences between the requirements of social 
conventions, institutions, morality, justice, and human desires. They can support the 
empathy (or capacity for engrossment) of those involved through the methods of Hoffman 
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and Noddings, and their current structures are well-suited to exploring and strengthening a 
child's awareness of the emotional impact their actions have on their relationships and 
those around them. Extended restorative discussions as proposed in this thesis can further 
support rational understandings of justice, as some conflict resolutions already do by 
addressing ideas of fairness and exploring how others would perceive an action or event. 
Nucci (2009) points out the importance of responding to a disciplinary infraction in the 
appropriate manner for the domain — in a moral way for a moral transgression, and a 
conventional way for a conventional one — in order for a teacher's proclamations to be 
seen as carrying more authority than that of their position of power. After a less-successful 
restorative discussion, failing to understanding why an outcome is fair may prove a serious 
obstacle to a child feeling that they are being related to with care. As with so many 
situations in educational environments, an awareness of multiple approaches allows for a 
more effective, particular response to be chosen by the professionals involved. A child 
involved in one conversation might be more receptive to rational approaches, and another 
to affective motivations. 
Deliberative discussion seeks to develop participants’ understandings and voices. There is 
value to educating our youth to be able to engage with the world both from primarily 
rational and primarily emotional perspectives. For the shaping of public institutions, the 
ability to consider matters of justice impersonally is important. For caring relations, so is the 
acknowledgement of our emotions when we relate to others. While the content of morality 
remains an unresolved question, our educational institutions can prepare our children to 
continue to evaluate such ideas in adult deliberative discussion, as opposed to emphasising 
that one way of engaging with the world should be prioritised. Schools can educate about 
effective debate as well as about possible understandings of morality. 
It is valuable both to be able to engage rationally with our own social institutions, and to be 
good, feeling people, leading rich, connected lives.  Through restorative discussions, our 
school discipline systems can help teach our students both how better to understand 
justice, and how better to care. 
In conclusion, while care theory is often presented in opposition to the work of Kohlberg 
and others on cognitive moral development, both have valuable elements that can coexist 
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and be supported by restorative discussions in schools. Such discussions can develop 
empathy and sympathy; moral intuition and justice cognition; and rational evaluation and 
natural care. While there initially appears to be some tension between these models, it is 
largely ameliorated for the purposes of restorative discipline by considering the role of 
justice in conflict resolution as distinct from morality rather than as a competing claim to 
that domain. That debate can take place within the structures of deliberative democracy, 
rather than a position on the matter being necessary for the conversations proposed in this 
thesis. Both rational and sentimental approaches to morality have weaknesses when 
adopted in isolation, and it is consequently desirable to address both in the educational 
environment of restorative discussions. Whether focusing on rational consideration of 
fairness, or empathic concerns of restoration, these discussions can make some contribution 
both to moral motivation and to the disposition to act in accordance with justified political 




This thesis has considered an incoming education policy in New Zealand, and suggested an 
extension to it that seems to be philosophically sound, practical, and of significant potential 
educational benefit. This final section recaps and summarises the argument before making 
some concluding comments on its broader implications, potential for future development, 
and limitations to its scope. 
The first chapter of this thesis examined how the concept of school discipline is widely 
misunderstood, and explained that it entails three goals: the maintenance of sufficient order 
in classrooms to enable effective teaching, education about just authority, and the 
development of pupils’ dispositions to act in accordance with just authority. The chapter 
argued that classroom management is often confused with school discipline, and that 
classroom management typically only meets the first of these three goals. The thesis built 
on these three goals to defend how good school discipline contributes to the better 
preparation of students for participation in adult democratic society. 
Chapter two explored the literature around school discipline. It discussed how even 
specialist books on school discipline typically only address the goal of classroom 
management, and do not recognise the equal importance of the other two goals identified 
in chapter one. Many books do not commit to a specific set of goals for school discipline, 
devolving this responsibility instead to their readers’ judgement – judgement that may be 
ill-founded in a field that is often addressed only practically in initial teacher training, rather 
than with the philosophical content necessary for making such a decision. An examination of 
different families of discipline systems revealed that restorative practices are well- 
positioned to meet the above goals. Restorative practices are currently undergoing pilot 
implementation as part of the Positive Behaviour for Learning initiative in New Zealand 
schools. In chapter three, a detailed examination of these policies revealed that 
considerable attention has been paid to the leading academic theories on how such 
programmes can successfully be implemented, and what they might achieve. This suggests 
that the Ministry of Education is implementing well-supported policies in this area with 
significant potential for success. 
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Given the above understanding of specific goals for classroom discipline, and an incoming 
policy that looks well-placed better to meet them, the main proposal of this thesis was 
tabled: for the extension of restorative practices to better support the meeting of the above 
goals. Restorative practices attend well to the restoration of damaged relationships. They 
are also able to encourage consideration of fair outcomes, but this is not a primary focus of 
restorative discussions. This thesis proposed using the structures of restorative discussions 
to give considerable attention to stimulating thought about what resolution to an incident 
might be fair, as well as what might be emotionally reparative. Such discussions, the 
argument continued, can help to develop rational thought about justice as well as concern 
for emotional damage. 
A certain amount of theoretical justification was needed for this claim, and this was 
undertaken in chapter four. It addressed the particular conception of the rational that this 
thesis has adopted, and distinguished it both from other uses of the term and the emotional 
work restorative conversations already perform. The chapter defended why developing 
students’ rationality is valuable. Besides the widespread consideration of one of the goals of 
education to be the cultivating of rationality, chapter four argued how rationality is 
important for the functions of social institutions in a democracy in a way that it is not 
necessarily important for individuals. The operation and modification of these institutions 
through the democratic process is an important part of adult democratic citizenship, and 
consequently greater development of rational capabilities — together with an 
understanding of how these institutions operate — is better preparation for adult 
democratic life. The chapter also clarified how this is linked to good school discipline, as 
follows. Given a plurality of reasonable moral positions in democracies such as New 
Zealand, neutrality between these sometimes means that fairness in conflict resolution has 
to rest on principles of justice rather than the principles of a particular moral position. When 
different moral claims are in irreconcilable conflict, it is political authority that can have 
justified authority in resolving such a conflict — a position that was defended by respect for 
the impartial judgement of (rational) fairness when all other grounds for compromise or co-
operation fail. The structure established was that justice can help to evaluate potential 
solutions in situations of conflict between opposing conceptions of the good. 
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Beyond a respect for rationality and impartiality, the exact conception of justice is as open 
to debate as particular conceptions of the good. This thesis stipulates neither. What it does 
describe is how a deliberative conception of democracy can allow for the collective 
discussion and revision of these concepts, and also of the structures by which they are 
revised. Democratic discussion was presented as a basis for the resolution to conflicts, and it 
is to this that greater focus on fairness in restorative discussions can contribute. Greater 
attention to rational consideration of fairness is better preparation for democratic 
deliberation in an environment of moral pluralism. This helps develop the better 
understanding of justified political authority. This is both one of the three components of 
good school discipline, and better education for democratic adult life. 
Chapter five presented a suggested model to frame such discussions of fairness. Social 
contract theory was argued to be useful as it makes few theoretical presuppositions, is easy 
to present in its simplest forms, and has scope for considerable development and 
exploration. It is also moderately intuitive, theoretically contemporary, requires little 
theoretical expertise to engage with, and can fit the existing patterns of restorative 
conversations. Different social contract theories provide different ways to explore and 
develop pupils’ understandings of fairness that may appeal to different students at different 
times. Contractarian approaches appeal to self-interest in finding mutually beneficial 
agreements, whereas contractual approaches focus more on the consideration of what 
might be mutually acceptable (given the existing conflict or point of difference). Discussions 
of fairness can draw on more than one approach to SCT as deliberative democracy allows 
for a plurality of conceptions of justice, similarly to a plurality of conceptions of morality. 
The second part of the chapter introduced how the practical consideration of such models 
was considerably simpler than their philosophical justification. Just as restorative 
discussions currently ask ‘How might you make this situation right?’ (i.e. repair the 
relationship), they can also ask ‘What might be a fair way to resolve this on which you can 
both agree?’ The chapter proposed how the training required to conduct such conversations 
consists of a small addition to the considerably larger undertaking of transforming schools 
into restorative cultures. Conducted alongside training on other approaches to restorative 
conversations, it is not a considerable addition, and yet may have significant results. 
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At this point, the core proposal of the thesis was complete: that the discussion of fairness in 
restorative conversations is a worthwhile addition to the existing considerations of 
restorative practice, and that Positive Behaviour for Learning is an opportune policy 
framework within which to implement it. The argument was made that such discussion of 
fairness contributes to meeting an often neglected goal of good school discipline which 
contributes to education for democratic citizenship. Chapters six to eight addressed 
seemingly strong arguments against this proposition, and in doing so developed the 
proposal in further detail. 
Chapter six addressed how certain conceptions of children and their rights might suggest 
alternative approaches to allowing children full participation in democratic discussions of 
justice in the school community. The chapter argued that labels and blunt legal definitions 
of childhood were unhelpful, and that capabilities and potential should instead be 
considered. It acknowledged that school policy cannot override national law, but that 
awareness of such limitations and consideration of their justice can be educational. Will- or 
interest-based approaches to human rights were shown to be theoretically difficult to apply 
to children, but it was suggested that considering rights as emergent from the social 
contract, and subject to democratic discussion, could be supportive of the discussions 
proposed in this thesis as opposed to being further necessary principles established outside 
of democratic structures and on different grounds. This chapter also addressed the priority 
of education for democratic citizenship — including education about secular justice — over 
the conflicting demands of any individual moral framework. Faith schools are defensible 
when they attend to the equal preparation of all children for democratic society, but neither 
they nor a parent’s will can override a child’s entitlement to development for equal 
democratic citizenship. 
Chapter seven addressed the capability of children to engage in such discussions as 
proposed here, and did so by reference both to Kohlberg’s theories of cognitive moral 
development and the empirical data gathered concerning his work. While this thesis 
defends discussions of justice as not promoting specifically moral development (as was 
Kohlberg’s understanding), his work is highly analogous to the discussions proposed here 
and supports the argument of this thesis in a number of ways. Kohlberg’s stage theory 
provides a means of assessing what individual children might perceive fairness or goodness 
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to entail, and consequently a simple reference for how to pitch discussions appropriately in 
the absence of other indicators. The data from his ‘Just Communities’ suggest that 
teenagers and teachers are capable of the reasoning proposed in this thesis, that the 
discussions suggested here may contribute to the development desired, and also that the 
current environment of PB4L may be a better fit for attempts at such education than the 
environments he originally created. 
The final chapter addressed a challenge to a core principle of the thesis — that a rational 
approach to justice is desirable. It considered the challenge from care theory as an 
alternative paradigm, and explored how the two are not necessarily incompatible. When 
Kohlberg’s theories are considered to concern justice — a rational means of adjudicating 
between opposing claims about fact or values — then they are not necessarily in 
contradiction with an approach to care that is primarily concerned with the moral domain. 
Chapter eight clarified how this does not entail privileging justice over care, rather applying 
them in different situations. This distinction helped to highlight the value of developing both 
students’ care and justice reasoning in preparation for adult life in democratic societies such 
as New Zealand. Consideration of care as well as justice also helps to address the third goal 
of good school discipline — developing the disposition to act in accordance with just 
authority. Rather than being a challenge to the argument of this thesis, care theories can 
support a plural approach to education about morality and justice, and contribute to 
restorative discussions better meeting the goals of good school discipline. 
While this thesis argues that the case for discussing fairness in restorative practices is 
strong, it is not without its limitations. Not all democratic states value the public 
deliberation of policy, either in theory or in practice. While education about justice is still 
valuable in such situations, the link between the classroom discussions proposed and 
preparation for the reality of democratic citizenship becomes weaker. There are also 
possible arguments against the value of concepts central to this thesis, such as good school 
discipline itself. The importance of fairness in conflict resolution can be denied, with 
emphasis instead placed on negative freedoms from institutions that would seek to 
interfere with the outcome of private conflicts. 
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The practical challenges faced by a proposal such as this are also considerable. This thesis 
argues for a significant addition to a current school discipline policy. Many different political 
forces are at play, and numerous parties will have different interests and investments in the 
current situation. Change takes time, and the proposal made here would require wide 
circulation, discussion, and acceptance before significant action is likely to be taken, or even 
recommended. 
This suggests an incremental approach to further action and research. A small-scale 
implementation of the restorative discussions proposed here would provide the opportunity 
not only to collect data — a valuable complement to the theoretical arguments and thought 
experiments constructed here — but also to experiment with different ways of structuring 
these conversations. This would enable the construction of recommended templates for 
discussions of fairness similar to those already in the training material for restorative 
practices. There is also scope for the theoretical development of the ideas explored here. It 
may be possible to mount a robust defence of such discussions of fairness for other models 
of government or environments that are not fully secular or morally plural. Such societies 
can still value developing the understanding of fairness, even if certain communities may 
desire particular moral values to be considered beyond the scope of democratic debate. It is 
certainly possible to argue that not every aspect of justice and conflict resolution should be 
open to classroom discussion. Strong paternalist arguments exist that there are benefits to 
protecting children from the full consideration of certain harsh realities. The extension to 
restorative practices proposed here might also change the compatibility of such systems 
with particular theories of learning. Exploring the connections between extended 
restorative discipline and specific learning theories may prove a worthwhile avenue of 
research. 
The argument presented in this thesis also has broader implications for policy and policy 
discussions beyond the domain of school discipline. The value of the rational and the 
contrasting limitations of subjective beliefs and ideologies are not strongly emphasised in 
parliamentary discussions. Political debate often features the advocacy of specific ideologies 
rather than the recognition of difference and the search for fair rational compromise. An 
eventual outcome of developing citizens’ awareness of the value of fairness and co-
operation over moral difference may be to improve the attention given to such rational 
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compromise in public debate. The discussion of faith schools in chapter six, and children’s 
rights to an education that prepares them as well as possible for equal participation in adult 
democratic society, also suggest a review of legislation concerning the acceptable limits of 
teaching particular approaches to morality. Communities should not be permitted to 
provide an education that upholds particular moral values at the cost of restricting 
children’s development for full and equal participation in democratic adult life. 
This thesis also has implications for classroom practice outside of restorative environments. 
It argues for a clear conception of what good school discipline involves, and how good 
classroom management can support this but is inadequate on its own. Transmitting this 
understanding to teachers in their training and ongoing professional development may 
encourage attention to social education as well as the maintenance of order even outside of 
specifically restorative communities. 
Restorative practice is an excellent approach to school discipline, and Positive Behaviour for 
Learning appears a promising policy for supporting its effective implementation. PB4L is 
theoretically well-grounded, and its adoption provides a significant opportunity for 
implementing the addition to restorative discussions described here — especially given that 
the most demanding requirements of the changes involved have already received the 
financial commitment of the Ministry of Education. There is scope for an extension to 
restorative discussions which is potentially of significant benefit yet requires only 
comparatively small changes in practice. Greater consideration of fairness as well as the 
restoration of relationships could better enable restorative practices to meet the three goals 





Acorn, A. E. (2004). Compulsory compassion: A critique of restorative justice. Vancouver: 
UBC Press. 
Adair, V., Dixon, R., New Zealand Ministry of Education Research Division, & Auckland 
UniServices. (2000). Evaluation of the restorative conference pilot project: Final 
report. Wellington, N.Z.: Ministry of Education, Research Division. 
Agosta, L. (n.d.). Empathy and sympathy in ethics. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/emp-symp/#SH3a 
Albert, L. (1989). A teacher’s guide to cooperative discipline: How to manage your classroom 
and promote self-esteem. Circle Pines, Minn.: American Guidance Service. 
American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force. (2008). Are zero tolerance 
policies effective in the schools?: An evidentiary review and recommendations. 
American Psychologist, 63(9), 852–862. 
Amstutz, L. S., & Mullet, J. H. (2005). The little book of restorative discipline for schools: 
Teaching responsibility, creating caring climates. Intercourse, PA: Good Books. 
Anti-Smacking Polls : Family First NZ. (2014). Retrieved 19 June 2016, from 
https://www.familyfirst.org.nz/research/anti-smacking-polls/ 
Arbuthnot, J. B., & Faust, D. (1981). Teaching moral reasoning: Theory and practice. New 
York: Harper and Row. 
Archard, D. (2003). Children, family, and the state. Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate. 
Ariès, P. (1965). Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life (R. Baldick, Trans.). New 
York: Random House. (Original work published 1962) 
232 
 
Becker, L. C. (2005). Reciprocity, justice, and disability. Ethics, 116(1), 9–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/453150 
Bessette, J. M. (1980). American government and politics: Deliberation, democracy, and 
citizenship (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Cengage Learning. 
Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the literature. 
Psychological Bulletin, (88), 1–45. 
Blatt, M. (1969). The effects of classroom discussion on the development of moral judgment 
(PhD dissertation). University of Chicago. 
Blatt, M., & Kohlberg, L. (1975). The effects of classroom moral discussion upon children’s 
level of moral judgment. Journal of Moral Education, 4, 129–161. 
Bloom, P. (2017, February 7). Why empathy is dangerous. Retrieved from 
https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/why-empathy-is-dangerous 
Bohman, J., & Rehg, W. (2014). Jürgen Habermas. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/habermas/ 
Braithwaite, J. B. (2002). Restorative justice & responsive regulation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality through reasoning. Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA: 
Wiley Blackwell. 
Bryk, A. S., & Driscoll, M. E. (1988). The school as community: Theoretical foundations, 
contextual influences, and consequences for students and teachers. Madison: 
National Center on Effective Secondary Schools, University of Wisconsin. 
Buber, M. (2004). I and thou (R. G. Smith, Trans.). London ; New York: Continuum. (Original 
work published 1923) 
233 
 
Burton, N. (2015, May 22). Empathy vs sympathy. Retrieved 22 September 2016, from 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hide-and-seek/201505/empathy-vs-
sympathy 
Butchart, R. E., & McEwan, B. (1998). Classroom discipline in American schools: Problems 
and possibilities for democratic education. Albany: State University of New York 
Press. 
Cairns, J. (2009). Faith schools and society: Civilizing the debate. London ; New York: 
Continuum. 
Cameron, L., & Thosborne, M. (2001). Restorative justice and school discipline: Mutually 
exclusive? In Restorative Justice and Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Child discipline. (2016, May 24). In Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Child_discipline&oldid=721816280 
Chomsky, N. (1995). The minimalist program. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 
Cohen, H. (1980). Equal rights for children. Totowa, N.J: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Cohen, J. (1989). Deliberation and democratic legitimacy. In The good polity: Normative 
analysis of the state (pp. 17–34). Oxford, UK ; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell. 
Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Fenton, E., Speicher-Dubin, B., & Lieberman, M. (1977). Secondary 
school moral discussion programmes led by social studies teachers. Journal of Moral 
Education, 6(2), 90–111. 
Cowley, S. (2006). Getting the buggers to behave. London ; New York: Continuum. 
Cudd, A. (2013). Contractarianism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 




Curwin, R., & Mendler, A. (2008). Discipline with dignity : New challenges, new solutions (3rd 
ed.). Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. 
(Original work published 1988) 
Delpit, L. (1995). Other people’s children: Cultural conflict in the classroom. New York: The 
New Press. 
DeVries, R., & Zan, B. (1994). Moral classrooms, moral children: Creating a constructivist 
atmosphere in early education. New York: Teachers College Press. 
Dewey, J. (1913). Interest and effort in education. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press. 
Diamond, L. J. (2016). In search of democracy. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Discipline. (2016). Retrieved from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/discipline?s=ts 
Dreikurs, R., Cassell, P., & Kehoe, D. (1972). Discipline without tears. New York: Penguin. 
Dreikurs, R., Grunwald, B. B., & Pepper, F. C. (1998). Maintaining sanity in the classroom: 
Classroom management techniques (2nd ed.). Washington, D.C. ; Bristol, PA: 
Accelerated Development ; Distribution office, Taylor & Francis. 
Drewery, W. (2007). Restorative practices in schools: Far-reaching implications. 
Durkheim, E. (1961). Moral education: A study in the theory and application of the sociology 
of education. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. (Original work published 
1925) 
Ellis, S., & Tod, J. (2009). Behaviour for learning: Proactive approaches to behaviour 
management. London ; New York, NY: Routledge. 




Empathy vs Sympathy - Difference and Comparison | Diffen. (n.d.). Retrieved 22 September 
2016, from http://www.diffen.com/difference/Empathy_vs_Sympathy 
Empathy vs. sympathy - Grammarist. (n.d.). Retrieved 22 September 2016, from 
http://grammarist.com/usage/empathy-sympathy/ 
empathy vs. sympathy : Choose Your Words : Vocabulary.com. (n.d.). Retrieved 22 
September 2016, from 
https://www.vocabulary.com/articles/chooseyourwords/empathy-sympathy/ 
Empathy vs. Sympathy: What’s the Difference? - Writing Explained. (n.d.). Retrieved 22 
September 2016, from http://writingexplained.org/empathy-vs-sympathy-difference 
Evertson, C. M., & Weinstein, C. S. (2006). Handbook of classroom management : Research, 
practice, and contemporary issues. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Experts: Ebola Vaccine At Least 50 White People Away. (2014, July 30). Retrieved 22 
September 2016, from http://www.theonion.com/article/experts-ebola-vaccine-at-
least-50-white-people-awa-36580 
Farson, R. E. (1974). Birthrights. New York: Macmillan. 
Feyerabend, P. (1987). Farewell to reason. London ; New York: Verso. 
Feyerabend, P. (1993). Against method (3rd ed.). London ; New York: Verso. 
Fishkin, J. S. (2011). When the people speak: Deliberative democracy and public consultation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Foot, P. (1967). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect. Oxford Review, 
(5), 5–15. 
Foucault, M. (1995). Discipline and punish : The birth of the prison (2nd Vintage Books ed.). 
New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1975) 
236 
 
Freire, P. (2000). Pedagogy of the oppressed (30th anniversary ed.). New York: Continuum. 
(Original work published 1968) 
Galbraith, R. E., & Jones, T. M. (1976). Moral reasoning: A teaching handbook for adapting 
Kohlberg to the classroom. Minneapolis: Greenhaven Press. 
Gathercoal, F. (1993). Judicious discipline. San Francisco: Caddo Gap Press. 
Gauthier, D. (1986). Morals by agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Gibbs, J. C. (2014). Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg, 
Hoffman, and Haidt (3rd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., Grime, R. L., & Snarey, J. R. (2007). Moral judgment development 
across cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg’s universality claims. Developmental Review, 
27(4), 443–500. 
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (UKHL 7 17 October 1985). 
Retrieved from http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1985/7.html 
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Ginott, H. G. (1972). Teacher and child: A book for parents and teachers. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Goldacre, B. (2013). Building evidence into education. Retrieved from 
http://media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/pdf/b/ben%20goldacre%20paper.pdf 
Goodenow, C. (1993). Classroom belonging among early adolescent students: Relationships 
to motivation and achievement. Journal of Early Adolescence, (13), 21–43. 




Goslin, D. A. (Ed.). (1969). Handbook of socialization theory and research (3rd ed.). Chicago, 
Ill.: Rand McNally. 
Gutmann, A. (1999). Democratic education. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
(Original work published 1987) 
Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. F. (1996). Democracy and disagreement. Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Gutmann, A., & Thompson, D. F. (2004). Why deliberative democracy? Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Habermas, J., & McCarthy, T. (1984). Reason and the rationalization of society. Boston: 
Beacon Press. 
Hartshorne, H., & May, M. (1928). Studies in the nature of character (Vols. 1–3). New York: 
Macmillan. 
Held, V. (1993). Feminist morality: Transforming culture, society, and politics. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan (Rev. student Ed.). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice. 
Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Holt, J. (1974). Escape from childhood: The needs and rights of children. Mdx., England: 
Penguin. 
Hook, P., & Vass, A. (2002). Teaching with influence. London: David Fulton. 




Hume, D. (2009). A treatise of human nature. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. (Original work 
published 1738) 
Jackson, P. W., Boostrom, R., & Hansen, D. T. (1993). The moral life of schools. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Johnstone, G., & Van Ness, D. W. (Eds.). (2007). Handbook of restorative justice. 
Cullompton ; Portland, Or: Willan. 
Kagan, S., Kyle, P. B., & Scott, S. (2004). Win-win discipline: Strategies for all discipline 
problems. San Clemente, CA: Kagan Publishing. 
Kane, J., Lloyd, G., McCluskey, G., Stead, J., Riddell, S., & Weedon, E. (2007). Restorative 
practices in three Scottish councils: Evaluation of pilot projects 2004-2006. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Executive. 
Key competencies / Kia ora - NZ Curriculum Online. (n.d.). Retrieved 3 May 2016, from 
http://nzcurriculum.tki.org.nz/Key-competencies 
Kohlberg, L., & Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development: The nature and 
validity of moral stages (1st ed.). San Francisco: Harper & Row. 
Kohn, A. (1996). Beyond discipline : From compliance to community. Alexandria, VA: 
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. 
Kolodny, N. (2005). Why be rational? Mind, (114), 509–63. 
Kounin, J. S. (1970). Discipline and group management in classrooms. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
Lee Canter & Associates, & Canter, M. (1993). The new and revised assertive discipline. Santa 
Monica, CA ; Hong Kong: Lee Canter & Associates ; Sinostar [distributor]. 
Lewis, R. (1997). The discipline dilemma: Control, management, influence. Camberwell, Mel.: 
Australian Council for Educational Research. 
239 
 
Locke, J. (1988). Two treatises of government (Student ed.). Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1689) 
Macfarlane, A. H., & New Zealand Council for Educational Research. (2007). Discipline, 
democracy and diversity : Working with students with behaviour difficulties. 
Wellington, N.Z.: NZCER Press. 
Macfarlane, S., Macfarlane, A. H., & Margrain, V. (2011). Restoring the individual. In 
Responsive pedagogy: Engaging restoratively with challenging behaviour. 
Wellington, N.Z.: NZCER Press. 
MacRae, A., & Zehr, H. (2011). Righting wrongs the Maori way. YES! Magazine. Retrieved 
from http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/beyond-prisons/righting-wrongs-the-
maori-way 
Margrain, V., & Macfarlane, A. H. (Eds.). (2011). Responsive pedagogy : Engaging 
restoratively with challenging behaviour. Wellington, N.Z.: NZCER Press. 
Marland, M. (1993). Craft of the classroom : A survival guide to classroom management in 
the secondary school. London: Heinemann Educational. 
Marshall, J., & Marshall, D. (1997). Discipline and punishment in New Zealand education. 
Palmerston North, N.Z.: Dunmore Press. 
Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class. (T. Bottomore, Ed.). London: Pluto Press. 
McDonald, T. (2013). Classroom management: Engaging students in learning (2nd ed.). 
South Melbourne, Vic.: Oxford University Press. 
Meyer, L. H., & Evans, I. M. (2012a). The school leader’s guide to restorative school 
discipline. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Corwin Press. 
Meyer, L. H., & Evans, I. M. (2012b). The teacher’s guide to restorative classroom discipline. 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Corwin Press. 
240 
 
Ministry of Education, New Zealand. (2007). The New Zealand Curriculum for English- 
medium teaching and learning in years 1-13. Wellington, N.Z.: Learning Media. 
Ministry of Education, New Zealand. (2012). Positive Behaviour for Learning update 2012. 
Retrieved 11 June 2016, from 
http://www.education.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Ministry/consultations/Residentia
l-Special-Schools-consultation/PB4LActionPlan-2012.pdf 
Ministry of Education, New Zealand. (2013). Positive Behaviour for Learning update 2013. 
Ministry of Education, New Zealand. (2014). Restorative practice kete book one. Retrieved 
11 June 2016, from 
http://pb4l.tki.org.nz/content/download/304/1385/file/Restorative%20Practice%20
Book%20One.pdf 
Modgil, S., Modgil, C., & Kohlberg, L. (Eds.). (1986). Lawrence Kohlberg, consensus and 
controversy. Philadelphia: Falmer Press. 
Moncrieffe, J., & Eyben, R. (Eds.). (2007). The power of labelling: How people are categorized 
and why it matters. London ; Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
Munsey, B. (Ed.). (1980). Moral development, moral education, and Kohlberg. Birmingham, 
Alabama: Religious Education Press. 
Nelsen, J., Lott, L., & Glenn, H. S. (2007). Positive discipline A-Z: 1001 solutions to everyday 
parenting problems (completely revised and expanded 3rd ed.). New York: Three 
Rivers Press. 
Niccol, A. (Writer and Director). (1997). Gattaca [Motion picture]. United States: Columbia 
Pictures. 
Noblit, G. W. (1993). Power and caring. American Educational Research Journal, (30), 23–38. 
241 
 
Noddings, N. (1992). The challenge to care in school: An alternative approach to education. 
New York [etc.]: Teachers College Press. 
Noddings, N. (2002a). Educating moral people: A caring alternative to character education. 
New York: Teachers College Press. 
Noddings, N. (2002b). Starting at home: Caring and social policy. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Noddings, N. (2013). Caring: A relational approach to ethics and moral education. Retrieved 
from http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1342614 
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York: Basic Books. 
Nucci, L. P. (2009). Nice is not enough: Facilitating moral development. Upper Saddle River, 
N.J.: Merrill/Prentice Hall. 
Okin, S. M. (1998). Justice, gender, and the family. New York: Basic Books. (Original work 
published 1989) 
Olsen, B., & Sexton, D. (2009). Threat rigidity, school reform, and how teachers view their 
work inside the current education policy contexts. American Educational Research 
Journal, 46(1), 9–44. 
Opinion: Anti-smacking law still fails children. (2015). Retrieved 19 June 2016, from 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/comment/70480975/opinion-antismacking-
law-still-fails-children 
Oser, F. K. (1990). Kohlberg’s educational legacy. New Directions for Child and Adolescent 
Development, 1990(47), 81–87. 
Osler, A., & Starkey, H. (2006). Education for democratic citizenship: A review of research, 
policy and practice 1995-2005. Research Papers in Education, 24, 433–466. 
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
242 
 
Parfit, D. (2003). Justifiability to each person. Ratio, (16), 368–370. 
Parfit, D. (2011). On what matters (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning. (n.d.). Retrieved 28 
May 2016, from http://pb4l.tki.org.nz/PB4L-Restorative-Practice 
Peters, M., Britton, A., & Blee, H. (Eds.). (2008). Global citizenship education: Philosophy, 
theory and pedagogy. Rotterdam: Sense Publ. 
Peters, R. S. (1970). Ethics and education (New ed.). London: Allen and Unwin. 
Peters, R. S. (1976). The concept of education. London: Routledge & Kegan. 
Piaget, J. (1977). The origin of intelligence in the child. (M. Cook, Trans.). Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
Pinker, S. (2011). The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined. New York: 
Viking. 
Power, F. C., & Higgins-D’Alessandro, A. (2008). The Just Community approach to moral 
education and the moral atmosphere of the school. In Handbook of Moral and 
Character Education (pp. 230–247). New York: Routledge. 
Prichard, H. A. (1912). Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Mind, (21), 21–37. 
Rawls, J. (2000). A theory of justice. (Rev. ed., 2nd print.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap. (Original 
work published 1971) 
Rawls, J. (2005). Political liberalism (Expanded ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. 
Reimer, J., Hersch, R. H., & Paolitto, D. P. (1983). Promoting moral growth: From Piaget to 
Kohlberg (2nd ed.). New York: Longman. 
Rest, J. R., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M. J., & Thoma, S. J. (1999). Postconventional moral 
thinking: A neo-Kohlbergian approach. Mahwah, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates. 
243 
 
Restorative Practice Kete Book Three / PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive 
Behaviour for Learning. (n.d.). Retrieved 11 June 2016, from 
http://pb4l.tki.org.nz/PB4L-Restorative-Practice/Restorative-Practice-Kete-Book-
Three 
Restorative Practice Kete Book Two / PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive 
Behaviour for Learning. (n.d.). Retrieved 28 May 2016, from 
http://pb4l.tki.org.nz/PB4L-Restorative-Practice/Restorative-Practice-Kete-Book-Two 
Roberts, P., & Freeman-Moir, J. (2013). Better worlds: Education, art, and utopia. Lanham: 
Lexington Books. 
Rousseau, J.-J. (1979). Emile: or, On education. New York: Basic Books. (Original work 
published 1763) 
Rousseau, J.-J. (2009). The social contract: or, Principles of political right. Washington, D.C. ; 
New York: Regnery Pub. ; Distributed to the trade by Perseus Distribution. 
Russ, G. (1993). Through the eyes of a child, ‘Gregory K.’: A child’s right to be heard. Family 
Law Quarterly, 27(3), 365–394. 
Sandel, M. J. (1998). Liberalism and the limits of justice (2nd ed.). Cambridge, UK ; New York: 
Cambridge Universtiy Press. 
Sanger, M. (2012). The schizophrenia of contemporary education and the moral work of 
teaching. Curriculum Inquiry, 42(2), 285–307. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
873X.2012.00590.x 
Scanlon, T. (1998). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press. 
Scarlett, W. (2009). Approaches to behavior and classroom management: Integrating 
discipline and care. Los Angeles: Sage. 
244 
 
Scheffler, I. (2010). In praise of the cognitive emotions and other essays in the philosophy of 
education. New York: Routledge. 
Sellman, E., Cremin, H., & McCluskey, G. (Eds.). (2013). Restorative approaches to conflict in 
schools: Interdisciplinary perspectives on whole school approaches to managing 
relationships. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press. 
Siegel, H. (1988). Educating reason: Rationality, critical thinking and education. New York: 
Routledge. 
Siegel, H. (Ed.). (2009). The Oxford handbook of philosophy of education. Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Siegel, H. (2012). Education as initiation into the space of reasons. Theory and Research in 
Education, 10(2), 191–202. 
Singer, P. (2011). Practical ethics (3rd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Slote, M. (2007). The ethics of care and empathy. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Slote, M. (2009). Caring, empathy, and moral education. In The Oxford handbook of 
philosophy of education (pp. 211–226). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Slote, M. (2010). Moral sentimentalism. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, A. (1976). The Glasgow edition of the works and correspondence of Adam Smith. 
Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press. 
Smith, A. (2000). The theory of moral sentiments. Amherst (N.Y.): Prometheus Books. 
(Original work published 1759) 
Snook, I. (2003). The ethical teacher. Palmerston North, N.Z.: Dunmore Press. 
245 
 
Sockett, H., & LePage, P. (2002). The missing language of the classroom. Teaching and 
Teacher Education, 18(2), 159–171. 
Southwood, N. (2008). Vindicating the normativity of rationality. Ethics, (119), 9–30. 
Spanking Can Be an Appropriate Form of Child Discipline | TIME. (2014). Retrieved 19 June 
2016, from http://time.com/3387226/spanking-can-be-an-appropriate-form-of-
child-discipline/ 
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and cognition (2nd ed.). Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Stephens, R. (2015, May 7). The data that threatened to break physics. Retrieved 26 May 
2016, from http://nautil.us/issue/24/error/the-data-that-threatened-to-break-
physics 
Straughan, R. (1986). Why act on Kohlberg’s moral judgments? (Or how to reach stage 6 and 
remain a bastard). In Lawrence Kohlberg, consensus and controversy (pp. 149–57). 
Philadelphia and London: The Falmer Press. 
Support material / PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning. 
(n.d.). Retrieved 4 May 2016, from http://pb4l.tki.org.nz/PB4L-Restorative-
Practice/Support-material2 
Swanson, C. G. (2009). Restorative justice in a prison community: Or everything I didn’t learn 
in kindergarten I learned in prison. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Taurek, J. (1977). Should the numbers count? Philosophy and Public Affairs, (6), 293–316. 
The Restorative Practices Development Team. (2004). Restorative practices in schools: A 
resource. Hamilton, N.Z.: School of Education, University of Waikato. 




Titchner, E. B. (1909). Lectures on the experimental psychology of the thought-processes. 
New York: Macmillan. 
Trickey, S. (2007, June 17–21). Promoting social and cognitive development in schools: An 
evaluation of ‘Thinking through Philosophy’. Paper presented at the 13th 
International Conference on Thinking, Norrköping, Sweden. Retrieved from 
http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp/021/vol1/026/ecp2107026.pdf 
Tronto, J. C. (1993). Moral boundaries: A political argument for an ethic of care. New York: 
Routledge. 
Turiel, E. (1974). Conflict and transition in adolescent moral development. Child 
Development, 45(1), 14–29. 
UN General Assembly. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 A (III). Retrieved 
from http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ 
UN General Assembly. (1989). Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations, Treaty 
Series, 1577, 3. 
Vaughan, M., & Brighouse, T. (Eds.). (2006). Summerhill and A. S. Neill. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press. 
Walker, L. J. (1982). The sequentiality of Kohlberg’s stages of moral development. Child 
Development, 53, 1330–1336. 
Wasserman, E. R. (1976). Implementing Kohlberg’s ‘Just Community’ concept in an 
alternative high school. Social Education, 40(4), 203–207. 
Watson, M., & Battistich, V. (2006). Building and sustaining caring communities. In 
Handbook of classroom management : Research, practice, and contemporary issues 
(pp. 253–279). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
247 
 
Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning. (n.d.). Retrieved 28 May 2016, from 
http://pb4l.tki.org.nz/ 
What is involved? / PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive Behaviour for Learning. 
(n.d.). Retrieved 11 June 2016, from http://pb4l.tki.org.nz/PB4L-Restorative-
Practice/What-is-involved 
What is PB4L Restorative Practice? / PB4L Restorative Practice / Welcome - Positive 
Behaviour for Learning. (n.d.). Retrieved 11 June 2016, from 
http://pb4l.tki.org.nz/PB4L-Restorative-Practice/What-is-PB4L-Restorative-Practice 
When Another Parent Disciplines Your Child. (2011). Retrieved 19 June 2016, from 
http://www.popsugar.com/moms/When-Another-Parent-Disciplines-Your-Child-
27331095 
Williams, B. (1981). Persons, character, and morality. In Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wilson, J. (1981). Discipline and moral education: A survey of public opinion and 
understanding. Windsor, Berks. ; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: NFER-Nelson ; Distributed 
in the USA by Humanities Press. 
Wisconsin vs. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205. 
Zalaznick, E. (1980). The just community school: A student perspective. Moral Education 
Forum, (5), 27–35. 
Zammit, L. (2001, October 10–13). Restorative justice: Building schools’ capacities. Paper 
presented at the Association for Conflict Resolution, Toronto, Canada. 
Zehr, H. (2002). The little book of restorative justice. Intercourse, PA: Good Books. 
 
